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The	  best	  of	  science	  doesn’t	  consist	  of	  mathematical	  models	  and	  experiments,	  as	  textbooks	  make	  
it	  seem.	  Those	  come	  later.	  It	  springs	  fresh	  from	  a	  more	  primitive	  mode	  of	  thought	  when	  the	  
hunter’s	  mind	  weaves	  ideas	  from	  old	  facts	  and	  fresh	  metaphors	  and	  the	  scrambled	  crazy	  images	  
of	  things	  recently	  seen.	  To	  move	  forward	  is	  to	  concoct	  new	  patterns	  of	  thought,	  which	  in	  turn	  
dictate	  the	  design	  of	  models	  and	  experiments.	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Note:	   This	   White	   Paper	   is	   not	   a	   concise	   report	   on	   the	   research	   program	   we	   seek	   to	   elaborate	   in	  
INBIOSA.	   It	   has	   been	   conceived	   as	   a	   'living'	   document,	   progressively	   developed	   along	   the	  months	   by	  
discussions	  among	  scientists	  with	  differing	   formations	  and	  states	  of	  mind.	  We	  have	  chosen	  to	  respect	  
their	  personalities,	  at	  the	  risk	  of	  some	  lack	  of	  homogeneity	  and	  repetitions	  between	  different	  passages.	  
Also,	  incompleteness,	  inconsistences	  and	  antagonisms	  could	  not	  be	  completely	  avoided.	  	  
	  
This	  document	  is	  not	  intended	  to	  question	  the	  goals	  or	  the	  validity	  of	  Systems	  Biology	  or	  its	  approaches.	  
However,	   it	   is	  necessary	  to	  clearly	  differentiate	  what	  our	  Integral	  Biomathics	  community	   is	  attempting	  









1.	  Preamble	  ..............................................................................................................................	  10	  
2.	  Introduction	  ..........................................................................................................................	  11	  
3.	  Motivation	  ............................................................................................................................	  13	  
5.	  Issues	  Affecting	  Integral	  Biomathics	  .....................................................................................	  25	  
5.1	  Complementarity	  ............................................................................................................	  25	  
5.2	  Scale	  and	  Hyperscale	  ......................................................................................................	  26	  
5.3	  Class	  Identity	  vs.	  Individual	  Identity	  ...............................................................................	  29	  
5.4	  First	  Person	  Perspective	  .................................................................................................	  30	  
5.5	  Biological	  Time	  ................................................................................................................	  31	  
5.6	  Memory	  ..........................................................................................................................	  34	  
5.7	  Vagueness	  .......................................................................................................................	  35	  
5.8	  Quantum	  Effects	  in	  Biology	  ............................................................................................	  35	  
5.9	  Biotic	  vs.	  Abiotic	  Systems	  ...............................................................................................	  37	  
6.	  The	  Grand	  Challenge	  ............................................................................................................	  38	  
6.1	  The	  Relevance	  of	  Complexity	  to	  the	  Problems	  of	  Science	  ..............................................	  39	  
6.2	  The	  Radical	  Paradigm	  .....................................................................................................	  41	  
6.2.1	  A	  New	  Trajectory:	  Towards	  Theoretical	  Foundations	  for	  Biology	  ...............................	  41	  
6.3	  Institutionalizing	  the	  Lessons	  of	  the	  First	  Scientific	  Revolution	  .....................................	  45	  
6.4	  A	  New	  Strategic	  Collaboration	  Framework	  ....................................................................	  46	  
7.	  Towards	  a	  General	  Theory	  of	  Living	  Systems	  (GTLS)	  ............................................................	  49	  
7.1	  Objective	  .........................................................................................................................	  49	  
7.2	  Background	  .....................................................................................................................	  49	  
7.3	  The	  Road	  Ahead	  ..............................................................................................................	  52	  
7.4	  The	  Junctions	  ..................................................................................................................	  54	  
7.5	  What	  Can	  We	  Do	  Now?	  ..................................................................................................	  58	  
7.6	  A	  Unifying	  Formal	  Framework	  ........................................................................................	  64	  





8.	  Initial	  GTLS	  Application	  Domains	  ..........................................................................................	  68	  
8.1	  Fusing	  the	  Different	  Levels	  of	  Brain/Mind	  Modeling	  .....................................................	  68	  
8.2	  Scale-­‐free	  Dynamics	  .......................................................................................................	  69	  
8.3	  The	  Model	  MENS	  ............................................................................................................	  70	  
8.4	  Application	  to	  Complex	  Event	  Processing.	  A	  Theory	  of	  Aging	  ........................................	  70	  
9.	  The	  GTLS	  Test	  Cases	  .............................................................................................................	  71	  
9.1	  WLIMES	  ...........................................................................................................................	  71	  
9.2	  Hyper-­‐B	  ...........................................................................................................................	  73	  
9.3	  Morphogenesis	  ...............................................................................................................	  74	  
10.	  Call	  to	  Action	  ......................................................................................................................	  75	  
10.1	  The	  Case	  for	  Transformative	  Research	  in	  Biology	  ........................................................	  75	  
10.2	  The	  Threat	  to	  the	  Certainities	  of	  Continuing	  Progress	  .................................................	  76	  
10.3	  The	  Intellectual	  Challenge	  of	  the	  Complexity	  Complexity	  ............................................	  77	  
10.4	  Programmatic	  Advance	  in	  Theoretical	  Research	  ..........................................................	  78	  
10.5	  A	  New	  Framework	  for	  Mathematics	  and	  Computation	  ...............................................	  79	  



















Executive	  Summary	  	  
	  
The	   INBIOSA	  project	  brings	   together	  a	   group	  of	  experts	   across	  many	  
disciplines	   who	   believe	   that	   science	   requires	   a	   revolutionary	  
transformative	  step	  in	  order	  to	  address	  many	  of	  the	  vexing	  challenges	  
presented	  by	  the	  world.	  It	  is	  INBIOSA’s	  purpose	  to	  enable	  the	  focused	  
collaboration	  of	  an	  interdisciplinary	  community	  of	  original	  thinkers.	  
	  
This	   paper	   sets	   out	   the	   case	   for	   support	   for	   this	   effort.	   The	   focus	  of	  
the	   transformative	   research	   program	  proposal	   is	   biology-­‐centric.	  We	  
admit	   that	   biology	   to	   date	   has	   been	   more	   fact-­‐oriented	   and	   less	  
theoretical	   than	   physics.	   However,	   the	   key	   leverageable	   idea	   is	   that	  
careful	   extension	   of	   the	   science	   of	   living	   systems	   can	   be	   more	  
effectively	  applied	  to	  some	  of	  our	  most	  vexing	  modern	  problems	  than	  
the	   prevailing	   scheme,	   derived	   from	   abstractions	   in	   physics.	   While	  
these	   have	   some	   universal	   application	   and	   demonstrate	  
computational	   advantages,	   they	   are	   not	   theoretically	   mandated	   for	  
the	   living.	   A	   new	   set	   of	   mathematical	   abstractions	   derived	   from	  
biology	   can	   now	   be	   similarly	   extended.	   This	   is	   made	   possible	   by	  
leveraging	   new	   formal	   tools	   to	   understand	   abstraction	   and	   enable	  
computability.	   [The	   latter	   has	   a	   much	   expanded	   meaning	   in	   our	  
context	   from	   the	   one	   known	   and	   used	   in	   computer	   science	   and	  
biology	   today,	   that	   is	   "by	   rote	   algorithmic	   means",	   since	   it	   is	   not	  
known	   if	   a	   living	   system	   is	   computable	   in	   this	   sense	   (Mossio	   et	   al.,	  
2009).]	  	  Two	  major	  challenges	  constitute	  the	  effort.	  
	  
The	   first	   challenge	   is	   to	   design	   an	   original	   general	   system	   of	  
abstractions	   within	   the	   biological	   domain.	   The	   initial	   issue	   is	  
descriptive	   leading	   to	   the	   explanatory.	   There	   has	   not	   yet	   been	   a	  
serious	   formal	   examination	   of	   the	   abstractions	   of	   the	   biological	  
domain.	  What	   is	   used	   today	   is	   an	   amalgam;	  much	   is	   inherited	   from	  
physics	   (via	   the	   bridging	   abstractions	   of	   chemistry)	   and	   there	   are	  
many	  new	  abstractions	  from	  advances	  in	  mathematics	  (incentivized	  by	  
the	  need	  for	  more	  capable	  computational	  analyses).	   Interspersed	  are	  
abstractions,	  concepts	  and	  underlying	  assumptions	  “native”	  to	  biology	  
and	  distinct	  from	  the	  mechanical	  language	  of	  physics	  and	  computation	  
as	  we	  know	  them.	  A	  pressing	  agenda	  should	  be	  to	  single	  out	  the	  most	  
concrete	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  the	  most	  fundamental	  process-­‐units	  in	  
biology	   and	   to	   recruit	   them	   into	   the	   descriptive	   domain.	   Therefore,	  
the	  first	  challenge	  is	  to	  build	  a	  coherent	  formal	  system	  of	  abstractions	  






We	  still	  know	  little	  about	  how	  the	  
world	  works,	  and	  these	  limits	  are	  
acknowledged	  in	  our	  emergent	  
biological	  systems	  and	  in	  the	  
frontiers	  of	  astrophysics.	  A	  new	  
mathematical	  foundation	  could	  
punch	  through	  those	  barriers	  and	  




The	  reason	  that	  biology	  has	  failed	  to	  
develop	  a	  viable	  set	  of	  mathematical	  
methods	  appropriate	  to	  solving	  its	  
problems	  is	  that	  we	  have	  relied	  too	  
long	  on	  mathematics	  developed	  to	  




The	  goal	  of	  the	  INBIOSA	  project	  is	  to	  
devise	  a	  long	  term	  research	  program	  
for	  naturalistic	  biocomputation	  
based	  on	  a	  general	  theory	  of	  
entangled	  coherent	  complex	  
systems,	  both	  living	  and	  non-­‐living	  
ones,	  from	  quantum	  computers	  to	  
the	  human	  brain.	  	  
	  
	  
We	  focus	  on	  an	  integral/wholist,	  
approach	  to	  dynamic,	  ordered,	  
layered	  systems	  and	  on	  the	  
development	  of	  their	  emergent	  
properties	  and	  structure.	  	  At	  its	  core	  
is	  a	  set	  of	  principles,	  “axioms	  of	  life”	  
upon	  which	  we	  build	  a	  testable	  
formal	  theory.	  	  
	  
We	  use	  both,	  a	  top	  down	  and	  
bottom-­‐up	  approach,	  modeling	  
natural	  behaviours	  from	  the	  simplest	  












Nothing	   will	   be	   thrown	   away,	   but	   many	   common	   methods	   will	   be	  
philosophically	   recast,	   just	   as	   in	   physics	   relativity	   subsumed	   and	  
reinterpreted	  Newtonian	  mechanics.	  This	  step	  is	  required	  because	  we	  
need	   a	   comprehensible,	   formal	   system	   to	   apply	   in	   many	   domains.	  
Emphasis	   should	   be	   placed	   on	   the	   distinction	   between	   multi-­‐
perspective	   analysis	   and	   synthesis	   and	   on	   what	   could	   be	   the	   basic	  
terms	  or	  tools	  needed.	  
	  
The	  second	  challenge	  is	  relatively	  simple:	  the	  actual	  application	  of	  this	  
set	  of	  biology-­‐centric	  ways	  and	  means	  to	  cross-­‐disciplinary	  problems.	  
In	  its	  early	  stages,	  this	  will	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  “new	  science”.	  
	  
This	   White	   Paper	   sets	   out	   the	   case	   of	   continuing	   support	   of	  
Information	   and	   Communication	   Technology	   (ICT)	   for	   transformative	  
research	  in	  biology	  and	  information	  processing	  centered	  on	  paradigm	  
changes	   in	   the	   epistemological,	   ontological,	   mathematical	   and	  
computational	  bases	  of	  the	  science	  of	  living	  systems.	  Today,	  curiously,	  
living	   systems	   cannot	   be	   said	   to	   be	   anything	   more	   than	   dissipative	  
structures	   organized	   internally	   by	   genetic	   information.	   There	   is	   not	  
anything	   substantially	   different	   from	   abiotic	   systems	   other	   than	   the	  
empirical	  nature	  of	  their	  robustness.	  We	  believe	  that	  there	  are	  other	  
new	  and	  unique	  properties	   and	  patterns	   comprehensible	   at	   this	  bio-­‐
logical	   level.	   The	   report	   lays	  out	  a	   fundamental	   set	  of	  approaches	   to	  
articulate	  these	  properties	  and	  patterns,	  and	   is	  composed	  as	  follows.	  
Sections	   1	   through	   4	   (preamble,	   introduction,	  motivation	   and	  major	  
biomathematical	   problems)	   are	   incipient.	   Section	   5	   describes	   the	  
issues	  affecting	  Integral	  Biomathics	  and	  Section	  6	  -­‐-­‐	  the	  aspects	  of	  the	  
Grand	  Challenge	  we	  face	  with	  this	  project.	  Section	  7	  contemplates	  the	  
effort	   to	   formalize	   a	   General	   Theory	   of	   Living	   Systems	   (GTLS)	   from	  
what	  we	  have	  today.	  The	  goal	   is	   to	  have	  a	   formal	  system,	  equivalent	  
to	  that	  which	  exists	  in	  the	  physics	  community.	  Here	  we	  define	  how	  to	  
perceive	   the	   role	   of	   time	   in	   biology.	   Section	   8	   describes	   the	   initial	  
efforts	  to	  apply	  this	  general	  theory	  of	  living	  systems	  in	  many	  domains,	  
with	   special	   emphasis	   on	   cross-­‐disciplinary	   problems	   and	   multiple	  
domains	   spanning	   both	   “hard”	   and	   “soft”	   sciences.	   The	   expected	  
result	  is	  a	  coherent	  collection	  of	  integrated	  mathematical	  techniques.	  
Section	   9	  discusses	   the	   first	   two	  test	  cases,	  project	  proposals,	  of	  our	  
approach.	   They	   are	   designed	   to	   demonstrate	   the	   ability	   of	   our	  
approach	   to	   address	   “wicked	   problems”	   which	   span	   across	   physics,	  
chemistry,	   biology,	   societies	   and	   societal	   dynamics.	   The	   solutions	  
require	   integrated	   measurable	   results	   at	   multiple	   levels	   known	   as	  
“grand	  challenges”	  to	  existing	  methods.	  Finally,	  Section	  10	  adheres	  to	  
an	   appeal	   for	   action,	   advocating	   the	   necessity	   for	   further	   long-­‐term	  
support	  of	  the	  INBIOSA	  program.	  	  
	  
	  
There	  are	  problems	  (in	  biology)	  at	  
the	  intersections	  of	  
reductionism/holism	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  
the	  dichotomies	  that	  can	  be	  
reformulated	  so	  as	  not	  to	  be	  




What	  we	  lack	  is	  a	  uniquely	  
developmental	  mathematics	  that	  
deals	  with	  the	  emergence	  of	  
organization	  from	  non-­‐random	  
selection	  among	  replicating	  
variations	  within	  complex	  
populations	  of	  living	  entities.	  
	  
	  
The	  first	  challenge	  is	  to	  build	  a	  
coherent	  formal	  system	  of	  
abstractions	  and	  operations	  that	  is	  






v Can	  we	  explore	  the	  
principles	  and	  understand	  
the	  meaning	  of	  multilevel	  
living	  systems	  by	  extracting	  
and	  developing	  the	  means	  of	  
a	  new	  native	  
biomathematics	  and	  
biocomputation	  (biological	  
information	  processing)?	  	  
	  
	  
v Can	  we	  take	  models	  	  and	  
logic	  of	  quantum	  
entanglement	  and	  
superposition	  and	  apply	  
them	  to	  biology	  and,	  vice	  
versa,	  can	  we	  use	  models	  of	  
integrated	  biological	  systems	  











The	  paradig 	  shift	  in	  biology	  
comparable	  to	  those	  invok d	  by	  the	  
theory	  of	  r lativity	  and	  the	  quantum	  




Org nisms	  are	  not	  machines.	  Life	  is	  
not	  a	  s ecialization,	  but	  rather	   n	  




Living	  systems	  should	   o 	  always	  be	  
modeled	  as	  physical	  systems	  are,	  
since	  the	  frontiers	  of	  living	  systems	  
ar 	  hard	  to	  defin 	  and	  are	  ch nging	  
at	  any	  time.	  
	  	  
	  
A	  living	  system	  is	  impredicative	  and	  
self-­‐referencing:	  its	  definition	  
invokes	  the	  system	  itself,	  or	  perhaps	  
another	  set	  which	  contains	  it.	  This	  is	  
what	  makes	  it	  more	  than	  a	  machine.	  	  
	  
	  
Classical	  co puting	  is	  based	  on	  
precise	  algorithmic	  procedures	  which	  
are	  immensely	  suited	  to	  mod l	  
mechanisms.	  	  This	  quality,	  however,	  
is	  exactly	  wh 	  makes	  it	  u suitable	  
to	  model	  impredic tivity,	  l fe,	  since	  a	  
consequence	  of	  impredi ativity	  is	  the	  












The	   report	   is	   concluded	   with	   preliminary	   non-­‐exclusive	   list	   of	  
challenging	   research	   themes	   to	   address,	   as	   well	   as	   required	  
administrative	  actions.	  
	  
The	   efforts	   described	   in	   the	   ten	   sections	   of	   this	   White	   Paper	   will	  
proceed	   concurrently.	   Collectively,	   they	   describe	   a	   program	   that	   can	  




Fundamental	   assumption:	   all	   natural	   objects	   and	   phenomena	   have	  
representations	   in	   the	   language	   of	  mathematics.	   Biology	   is	   a	   subject	  
concerned	   with	   the	   organization	   of	   relations.	  	   Life	   is	   not	   primarily	  
characterized	  by	   its	  underlying	  physicochemical	   structures,	  but	  by	   its	  
entailment	  relations	  –	  by	  what	  the	  physiochemical	  structures	  do,	  and	  
to	  what	  end.	  	  
	  
Organisms	  are	  not	  man-­‐made	  machines.	  	  Life	  is	  not	  a	  specialization	  of	  
engineering;	  it	  is	  an	  expansive	  generalization	  of	  engineering,	  subject	  to	  
regulations	   of	   internal	   origin.	   To	   answer	   biological	   questions,	   it	   is	  
therefore	   insufficient	   to	   follow	   the	   reductionist	   strategy	   derived	  
entirely	  from	  the	  Cartesian	  metaphor	  and	  Newtonian	  mechanics.	  Such	  
a	  ‘watchmaker’	  approach	  is	  often	  limited	  to	  breaking	  down	  a	  complex	  
entity	  into	  simpler	  pieces,	  to	  examine	  the	  pieces	  themselves,	  and	  then	  
to	  attempt	  to	  understand	  the	  organism	  from	  a	  parts-­‐only	  perspective.	  
	  
It	   is	   necessary	   to	   revive	   efforts	   to	   advance	   science	   beyond	   such	  
reductionism;	   its	   failure	   is	   due	   to	   the	   inability	   of	   a	   small	   surrogate	  
representation	   to	   exhaust	   the	   real	   world’s	   complexity.	   The	   limits	   of	  
physicochemical	  and	  mechanistic	  dogma	  are	  specific	  examples	  of	   the	  
restrictiveness	   of	   self-­‐imposed	  methodologies.	   The	   resulting	   artificial	  
‘limitations’	   on	   science	   and	   knowledge	   are	   due	   to	   the	   non-­‐generic	  
nature	  of	  the	  methods	  and	  their	  associated	  bounded	  microcosms.	  The	  
obstruction	   of	   the	   advance	   of	   science	   beyond	   such	   limitations	   is	   not	  
merely	  a	  problem	  within	  science;	  it	  has	  left	  societies	  floundering	  in	  the	  
face	  of	  what	  are	  now	  called	  ‘wicked	  problems’,	  problems	  that	  cannot	  









This	  proposal	  addresses	  the	  
fundamental	  problem	  in	  biology:	  
how	  to	  characterize	  the	  distinction	  




We	  aim	  at	  creating	  a	  discourse	  
environment	  for	  exploring	  radical	  
approaches	  to	  mathematics	  and	  
computation	  within	  biological	  
context	  with	  the	  potential	  for	  a	  
breakthrough	  and	  paradigm	  shift.	  
	  
	  
The	  understanding	  of	  living	  
processes	  has	  not	  been	  amenable	  to	  
orthodox	  mathematical	  modeling	  
and	  logic	  despite	  enormous	  




There	  could	  be	  a	  possible	  paradigm	  
change	  to	  DEVELOPMENT,	  not	  
evolution	  as	  the	  basic	  orientation	  of	  
biology.	  The	  living	  /	  non-­‐living	  gap	  
can	  never	  be	  closed	  without	  it.	  
	  
	  
A	  basic	  perspective	  opposite	  to	  the	  
‘growth	  ideology’	  of	  our	  culture	  






Classical	  computing,	  framed	  today	  in	  third	  person	  descriptions,	   is	  often	  based	  on	  unambiguous	  known	  
algorithmic	   or	   rote	   procedures;	   it	   is	   this	   lack	   of	   ambiguity	   that	  makes	   it	   precisely	   suited	   to	  modeling	  
mechanisms.	  A	   living	   system	   is	   impredicative	   and	   self-­‐referential:	   this	   is	   what	   makes	   it	   more	   than	   a	  
machine.	  	  We	  might	   call	   it	   a	   new	   variety	   of	  machine,	   perhaps	   a	   relational	  machine,	   as	   yet,	   not	   fully	  
entailed.	  The	   introduction	  of	   the	  self,	   the	  subject	   in	  addition	   to	   the	  object,	  makes	   the	  participation	  of	  
first	   person	   descriptions	   inevitable.	   The	   precision	   of	   conventional	   classical	   computing	   makes	   it	  
unsuitable	   for	   modeling	   impredicativity	   and	   its	   natural	   entailment	   of	   ambiguity.	  	   Ambiguity	   is	   by	   no	  
means	  an	   infamy:	   it	   is	  a	  great	  asset	  to	  biology	   in	   its	   redundancy,	   its	  ubiquitous	  degeneracy	  properties	  
and	   survivability.	   INBIOSA	  will	   shed	   light	  not	  only	  on	   third	  person	  descriptions	  of	  biology,	  but	  also	  on	  
first	  person	  descriptions	   for	  both	  organisms	  and	  machines.	  For	  computation	   to	  be	  a	  successful	   tool	   in	  
biology,	   it	   must	   go	   far	   beyond	   any	   strict	   limitation	   of	   currently	   known	   algorithms.	  However	   several	  
properties	   of	   living	   systems,	   including	   impredicativity	   can	   be	   computed,	   for	   instance	   by	   using	   typed	  
(polymorphic)	   programming	   languages	   (Mossio	   et	   al.,	   2009).	  While	  we	   often	   speak	   of	   “mathematics”	  





The	   goal	   of	   the	   INBIOSA	   support	   action	   is	   to	   devise	   a	   long-­‐term	   research	   program	   for	   naturalistic	  
biocomputation.	  There	  are	  two	  problematic	  areas	  in	  this	  enterprise:	  mathematical	  techniques,	  and	  their	  
ability	  to	  enable	  reflection	  on	  biological	  processes.	  Currently	  available	  mathematical	  techniques	  appear	  
to	  be	   insufficient	   to	  deal	  with	   the	  complexities	  of	  biology,	  and	  biological	  processes	  do	  not	  easily	   lend	  
themselves	  to	  traditional	  mathematical	  analysis.	  The	  central	  target	  of	  INBIOSA	  is	  to	  devise	  ways	  in	  which	  
these	   two	   initially	   independent	   domains	  may	   be	   resolved	   and	   integrated	   into	   a	   common	   framework.	  
There	   are	   a	   number	   of	   different	   regimes	   within	   which	   this	   integration	   may	   be	   attempted.	   A	   major	  
theme	  of	  INBIOSA	  is	  to	  critically	  consider	  each	  of	  these	  regimes	  to	  see	  where	  common	  ground	  may	  be	  
found.	   It	   is	   not	   initially	   obvious	   how	   biocomputational	   integration	   must,	   or	   can	   take	   place,	   but	   the	  
evidence	  of	  the	  natural	  world	  is	  that	  such	  integration	  is	  itself	  natural.	  While	  an	  easy	  starting	  place	  would	  
be	  to	  try	  to	  extend	  the	  reductionist	  position	  to	  include	  biology,	  this	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  unsuccessful	  or	  at	  least	  
incomplete,	   and	   we	   will	   almost	   certainly	   need	   to	   step	   beyond	   the	   Newtonian	   paradigm	   (Ulanowicz,	  
2009;	  Simeonov,	  2010a/b)	  in	  search	  of	  success.	  One	  alternative	  approach,	  for	  example,	  could	  be	  based	  
on	  a	  general	  theory	  of	  entangled	  coherent	  complex	  systems,	  both	  non-­‐living	  and	  living,	  from	  quantum	  
computers	  (e.g.	  Monz	  et.	  al.,	  2011)	  to	  the	  human	  brain	  (e.g.	  Ehresmann	  &	  Vanbremeersch,	  2007).	  Karl	  
Pribram	   (Pribram,	   2001)	   has	   proposed	   that	   one	   kind	   of	   quasi-­‐quantal	   neural	   processing	   takes	   place	  
within	   the	   ‘axonite	  mesh’	   between	   neurons.	   The	   associated	   presumption	  would	   be	   that	   if	   entangled	  
quanta	   can	   ‘calculate’	   by	  methods	  more	   powerful	   than	   Boolean	   algebras,	   then	   entangled	   nerves	   can	  
also	   ‘calculate’	   at	   a	   higher	   level	   than	   individual	   ones.	  Multicellular	   systems	   (animals,	   hearts,	   kidneys,	  
brains,	  etc.)	  work	  as	  unified	  entities,	  and	  exhibit	  emergent	  effects,	  which	  are	  not	   immediately	  obvious	  
from	  the	  properties	  of	  their	  constituent	  cells.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  In	   particular,	   computation	   belongs	   to	   the	   modern	   philosophical	   view	   of	   reality	   in	   which	   information	   assumes	   place	   of	  






Biological	   systems	  are	   integrated	   through	   their	   complementary	   functions	   and	   structures,	   so	   that	   they	  
can	  only	  be	  treated	  properly	  as	  causally	  integrated	  systems.	  Our	  mistake	  until	  now	  in	  biology	  has	  been	  
to	  treat	  them	  as	  if	  their	  causal	  integration	  matters	  less	  than	  their	  syntactic	  integration	  (as	  in	  computer	  
programs).	  
	  
To	  understand	  and	  explain	  how	  biological	   systems	  work	   is	   the	   task	  of	   Integral	  Biomathics	   (Simeonov,	  
2010a/b)	  and	  of	  the	  INBIOSA	  project.	   In	  the	  distinction	  between	  living	  and	  non-­‐living	  systems,	  and	  the	  
consequent	  generation	  of	  meaning	  (Rosen,	  1991;	  Cottam	  et	  al,	  2005;	  Gare,	  2008;	  Louie,	  2009),	  the	  basic	  
questions	  we	  ask	  about	  computation	  from	  a	  revised	  conceptual	  framework	  are:	  
	  
i) What	  is	  computation	  within	  the	  biological	  context?	  	  
	  
ii) How	  useful	  is	  computation	  for	  living	  systems,	  where	  usefulness	  is	  considered	  from	  the	  viewpoint	  
of	  the	  entity	  performing	  the	  computation?	  
	  
iii) To	  what	  extent	  can	  a	  computation	  be	  carried	  out	  in	  an	  organism	  or	  an	  ecosystem	  with	  the	  
available	  resources?	  
	  
Returning	   to	   the	   quantum	   mechanical	   domain,	   the	   underlying	   central	   question,	   which	   may	   indeed	  
deliver	  breakthrough	  answers,	  is:	  
	  
What	   can	   serve	   as	   a	   cohesive	   factor	   for	   making	   biological	   beings	   as	   they	   are?	   Can	   we	   take	  
quantum	  entanglement	  and	  superposition	  models	  from	  physics	  and	  apply	  them	  to	  biology	  and,	  
vice	  versa,	  can	  we	  use	  models	  of	  integrated	  biological	  systems	  to	  model	  quantum	  entanglement	  
and	  superposition?	  How	  can	  we	  relate	  the	  occurrence	  of	  a	  cohesive	  factor	  unique	  to	  biology	  to	  
nonlocal	  simultaneous	  correlations	  available	  in	  physics	  in	  general	  and	  in	  quantum	  mechanics	  in	  
particular?	  	  
	  
One	  associated	  area	  of	  investigation,	  which	  has	  up	  to	  now	  received	  little	  or	  no	  attention	  is	  the	  possibility	  
that	   biology	   makes	   use	   of	   quantum	   logic	   without	   the	   implication	   of	   physical	   quantum	   systems	  
(Schroeder,	  2009;	  2011).	  We	  will	  come	  back	  to	  this	  issue	  in	  sections	  5.8	  and	  7.4.	  
	  
It	   is	  not	  entirely	  beyond	  the	  bounds	  of	  reason	  that	  biological	  processing	  may	  rely	  on	  large-­‐scale	  quasi-­‐
entanglement.	  In	  this	  case	  we	  could	  postulate	  that	  individual	  cells	  in	  an	  organism	  are	  entangled	  to	  work	  
in	  a	  coherent	  way.	  The	  key	  question	  would	  be	  to	  understand	  the	  meaning	  of	  this	  biological	  computation	  
and	   entanglement	   of	   the	   whole	   organism.	   But	   this	   and	   other	   similarly	   specific	   questions	   should	   be	  
tackled	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  two	  initial	  difficulties	  we	  cited	  –	  those	  of	  mathematical	  viability	  for	  biology,	  
and	  of	  biological	  process	  suitability	  for	  mathematics.	  We	  will	  address	  these	  two	  aspects	  in	  the	  following	  
sections	  of	  this	  document.	  We	  must	  also	  come	  to	  understand	  how	  lower	  level	  quantum	  processes	  affect	  
other	   biological	   processes	   unfolding	   on	   differing	   scales	   in	   the	   body,	   flowing	   up	   to	   the	   level	   of	  
consciousness	   and	   behavior	   in	   the	   lived	   environment	   over	   time.	   This	  will	   be	   discussed	   in	   section	   5.2	  









In	  the	  history	  of	  science	  it	  is	  noted	  that	  Laplace	  had	  a	  checkered	  career.	  He	  seemed	  to	  work	  on	  physics	  
or	  astronomy	  for	  several	  years	  and	  then	  drop	  this	  and	  switch	  to	  studies	  of	  pure	  mathematics	  for	  a	  few	  
years;	  then	  suddenly,	  he	  would	  switch	  back	  to	  physics	  or	  astronomy,	  and	  so	  forth	  for	  decades	  (Gillispie,	  
2000).	   Laplace	   was	   such	   a	   productive	   scientist	   and	   mathematician	   because	   the	   two	   fields	   were	  
completely	   integrated	   in	   his	  mind.	   He	   derived	   his	  mathematical	   problems	   from	   his	   astronomical	   and	  
physical	   researches	   and	   his	   astronomical	   and	   physical	   problems	   from	   the	   regions	   in	   which	   existing	  
mathematical	  methods	  failed.	  So	  in	  practice,	  what	  Laplace	  did	  was	  to	  study	  a	  physical	  process,	  develop	  a	  
model	  for	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  system	  that	  would,	  in	  turn,	  yield	  a	  set	  of	  equations	  describing	  the	  model.	  
More	  often	  than	  not,	  because	  Laplace	  focused	  on	  processes	  that	  had	  no	  adequate	  physical	  explanation,	  
he	  would	  find	  that	  it	  was	  impossible	  to	  solve	  the	  equations	  needed	  to	  model	  the	  system.	  Being	  a	  first-­‐
rate	  mathematician,	   he	  would	   therefore	   refocus	   his	   efforts	   on	   deriving	   from	   first	   principles	   the	   new	  
methods	  necessary	   to	   solve	   the	   sets	  of	   equations	  he	  had	   invented.	  This	  effort	  often	   took	  him	  several	  
years.	  Once	  he	  had	  satisfactorily	   set	   that	  new	  area	  of	  mathematics	   to	   rights,	  he	  would	  go	  back	   to	  his	  
astronomical	  or	  physical	  studies,	  apply	  his	  new	  mathematical	  insights	  to	  his	  models,	  and	  see	  what	  kinds	  
of	  new	  problems	  these	  revealed.	  This	  story	  is	  important	  in	  devising	  a	  new	  field	  of	  biomathematics:	  those	  
undertaking	  the	  work	  should	  understand	  that,	  historically,	  both	  science	  and	  mathematics	  have	  provided	  
each	  other	  with	  fruitful	  problems	  and	  methods.	  Laplace	  was	  not	  a	  mathematical	  physicist	  or	  a	  physical	  
mathematician,	   but	   both,	   simultaneously.	   This	   integrated	   (or	   back-­‐and-­‐forth)	   view	   of	   the	   relation	  
between	  science	  and	  mathematics	   is	  quite	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  dominant	   (and	   long-­‐outmoded)	  Comteian	  
positivistic	  philosophy	  of	  science	  that	  still	  predominates	  among	  scientists	  and	  mathematicians	  today.	  	  
	  
Positivism	  explicitly	  posits	  the	  notion	  that	  science	  is	  founded	  in	  logic,	  and	  mathematics	  drives	  progress	  
in	  the	  rest	  of	  science,	  so	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  rank-­‐order	  the	  scientific	  reliability	  of	  a	  field	  by	  the	  degree	  
to	   which	   it	   has	   become	   mathematized.	   The	   increase	   in	   “positive	   knowledge”	   is	   always	   from	  
mathematics	  through	  physics	  to	  the	  “softer”	  sciences.	  
	  
There	  are	  two	  errors	  in	  this	  positivistic	  philosophy.	  One	  is	  that	  even	  pseudoscience2	  can	  be	  expressed	  in	  
terms	   of	   equations,	   (making	   the	   pseudoscience	   no	   more	   ‘true’	   than	   it	   was	   when	   expressed	   only	   in	  
words).	   The	   other	   error	   is	   to	  mistake	   the	   purpose	   of	  mathematization	   as	   being	   primarily	   a	  means	   of	  
validating	   scientific	   research.	   To	   the	   contrary,	   mathematics	   can	   provide	   novel	   tools	   for	   exploring	  
scientific	   problems.	   But	   that	   said,	   existing	   mathematics	   does	   not	   contain	   all	   the	   possible	   tools	   that	  
scientists	  may	  need.	  Like	  Laplace,	  present-­‐day	  mathematicians	  are	  likely	  to	  find	  fascinating	  and	  valuable	  
mathematical	   problems	   by	   learning	   enough	   biology	   to	   understand	  where	   existing	  mathematical	   tools	  
fail.	  From	  this	  perspective,	  mathematics	   is	  useful	  to	  any	  given	  science	  only	  to	  the	  extent	  to	  which	   it	   is	  
appropriate	  to	  addressing	  the	  problems	  posed	  by	  that	  science.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Pseudosciences	   are	  often	  promoted	  by	   sects	   as	   true	   sciences	  with	   the	   support	  of	  mathematical	  modeling,	   thus	  misleading	  





Simply	  mathematizing	   biology	  using	   existing	  methods	  does	   not	   add	   anything	   to	   our	   understanding	  of	  
biology	   unless	   the	   mathematics	   illuminates	   points	   that	   non-­‐mathematical	   statements	   of	   the	   same	  
models	   or	   theories	   cannot	   address.	   Unfortunately,	   many	   scientists	   make	   their	   models	   conform	   to	  
existing	  mathematical	  methods	   rather	   than	  doing	  what	  Laplace	  did,	  which	   is	   to	  devise	  an	  appropriate	  
model	  and	  then	  invent	  the	  mathematics	  to	  describe	  it.	  Thus,	  historically,	  “mathematical	  biology”	  has	  not	  
yielded	  many	  deep	  insights.	  
	  
The	   history	   of	   science	   suggests	   a	   second	   reason	   that	   mathematics	   has	   not	   been	   as	   useful	   in	   the	  
biological	  sciences	  as	  in	  the	  physical	  sciences.	  Scientists	  tend	  to	  ascribe	  the	  power	  of	  physical	  sciences	  to	  
their	  mathematization,	  but	  the	  real	  power	  has	  come	  from	  the	  ability	  of	  astronomers	  and	  physicists	   to	  
define	   their	  problems	  accurately	  and	  precisely	  enough	   for	  mathematical	  methods	   to	  be	  valuable.	  The	  
emphasis	   here	   is	   on	   problem	   finding	   and	   defining.	   Historically,	   chemists,	   biochemists,	   biologists,	   and	  
social	  scientists	  have	  rarely	  been	  able	  to	  define	  their	  problems	  with	  the	  precision	  and	  accuracy	  of	   the	  
physicist	   or	   astronomer,	   making	   the	   mathematical	   investigation	   of	   their	   relatively	   “fuzzy”	   problems	  
difficult.	   Thus,	   one	   reason	   for	   the	   lack	   of	   mathematics	   in	   biology	   is	   that	   the	   lack	   of	   well-­‐defined	  
problems	   has	   made	   the	   field	   less	   amenable	   to	   mathematization	   than,	   say,	   physics.	   Recognizing	   that	  
categories	   in	  non-­‐physical	   systems	  are	  often	   ‘fuzzy’	   is,	   in	   fact,	  what	   led	   Zadeh	   to	   invent	  his	   theory	  of	  
‘fuzzy	   sets’,	   a	   major	   advance	   for	   both	   mathematics	   and	   modeling	   in	   biological	   and	   social	   sciences	  
(Zadeh,	   1965).	   The	   degree	   to	   which	   we	   can	   define	   our	   biological	   problems	   accurately	   and	   precisely	  
enough	   to	   intrigue	   mathematicians	   will	   determine	   whether	   we	   make	   progress	   in	   developing	  
biomathematics,	  e.g.	  in	  working	  toward	  defining	  new	  forms	  of	  dynamic	  relational	  sets.	  
	  
The	   third	   reason	   that	   biology	   has	   so	   far	   failed	   to	   benefit	   from	   mathematization	   to	   the	   degree	   that	  
physics	   and	  astronomy	  have,	   is	   that	   the	  mathematics	   that	   is	   used	   to	  describe	  physics	   and	  astronomy	  
developed	   hand-­‐in-­‐hand	   with	   those	   sciences	   but	   has	   not	   developed	   hand	   in	   hand	   with	   biological	  
problems.	  Laplace	  is	  hardly	  unique	  in	  having	  had	  hands	  in	  both	  mathematics	  and	  physics	  simultaneously	  
–	  think	  Descartes,	  Leibnitz,	  Lagrange,	  Fourier,	  Poincare,	  etc.	  Unfortunately,	  the	  mathematical	  methods	  
developed	  to	  model	  physical	  processes	  do	  not	  (in	  general)	  illuminate	  biological	  problems.	  Biology	  is	  not	  
chemistry,	  which	  is	  not	  physics.	  Simple	  hierarchical	  reasoning	  states	  that	  we	  can	  recognize	  a	  new	  level	  
of	   organization	   when	   the	   principles,	   properties	   and	   models	   that	   worked	   for	   the	   previous	   level	   of	  
organization	  can	  be	  reinterpreted	  and	  harnessed	  by	  the	  higher	  level	  (Weiss,	  1971).	  
	  	  
Chemistry	   becomes	   chemistry	   (and	   not	   physics)	   at	   the	   point	   where	   we	   can	   ignore	   the	   physical	  
properties	  of	   the	  components	  carrying	  out	  the	  chemistry.	  We	  don’t	  need	  an	  understanding	  of	  nuclear	  
physics	  to	  describe	  the	  kinetics	  of	  a	  chemical	  reaction;	  we	  don’t	  need	  to	  know	  the	  movements	  of	  every	  
molecule	   in	  a	  gas	  to	  measure	   its	  temperature	  or	  volume;	  we	  don’t	  need	  an	  understanding	  of	  electron	  
shells	   to	   explain	   how	   DNA	   encodes	   genetic	   information.	   Similarly,	   biology	   becomes	   biology	   and	   not	  
chemistry	  when	  we	  can	  ignore	  the	  chemical	  properties	  of	  the	  components	  carrying	  out	  the	  biology.	  For	  
example,	  Mendelian	   genetics	  was	   invented	  without	   any	   concept	   of	   the	   structure	  of	   a	   gene,	   let	   alone	  
what	   macromolecular	   structure	   encoded	   genetic	   information.	   Darwinian	   evolution	   by	   survival	   of	   the	  
fittest	   does	   not	   rely	   upon	   any	   chemistry	   at	   all!	   This	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   biological	   systems	   are	   not	  
comprised	  of	  chemicals	  or	  to	  deny	  that	  they	  obey	  the	  laws	  of	  physics,	  but	  rather	  to	  make	  the	  point	  that	  
biological	   systems	   are	   recognizably	   biological	   because	   they	   have	   organizational	   properties	   that	   allow	  





chemistry	  of	   their	   individual	   components.	   So,	  what	  we	  need	   is	   new	  mathematical	   notions	   and	  a	  new	  
concept	   of	   computing,	   but	   also	   a	   number	   of	   new	   mathematical	   tools,	   that	   permit	   us	   to	   model	   the	  
emergence	  of	  new	  properties	  resulting	   in	  the	  carrying	  out	  of	  novel	  processes	  as	  a	  result	  of	   innovative	  
forms	   of	   organization	   within	   complex	   systems.	   Or,	   put	   more	   simply,	   a	   mathematics	   which	   will	   be	  
appropriate	   to	  biology	  must	  be	  motivated	  by	  problems	   that	  are	  biological	   in	   their	  origins	  and	  nature,	  
just	  as	  mathematics	  appropriate	  to	  physics	  was	  physical	  in	  its	  origin	  and	  nature.	  
	  
Thus,	  to	  develop	  a	  new	  field	  of	  biomathematics,	  we	  would	  propose	  that	  we	  behave	  as	  a	  community	  as	  
Laplace	   and	   his	   colleagues	   did,	   by	   going	   back	   and	   forth	   between	   the	   science	   and	   the	   mathematics,	  
letting	   each	   inform	   the	   other.	   Biology	   has	   much	   to	   contribute	   to	   mathematics,	   especially	   to	   the	  
development	   of	   new	   forms	   of	   mathematics	   appropriate	   to	   solving	   the	   kinds	   of	   problems	   that	   make	  
biology	   different	   from	   physics	   or	   astronomy.	   And	   biology-­‐inspired	   mathematics	   can	   be	   expected	   to	  
return	  to	  biology	  the	  same	  kinds	  of	  gifts	  that	  physics-­‐inspired	  mathematics	  returned	  to	  physics.	  Indeed,	  
not	  until	  we	  abandon	  the	  Comteian	  idea	  that	  mathematics	  should	  drive	  science,	  will	  biology	  benefit,	  as	  
it	   should	   from	  mathematics.	  Reversing	   the	  equation,	  and	  permitting	  biology	  to	  drive	   the	  mathematics	  
(at	  least	  half	  of	  the	  time!)	  may	  yield	  us	  new	  insights	  as	  important	  as	  those	  generated	  by	  Laplace	  and	  the	  
other	  physicist-­‐mathematicians	  who	  founded	  their	   fields.	  Moreover,	   it	  may	  revolutionize	  mathematics	  
itself,	  just	  as	  the	  focus	  on	  physical	  problems	  motivated	  many	  of	  the	  great	  mathematicians	  of	  the	  past.	  
	  
But	  Integral	  Biomathics	  is	  not	  going	  to	  be	  a	  purely	  theoretical	  discipline.	  Because	  “simulation”	  is	  not	  only	  
running	  a	  discretized	  differential	  equation	  on	  a	  computer,	  and	  visualization	  is	  not	  only	  graphical	  imaging	  
and	   animation,	   it	   will	   also	   explore	   the	   creation	   of	   new	   simulation	   and	   visualization	   paradigms	   and	  
techniques	  for	  biological	  phenomena.	  The	  reason	  behind	  this	  multi-­‐perspective,	  quantitative-­‐emergent	  
approach	   is	   that	   there	   are	   certain	   emergent	   features	   of	   fundamental	   processes	   that	   cannot	   be	   easily	  
described/captured	   by	   closed	   form,	   differential	   or	   any	   currently	   known	   mathematical	   object	   or	  
expression.	   A	   good	   example	   can	   be	   found	   in	   molecular	   dynamics	   (MD).	   For	   instance,	   if	   we	   want	   to	  
computationally	  assess	  a	  macroscopic	  constitutive	  parameter	  such	  the	  permeability	  of	  a	  cell	  membrane	  
with	  respect	  to	  a	  given	  molecule,	  then	  much	  insight	  can	  be	  gained	  by	  simulating	  the	  dynamics	  of	  a	  large	  
number	   of	   molecules	   of	   the	   different	   species	   involved,	   whereas	   trying	   to	   find	   some	   elegant	  
mathematical	  equation	  that	  will	  answer	  the	  question	  may	  currently	  fail.	  The	  same	  holds	  for	  instance	  in	  
astrophysics	  where	  simulation	  techniques	  such	  as	  smooth	  particle	  hydrodynamics	  are	  used	  to	  study	  the	  
formation	   of	   complex	   astronomical	   objects	   such	   as	   a	   galaxy.	   In	   both	   these	   examples	   the	   emergent	  
complexity	  is	  assessed	  via	  simulation	  in	  which	  the	  mutual	  interactions	  between	  the	  objects	  themselves	  
are	  described	  by	  simple	   laws	  (e.g.	  Newton’s	   law	  of	  gravitation	  and	  those	  of	  classical	  electrodynamics).	  
Cellular	  automata,	  e.g.	  (von	  Neumann,	  1966;	  Wolfram,	  1994;	  Wolfram,	  2002;	  Miller	  &	  Fredkin,	  2005)	  are	  
another	  example	  of	  how	  a	  simulation	  tool	  can	  produce	  emergent	  behaviour	  by	  simulating	  the	  dynamics	  
of	  agents	  that	  follow	  simple	  rules.	  
	  
Therefore,	   we	   consider	   the	   development	   of	   new	   kinds	   of	   biologically	   inspired	   simulation	   and	  
visualization	  methods	  as	  part	  of	   the	   INBIOSA	  research	  program	  from	  which	  emergent	   features	  can	  be	  
rigorously	   analyzed.	   They	   constitute	   part	   of	   the	   intermediate	   steps	   towards	   the	   discovery	   of	   new	  
abstract	   mathematical	   tools	   enabling	   virtual	   experimentation,	   and	   enable	   with	   systems	   to	   study	  





4.	  Major	  Biomathematical	  Problems	  
	  
What	   kinds	   of	   well-­‐defined	   biological	   problems	   exist	   that	   seem	   not	   to	   be	   amenable	   to	   current	  
mathematical	   approaches,	   or	   have	   simply	   been	   overlooked	   by	  mathematicians	  who	   already	   have	   the	  
kinds	   of	   novel	   approaches	   that	   would	   open	   up	   these	   biological	   areas	   to	   formal	   analysis?	   INBIOSA’s	  
collaborators	  and	  colleagues	  have	  been	  struggling	  with	  six	  such	  areas,	  all	  of	  which	  are	  general	  enough	  to	  
have	  broad	  implications	  both	  in	  and	  beyond	  biology	  and	  are	  therefore	  potentially	  worth	  the	  effort	  of	  a	  
mathematician	   to	   explore.	   All	   of	   them,	   in	   one	   way	   or	   another,	   share	   the	   common	   feature	   that	   the	  
systems	   that	   need	   to	   be	   described	   combine	   some	   type	   of	   continuous	   function	   with	   some	   type	   of	  
discontinuous	  function	  and	  some	  add	  the	  fillips	  of	  vector/tensor,	  relational	  and	  geometrical	  aspects	  as	  
well.	   The	  mathematical	   challenge	   is	   how	   to	   analyze	  biological	   problems	   that	   currently	   exist	   in	   two	  or	  
more	  of	  these	  domains	  thought	  to	  be	  unrelated	  in	  orthodox	  mathematics.	  
	  
The	   first	   problem	   concerns	   the	  modeling	   of	   a	   cell	   as	   a	   dynamic	   process.	   The	   cell	   itself	   is	   a	   discrete	  
object	  yet	  the	  flow	  of	  materials	  in,	  out,	  and	  through	  a	  cell	  is	  continuous3.	  Moreover,	  if	  one	  asks	  at	  any	  
given	  time	  what	  defines	  the	  cell,	  the	  details	  of	  this	  description	  will	  differ	  fro	  those	  at	  any	  other	  time.	  For	  
example,	  when	  a	  cell	  replicates,	  it	  breaks	  down	  its	  Golgi	  apparatus,	  its	  actin	  fibers,	  and	  various	  other	  cell	  
organelles,	   into	   the	   molecular	   constituents	   from	   which	   they	   are	   assembled.	   These	   molecular	  
constituents	   are	   randomly	   distributed	   into	   the	   two	   daughter	   cells.	   Both	   of	   the	   resulting	   cells	   are	   still	  
cells	  of	  the	  same	  species	  as	  the	  parent	  cell,	  yet	  neither	  has	  exactly	  the	  same	  number	  or	  even	  exactly	  the	  
same	  proportion	  of	  cellular	  constituents	  as	  the	  parent	  cell	  or	  as	  each	  other.	  So	  clearly	  there	  is	  “variance”	  
in	  the	  absolute	  numbers	  and	  in	  the	  proportions	  of	  the	  constituents	  of	  a	  cell	  within	  which	  the	  cell	  can	  still	  
function	   as	   a	   cell.	   Moreover,	   the	   rates	   at	   which	   these	   constituents	   turn	   over,	   are	   replenished	   and	  
excreted	   also	   vary	   from	   cell	   to	   cell	   and	   from	   instant	   to	   instant.	  Now,	   this	   variance4	  is	   clearly	   open	   to	  
experimental	  manipulation.	  One	   can	  dehydrate	   cells	   and	   find	  out	   how	   little	   or	   how	  much	  water	   they	  
require	   or	   can	   sustain	   and	   continue	   to	   live.	  One	   can	   destroy	   particular	   cellular	   constituents,	   or	   block	  
particular	   receptors	   or	   transporters,	   and	   see	  how	   these	  modifications	   affect	   the	  proportions	  of	   other	  
cellular	  constituents	  in	  relation	  to	  whether,	  and	  how,	  the	  cell	  continues	  to	  function.	  	  
	  
So	   we	   can	   obtain	   plenty	   of	   quantitative	   data.	   But	   what	   do	   these	   data	   mean	   in	   terms	   of	   what	   the	  
interactive	   variances	   in	   constituents	   can	  be	  within	   a	   living	   system?	  The	  problem	  becomes	  even	  more	  
complicated	   when	   we	   start	   playing	   with	   cellular	   structures	   and	  macromolecules.	  While	   there	   are	   so	  
many	   molecules	   of	   water	   or	   glucose	   or	   ATP	   in	   a	   cell	   that	   it	   might	   be	   acceptable	   to	   model	   cellular	  
dehydration	   as	   a	   continuous	   function,	   one	   cannot	   vary	   the	   numbers	   of	   actin	   fibrils,	   Golgi	   apparatus,	  
mitochondria,	   chloroplast,	   ribosomes,	   nucleoli,	   centrosomes,	   chromosomes,	   etc.	   as	   continuous	  
functions.	  These	  are	  discrete	  variables,	  with	  variances	  that	  are	  measured	  in	  discrete	  units.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  The	   flow	   of	  material	   is	   actually	   a	   flow	   of	   discrete	   particles,	   but	   the	   time	   flow	  may	   be	   considered	   continuous.	   In	   fact,	   the	  
discrete/continuous	  duality	  does	  not	  reflect	  a	  fundamental	  modeling	  necessity,	  but	  the	  consequence	  of	  observer’s	  perspective,	  
(s.	  section	  5.4)	  and	  modeling	  choice.	  
4	  Under	   steady-­‐state	   conditions	   the	   cell’s	   total	  mass	  must	   remain	   constant	   otherwise	   it	   would	   increase	   or	   decrease	   in	   size	  
(which	   is	   the	   case	   when	   a	   cell	   is	   dividing	   or	   differentiating).	   Barring	   statistical	   fluctuations	   changes	   over	   time	   of	   some	   cell	  





The	  mathematical	   problem	   therefore	   becomes	  one	  of	   finding	  means	   to	   utilize	   all	   of	   this	   information,	  
both	  continuous	  and	  discrete,	  in	  an	  integrated	  model	  that	  lets	  us	  understand	  what	  the	  limits	  of	  variance,	  
and	  the	  limits	  of	  life,	  are	  for	  a	  functioning	  cell5. 	  
	  
Secondly,	  posing	  the	  question	  of	  what	  constitutes	  a	  cell	  in	  this	  way	  has	  provoked	  interest	  in	  set	  theory	  
as	   a	   possible	   basis	   of	   a	   new	   biological	   mathematics.	   But	   the	   current	   state	   of	   set	   theory	   seems	  
inadequate	   in	   two	   fundamental	   ways.	   First,	   cells	   are	   autopoietic	   –	   they	   form	   themselves.	   Indeed,	  
evolutionary	  theory	  asserts	  that	  cells	  evolved	  from	  primordial	  aggregates	  of	  self-­‐organizing	  compounds	  
built	  from	  even	  simpler	  interactive	  modules,	  back	  to	  the	  primordial	  soup.	  Sets,	  at	  least	  as	  they	  exist	   in	  
mathematical	  forms,	  are	  not	  autopoietic.	  Existing	  set	  theories	  use	  axioms	  which	  limit	  the	  way	  sets	  are	  
defined,	  for	  instance	  by	  limiting	  the	  expressions	  describing	  their	  elements	  to	  avoid	  self-­‐reference,	  which	  
in	   turn	   is	   a	   critical	   property	   of	   living	   systems.	  Development	   of	   a	   set	   theory	   suitable	   for	   such	   systems	  
could	  be	  attempted,	  for	  example	  allowing	  sets	  to	  be	  defined	  by	  dynamic	  rules,	  including	  self-­‐referential	  
ones,	  so	  as	  not	  to	  produce	  paradoxes,	  but	  to	  permit	  autopoiesis6	  (Maturana	  &	  Varela,	  1980). This	  is,	  in	  a	  
sense,	   what	   complexity	   theory	   is	   about	   (e.g.,	   Kauffmann,	   1993),	   but	   complexity	   theory	   does	   not	  
incorporate	  most	  of	  the	  useful	  features	  of	  set	  theory.	  Could	  a	  mathematics	  that	  described	  autopoietic	  
sets	   through	   complexity-­‐like	   theory	   exist?	  Might	   it	   shed	   light	   on	   the	   evolution	   of	   the	   “sets”	   we	   call	  
“cellular	   life”	  by	  permitting	  us	   to	  describe	  continuous	   functions	   that	  produce	   rules	   that	   then	   limit	   the	  
entry	  and	  exit	  of	  possible	  components	  of	   the	  set,	  and	  that	  can	  undergo	  transformations	   (metabolism)	  
within	   the	  set?	  After	  all,	   this	   is	  what	  cells	  do.	  So	  why	  not	  develop	  a	  mathematics	   that	  describes	  what	  
nature	  can	  already	  do? Another	  way	   in	  which	  modern	   set	   theory	  cannot	  be	   trivially	  applied	   to	   tackle	  
biological	  problems	  is	  because	  biological	  sets	  have	  the	  variance	  property	  described	  above.	  Any	  given	  cell	  
must	  have	  chromosomes,	  but	  their	  number	  can	  vary	  (as	  they	  do	  in	  cancers	  and	  parthenogenotes)	  and	  
still	   be	   viable;	   they	   can	   have	   many	   or	   few	   ribosomes	   and	   mitochondria	   and	   still	   live;	   they	   can	  
accumulate	  certain	  amounts	  of	  toxins	  or	  lose	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  key	  ions	  and	  still	  function;	  etc.	  So	  in	  
addition	   to	   inventing	   autopoietic	   sets,	   is	   it	   possible	   to	   invent	   sets	   that	   are	   not	   defined	   by	   specific	  
numbers	  of	  constituents,	  but	  by	  variances	  within	  which	  all	  of	  these	  constituents	  must	  exist.	  A	  bacterial	  
cell	  that	  becomes	  dehydrated	  may	  die,	  or	  it	  may	  sporulate.	  How	  can	  some	  form	  of	  set	  theory	  be	  devised	  
that	  models	  the	  process	  of	  switching	  between	  stable	  states	  when	  certain	  variances	  are	  exceeded?	  What,	  
in	   general,	   does	   such	   a	   state-­‐sensitive,	   mathematical	   set	   look	   like?	   How	   does	   it	   behave?	   What	  
properties	  does	  it	  have	  that	  sets,	  as	  currently	  defined	  in	  mathematics,	  do	  not?	  How	  might	  these	  new	  set	  
properties	  inform	  living	  systems	  and	  perhaps	  even	  our	  understanding	  of	  social	  processes,	  supply	  chains,	  
and	  other	  useful	  functions?	  Since	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  first	  protocells/autocells	  is	  imaginable,	  this	  approach	  
appears	   reasonable.	  But	   since	  we	  have	  no	   idea	  about	   the	  origin	  of	   the	  genetic	  apparatus	  where	  does	  
that	  get	  us? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  In	   this	  First	  Problem	   there	  are	  actually	   three	  sub-­‐problems,	  where	   the	   first	  one	   is	   somewhat	  unrelated	   to	   the	  other	   two:	   i)	  
combining	  discrete	  with	  continuous	  quantities,	  ii)	  explaining	  their	  variances	  and	  their	  interrelatedness,	  iii)	  discovering	  the	  cells’	  
functioning	   (and	   non-­‐functioning)	   parameter	   ranges.	   Regarding	   the	   third	   sub-­‐problem,	   dynamic	   systems	   theory,	   sensitivity	  
analysis	  and	  bifurcation	  theory	  seem	  to	  provide	  some	  tools	  to	  tackle	  it.	  	  	  
6	  The	  mathematics	  necessary	   to	  cover/explain	  autopoiesis	  may	  not	  necessarily	   require	  “autopoietic”	   sets	  but	   self-­‐referenced	  
objects.	   An	   alternative	   approach	   could	   be	   to	   define	   an	   object	   by	   the	   transitions	   rules	   (predicates)	   that	   hold	   over	   pairs	   of	  
objects.	   This	   allows	  under	   certain	   circumstances	   a	   (static)	  mathematical	   description	  of	   an	  object	   that	  would	   self-­‐replicate	   in	  







So	  one	  thing	  that	  is	  needed	  in	  our	  new	  biomathematics	  is	  a	  way	  to	  model	  self-­‐emergent	  sets	  (origins	  of	  
first	  cells;	  self-­‐assembly	  of	  viruses,	  etc.)	  But	  these	  self-­‐emergent	  sets	  would	  seem	  to	  need	  the	  ability	  to	  
carry	  out	  functions	  (selecting/rejecting	  among	  possible	  components;	  minimizing	  what	  a	  physicist	  thinks	  
of	  as	  free	  energy;	  etc.).	  One	  possible	  focus	  of	  a	  new	  biomathematics	  would	  be	  to	  invent	  an	  appropriate	  
theory	  of	  self-­‐emergent	  sets	  that	  can	  carry	  out	  functions	  within	  variances.	  	  
	  
Such	  a	  theory	  would	  preferably	  incorporate	  the	  work	  that	  has	  been	  done	  on	  understanding	  hierarchical	  
systems’	  emergent	  properties,	  complexity	  theory	  and	  so	  forth.	  Such	  a	  mathematics	  would	  therefore	  be	  
extraordinarily	  integrative,	  a	  point	  to	  which	  we	  will	  return.	  	  
	  
Thirdly,	   a	   biological	   problem	   related	   to	   set-­‐like	   properties	   is	   that	   organization	   strictly	   limits	   variance	  
through	  the	  formation	  of	  modules	   in	  a	  manner	  that	  requires	  diligent	  ways	  of	  using	  probability	  theory.	  
Imagine	   a	   clueless,	   blind	   “watchmaker”	   of	   the	   sort	   that	   Richard	   Dawkins	   likes	   to	   put	   in	   charge	   of	  
evolutionary	  processes.	  But	  let	  this	  watchmaker	  carry	  out	  a	  process	  first	  investigated	  by	  Herb	  Simon	  in	  
one	   of	   his	   little	   known	   and	   under-­‐appreciated	   essays	   on	   evolutionary	   processes	   (Simon,	   1981).	  
Combining	  Dawkins’s	  and	  Simon’s	  watchmakers	  produces	  the	  following	  scenario	  that	  exemplifies	  one	  of	  
the	   critical	   problems	   that	   needs	   to	   be	   addressed	   in	   the	   origins	   and	   evolution	   of	   life.	   Imagine	   two	  
watchmakers,	  the	  first	  of	  whom	  must	  randomly	  assemble	  25	  parts	   in	  order	  to	  put	  together	  a	  “watch”.	  
This	  completely	  ignorant	  watchmaker	  must	  explore	  every	  possible	  combination	  of	  the	  25	  parts	  he	  has	  in	  
front	  of	  him,	  which	  is	  to	  say	  25!,	  or	  about	  1.55	  x	  1025	  possibilities!	  If	  it	  took	  a	  single	  minute	  for	  each	  of	  
these	  possibilities	   to	   be	   explored,	   our	  watchmaker	  would	  not	   succeed	   in	  making	   even	   a	   single	  watch	  
within	  the	  lifetime	  of	  the	  universe!	  Moreover,	  because	  he’s	  just	  a	  random	  assembler	  and	  cannot	  learn	  
from	  experience,	  he	  has	  to	  explore	  all	  these	  possibilities	  each	  and	  every	  time	  he	  tries	  to	  build	  a	  watch!	  
Clearly,	   such	  an	  entity	  working	  by	   such	  a	  process	  would,	   for	   all	   intents	   and	  purposes,	   never	   succeed,	  
making	  de	  novo	  evolution	  of	  life	  virtually	  impossible.	  
	  
But	  what	   Simon	   first	   recognized,	   and	   Root-­‐Bernstein	   has	   developed	   (Root-­‐Bernstein	   and	  Dillon	   1997;	  
Hunding	   et	   al.,	   2006),	   is	   that	   an	   equally	   clueless,	   blind	   and	   random	   watchmaker	   who	   uses	   stable	  
modules	  built	  on	  the	  principle	  of	  molecular	  complementarity	  would	  succeed,	  and	  astoundingly	  quickly!	  
Simon’s	   model	   assumed	   that	   the	   watchmakers	   knew	   how	   to	   make	   a	   watch	   (a	   clearly	   un-­‐biological	  
assumption),	   from	  which	   he	   derived	   the	   following	   equation:	   the	   time	   required	   for	   the	   evolution	   of	   a	  
complex	   form	   from	   simple	   elements	   depends	   critically	   on	   the	   number	   and	   distribution	   of	   potential	  
intermediate	  stable	  forms.	  In	  particular,	  if	  there	  exists	  a	  hierarchy	  of	  potentially	  stable	  ‘sub-­‐assemblies’,	  
with	   about	   the	   same	   span,	   s,	   (i.e.,	   the	   number	   of	   parts	   or	   components	   required	   to	   form	   each	   stable	  
subunit)	   at	   each	   level	   of	   the	   hierarchy,	   then	   the	   probability	   that	   a	   subassembly	   process	   will	   be	  
completed	  within	  any	  given	  time,	  T,	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  be	  about	  1/(1	  –	  p)s,	  where	  p	  is	  the	  probability	  
that	  the	  assembly	  process	  will	  be	   interrupted	  during	  time	  T.	  	  Clearly	  the	   less	  stable	  each	  step	   is	   in	  the	  
assembly	   (i.e.,	   the	  greater	  p	   is)	  and	   the	   larger	   the	  number	  of	  components	   that	  must	  be	  assembled	   to	  
achieve	  a	  complete	  assembly	  (s),	   the	   less	  probable	  any	  particular	  assemblage	   is	  to	  evolve.	  Conversely,	  
the	   more	   stable	   each	   step	   in	   assembly	   is	   (i.e.,	   the	   smaller	   p	   gets)	   and	   the	   smaller	   the	   number	   of	  
components	  required	  to	  produce	  a	  completed	  assembly	  (s),	  the	  greater	  the	  probability	  an	  assemblage	  is	  






The	   implication	  of	  Simon’s	  model	   is	   that	  we	  should	   therefore	  expect	  evolution	   to	  be	  characterized	  by	  
the	   selection	   of	   semi-­‐stable	   modules	   arranged	   in	   a	   hierarchical	   fashion	   that	   minimizes	   wasted	   time,	  
effort	  and	  resources.	  This	  is	  precisely	  what	  we	  do	  see.	  But	  Simon’s	  model	  is	  not	  an	  accurate	  portrayal	  of	  
the	  biological	  problem.	  The	  problem	  with	  Simon’s	  model	  is	  that	  evolutionary	  watchmakers	  do	  not	  know	  
how	   to	   make	   a	   watch	   and	   must	   search	   randomly	   for	   stable	   modules.	   Fortunately,	   molecular	  
complementarity	   between	   compounds	   naturally	   forms	   such	   stable	   modules,	   so	   these	   come	   into	  
existence	   in	   just	   the	   kind	   of	   random	   fashion	   that	   needs	   to	   be	   assumed.	   So	   once	   again	   assume	   our	  
modular	   watchmaker	   needs	   to	   make	   a	   watch	   from	   25	   pieces,	   but	   also	   assume	   that	   she	   makes	   her	  
watches	  in	  five	  stable	  sets	  of	  five	  ordered	  parts.	  Stable	  five-­‐element	  modules	  could	  be	  built	  by	  exploring	  
only	   5!	   possibilities	   or	   just	   120	   combinations.	   Then	   our	  modular	  watchmaker	  would	   need	   to	   explore	  
randomly	  the	  5!	  possible	  combinations	  of	   these	  five	  modules,	  or	  another	  120	  possibilities.	  Altogether,	  
the	  modular	  watchmaker	  explores	  only	  720	  =	  6!	  possible	  combinations,	  which,	  if	  they	  could	  be	  explored	  
at	  one	  possibility	  per	  minute,	  would	  yield	  a	  watch	  every	  two	  hours.	  Quite	  a	  difference	  from	  1.55	  x	  1025	  
minutes	   to	   explore	   the	   original	   25!	   combinations!	   The	   impossible	   becomes	   highly	   likely 7 	  (Root-­‐
Bernstein,	  2012)!	  	  
	  
Now,	   obviously	   the	   advantage	   of	   modularity	   is	   not	   as	   great	   as	   just	   stated	   for	   a	   real,	   molecularly	  
complementary	  system.	  Firstly,	  stable	  modules	  might	  not	  result	  from	  any	  given	  set	  of	  five	  components	  
so	  that	  our	  modular	  watchmaker	  may	  have	  to	  explore	  more	  sets	  than	  we	  have	  assumed.	  Secondly,	  the	  
specificity	  of	  module	  building	  is	  not	  perfect	  and	  some	  non-­‐functional	  modules	  will	  also	  likely	  be	  stable,	  
confusing	  final	  assembly.	  We	  can	  also	  assume	  that	  the	  proper	  modules	  will	  out-­‐compete	  the	  improper	  
ones	   in	  producing	  complete	  watches,	  but	   this	  may	  not	  be	   the	  case	   if	   improper	  modules,	   inefficient	  at	  
assembly	   as	   they	   may	   be,	   so	   out-­‐number	   the	   proper	   ones	   as	   to	   swamp	   them.	   Finally,	   there	   is	   no	  
biological	   reason	  to	  assume	  that	  stable	  modules	  have	   five	  components	  –	   the	  number	  could	  vary	   from	  
two	  or	  three	  to	  two	  or	  three	  dozen	  per	  module.	  And	  this	  is	  exactly	  the	  point	  at	  which	  current	  probability	  
theory	   is	   improperly	   applied.	   How	   do	  we	  model	   the	   kind	   of	   system	  we	   have	   just	   proposed	   in	  which	  
modular	   sets	   are	   formed	   in	   a	   reversible	  manner,	  may	   contain	   variable	   numbers	   of	   components,	   and	  
compete	  with	  each	  other	  in	  a	  probabilistic	  scenario?	  	  
	  
Again,	  such	  a	  kind	  of	  mathematics	  must	  exist,	  since	  Nature	  already	  performs	  these	  functions,	  but	  what	  
does	   that	  mathematics	   look	   like?	   Perhaps	   it	   is	   not	   a	  matter	   of	   the	   non-­‐existence	   of	   certain	   types	   of	  
mathematics,	   but	   rather	   that	   the	   appropriate	   type	   of	   mathematics	   has	   not	   been	   applied	   to	   these	  







	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  However,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   pay	   attention	   to	   the	  principle	   of	  minimum	  of	   three	   levels	   of	  modules	   in	   hierarchy	  





The	   importance	  of	  being	  able	   to	   address	   this	  modularity-­‐probability	  problem	   is	   illustrated	  by	   the	   fact	  
that	   the	   formation	   of	   complementary	   module	   building	   within	   complex	   systems	   can	   prune	   out	   huge	  
numbers	   of	   possibilities	   at	   each	   step	   of	   hierarchical	   assembly.	   In	   general,	   the	   greater	   the	   number	   of	  
pieces,	  and	   the	  more	  modular	   steps	   involved	   in	   the	  process,	   the	  more	  efficient	   the	  process	  becomes.	  
Given	   the	   mathematics	   of	   these	   probabilities,	   there	   must	   be	   some	   optimal	   number	   of	   pieces	   per	  
module,	  and	  an	  optimal	  number	  of	  modules	  per	   functional	  unit	  and	  an	  optimal	   stability	   that	  must	  be	  
attained.	   All	   of	   these	   variables	   must	   be	   optimized	   so	   as	   to	   maximize	   the	   rate	   at	   which	   functional	  
modules	   are	   generated	   while	   minimizing	   the	   number	   of	   possibilities	   that	   must	   be	   explored.	   Our	  
assumption	   is	   that	   nature	   has	   already	   solved	   this	   problem.	   Analyzing	   naturally	   occurring	   modular	  
hierarchies	  for	  rules	  of	  optimization	  might	  therefore	  have	  vast	   implications	  not	  only	  for	  understanding	  
the	  evolution	  of	  life,	  but	  also,	  as	  Simon	  (1981)	  notes	  in	  his	  original	  essay,	  for	  the	  most	  efficient	  design	  of	  
chemical,	  technological,	  and	  even	  human	  systems	  of	  organization.	  
	  
We	   have	   already	   alluded	   above	   to	   various	   biological	   problems	   that	   require	   working	   at	   the	   interface	  
between	  continuous	  and	  discontinuous	  functions.	  One	  might	  posit	  that	  most	  of	  biology	  consists	  of	  sets	  
of	   problems	   that	   exist	   at	   this	   continuous-­‐discontinuous	   interface.	   For	   example,	   chemical	  
neurotransmitters	   (working	   continuously)	   release	   a	   single	   electrical	   discharge	   (occurring	  
discontinuously);	   individual	   organisms	   can	   potentially	   interact	   more	   or	   less	   strongly	   with	   other	  
individuals	   by	   means	   of	   chemical	   messages	   (continuously	   variable)	   that	   determine	   whether	   they	  
develop	  as	  many	  individuals	  or	  transform	  themselves	  into	  a	  single	  super-­‐organism	  (a	  biofilm).	  How	  can	  
we	  mathematically	  handle	   interactions	   that	  may	  vary	  continuously	  but	  act	  on	  a	   small	   set	  of	  definable	  
individuals?	   These	   are	   not	   amenable	   to	  modeling	   solely	   using	  mathematics	   that	   assumes	   continuous	  
functions.	  We	  are	  particularly	   interested	   in	   these	  continuous-­‐grainy	  problems	   from	  the	  perspective	  of	  
complementarity.	   Any	   given	   species	   of	   molecule	   may	   interact	   more	   or	   less	   with	   any	   other	   type	   of	  
molecule,	   so	   that	   in	   a	   very	   diverse	   mixture	   of	   molecules,	   a	   large	   number	   of	   weak	   interactions	   may	  
overwhelm	  a	  small	  number	  of	  strong	  ones.	  	  
	  
The	  same	  can	  be	  true	  among	  sets	  of	  cells	  or	  in	  species	  or	  social	  interactions	  that	  involve	  what	  Csermely	  
has	  called	  ‘weak	  links’	  (Csermely,	  2006)	  and	  Root-­‐Bernstein	  calls	  ‘complementarity’	  (Root-­‐Bernstein	  and	  
Dillon,	   1997;	   Root-­‐Bernstein,	   2011).	   There	   appears	   to	   be	   no	   orthodox	   way	   to	   model	   such	   systems	  
mathematically,	   yet	   such	   systems	  occur	   at	   every	   level	   of	   biological	   complexity.	  Again,	   since	  biological	  
systems	   are	   able	   to	   integrate	   units	   with	   continuous	   functions,	   surely	   there	   is	   a	   mathematics	   that	   is	  
appropriate	  for	  modeling	  how	  biological	  systems	  do	  so.	  
	  
A	  fourth	  set	  of	  problems	  relates	  to	  the	  key	  properties	  differentiating	  a	  living	  system	  from	  a	  non-­‐living	  
one.	  Living	  systems	  involve	  directional	  processes8.	  Their	  physical	  environment,	  however,	  is	  characterized	  
by	  non-­‐directional	  properties.	   In	  other	  words,	  we	  have	  two	  different	  models	  at	  the	  same	  level	  one	  for	  
living	  and	  one	  for	  non-­‐living	  matter.	  One	  doesn't	  need	  vectors	  to	  describe	  chemical	  reactions	   in	  a	  test	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  For	  clarity,	  in	  what	  follows	  in	  this	  paragraph	  and	  in	  the	  next	  ones,	  we	  will	  often	  name	  by	  "vector"	  the	  directional	  
properties	   and	   by	   "scalar"	   the	   non-­‐directional	   ones,	   discarding	   that	   we	   are	   outside	   the	   required	  mathematical	  
context	  in	  which	  these	  terms	  are	  usually	  defined.	  Thus,	  the	  use	  of	  these	  terms	  and	  several	  other	  ones	  should	  be	  
understood	   from	   our	   context	   rather	   than	   from	   the	   algebraic	   one.	   Furthermore,	   it	   should	   be	   obvious	  when	   the	  





tube,	  but	  one	  does	  need	  vectors	   to	  describe	  biochemical	  networks. Hence,	  a	  characteristic	   feature	  of	  
biological	   systems	   is	   that	   some	   of	   their	   properties	   involve	   transformations	   from	   scalar	   to	   vector	  
quantities.	   Some	   very	   interesting	   and	   important	   problems	   lie	   at	   the	   interfaces	   between	   the	   physical	  
world	   and	   the	   biological	   one;	   they	   require	   mathematical	   means	   to	   describe	   how	   vector	   processes	  
interface	  with	  scalar	  ones.	  For	   instance,	  how	  does	  random	  diffusion	  get	  converted	   into	  directional	   ion	  
transport?	  We	  need	  a	  single	  integrated	  model,	  but	  not	  different	  ones	  for	  each	  domain.	  	  
	  
We	  know	  from	  elementary	  algebra	  that	  multiplying	  a	  scalar	  by	  a	  scalar	  gives	  a	  scalar;	  and	  multiplying	  a	  
scalar	  by	  a	  vector	  gives	  a	  vector;	  and	  multiplying	  a	  vector	  by	  a	  vector	  gives	  a	  scalar	  (V.V)	  or	  vector	  (VxV);	  
but	   how	   does	   one	   get	   from	   purely	   scalar	   quantities	   to	   a	   vector	   one?	   Is	   this	   another	   kind	   of	   tensor	  
transformation?	  How	  do	  racemic	  mixtures	  of	  chemicals	  give	  rise	  to	  chiral	  handedness	  in	  living	  systems?	  
How	  does	   a	   chemical	   neurotransmitter	   signal	   (scalar	   diffusion)	   become	  a	   directional	   electrical	   signal?	  
How	  does	  one	  evolve	  from	  random	  diffusion	  (scalar)	  to	  facilitated	  transport	  systems	  (vector)?	  How	  does	  
one	   evolve	   from	   all	   possible	   reactions	   occurring	   (primordial	   soup,	   laboratory	   bench)	   to	   reaction	  
pathways	  (vector/tensor)?	  In	  all	  these	  cases	  (and	  many	  more)	  scalar	  processes	  result	  in	  vector	  ones,	  yet	  
mathematics	   generally	   treats	   either	   scalar	   quantities	   or	   vector	   and	   tensor	   quantities,	   but	   not	   the	  
transformation	  of	  scalar	  to	  vector	  and	  vice	  versa.	  In	  differential	  geometry,	  scalars,	  vectors,	  tensors	  and	  
matrices	  are	  considered	  as	  examples	  of	  multilinear	  maps,	  and	  so	  are	  graphs	  in	  the	  usual	  definition	  with	  
only	   one	   arrow	  between	   2	   vertices,	  which	   is	   easily	   translated	   into	   a	   tensor	   or	   a	  matrix.	   Could	   a	   new	  
operator	  be	  adapted	  for	  living	  systems?	  Or	  we	  need	  a	  new	  mathematical	  formalism	  for	  this	  purpose?	  Or	  
should	  we	  still	  approach	  problems	  in	  differentiated	  way?	  Perhaps	  we	  may	  well	  need	  to	  apply	  different	  
types	   of	  mathematics	   than	   are	   currently	   applied.	   Recall	   that	   the	   tensor	   concept	   emerged	   out	   of	   the	  
necessity	   to	   have	   vector	   transformations.	   The	   issue	   with	   matrices	   and	   determinants	   used	   to	   solve	  
systems	  of	   (polynomial	   and	  differential)	   equations	   is	   similar:	   they	  all	   emerged	  out	  of	   the	  necessity	   to	  
solve	  particular	  problems.	  Mathematicians	   like	  Newton,	  Leibniz,	  Gauss	  and	  others	  were	  clever	  enough	  
to	   discover	   the	   repeating	   pattern	   and	   simplify	   the	   solution.	   Now,	   we	   have	   another	   set	   of	   biological	  
problems,	   e.g.	   in	   the	  domain	  of	   genetic	   regulatory	  networks,	  where	  one	   can	   trace	   a	   complex	  map	  of	  
enactions	   and	   transitions	   between	   certain	   protein	   chains	   (objects)	   –	   well	   modeled	   by	   directed	  
(hyper)graphs	  –	  but	  then	  at	  a	  certain	  point	  in	  time	  these	  objects	  suddenly	  turn	  into	  processes	  or	  entire	  
networks	   of	   them	   (autopoiesis!?)	   revealing	   some	   hidden	   variable	   operational	   semantics	   (Bohm)	   that	  
completely	   inverts	   the	  picture,	   so	  one	  has	   a	   “jump”	  or	   gap	   in	   the	  overall	   description.	  How	   to	  explain	  
that?	  The	  object	  becomes	  a	  process,	  and	  then	  again	  the	  reverse	  situation	  at	  some	  point	  later.	  What	  we	  
may	  need	  is	  a	  mathematics	  in	  which	  one	  assumes	  that	  every	  scalar	  quantity	  is	  actually	  a	  pair	  of	  opposite	  
vectors	   (or	   tensors)	   that	  normally	  sum	  to	  the	  null	  vector	   (or	   tensor).	  For	  example,	   in	  all	  vector/tensor	  
systems	  in	  biology	  of	  which	  we	  are	  aware,	  an	  inflow	  of	  one	  kind	  of	  molecule	  is	  always	  balanced	  by	  an	  
outflow	  of	  another;	  selection	  for	  right-­‐handed	  sugars	  occurs	  only	  where	  there	  is	  concomitant	  selection	  
for	   left-­‐handed	   amino	   acids.	   So	   is	   it	   possible	   that	   in	   fact	   the	   overall	   balance	   of	   vectors/tensors	   in	   a	  
biological	  system	  is	  always	  conserved	  and	  that	  the	  local	  manifestation	  of	  one	  half	  of	  a	  vector/tensor	  pair	  
(e.g.,	   inflow)	   is	   always	  balanced	  by	   the	  expression	  of	   the	  opposite	   vector/tensor	  pair	   (outflow)	   in	   the	  
opposing	  process?	  Is	  there	  a	  mathematics	  that	  can	  help	  us	  investigate	  the	  rules	  that	  might	  govern	  such	  
processes	  by	  integrating	  vector/tensor	  reasoning	  into	  the	  kinds	  of	  set	  thinking	  postulated	  above	  so	  we	  






The	  fifth	  type	  of	  problem	   involves	  the	   linkage	  of	  form	  and	  function.	  Biologists	  who	  deal	  with	  almost	  
any	  level	  of	  biological	  organization	  have	  recognized	  that	  natural	  selection	  attempts	  to	  optimize	  forms	  to	  
carry	  out	  particular	  functions,	  but	  since	  novel	  functions	  evolve	  from	  existing	  forms,	  these	  attempts	  may	  
be	  seriously	  limited.	  The	  mathematical	  challenges	  involved	  in	  attempting	  to	  model	  these	  form-­‐function	  
interactions	  are	  far	  from	  trivial.	  Knot	  Theory	  (Manturov,	  2004)	  allows	  study	  of	  the	  form	  of	  proteins,	   in	  
particular	  protein	   folding	   (Kauffman	  and	  Magarshak,	  1993;	  Taylor,	  2000;	  Martz,	  2000),	  but	  we	  do	  not	  
have	   good	  geometrical	   tools	   that	   can	  easily	  model	   complex	  processes	   in	   embryological	   development.	  	  
Fractals	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  mathematics	  that	  generate	  lovely	  images	  that	  look	  like	  the	  final	  products	  of	  
some	  of	  these	  processes	  (e.g.,	  the	  branching	  structure	  of	  the	  bronchioles	  in	  the	  lungs)	  but	  share	  nothing	  
of	   the	   actual	   biological	   processes	   that	   give	   rise	   to	   these	   structures.	   But	  the	   very	   fact	   that	   the	   final	  
outcomes	   of	   these	   images	   look	   similar	   suggests	   that	   they	   do	   share	   something	   in	   the	   functional	   and	  
structural	  organization,	  even	  if	  we	  do	  not	  understand	  what	  it	  is.	  Our	  mathematical	  geometries	  generally	  
do	  not	   illuminate	   the	  processes	   that	   give	   rise	   to	  biological	   geometries,	   but	  only	   their	   outward	   forms.	  
More	   importantly,	   the	   interesting	   thing	  about	  biological	   forms	   is	  not	   their	   geometries	  per	   se,	  but	   the	  
ways	  in	  which	  these	  forms	  are	  reifications	  of	  the	  biochemical	  processes	  they	  carry	  out	  or	  make	  possible.	  
For	   example,	   it	   has	   become	   evident	   that	   the	   folding	   of	   chromosomes	   is	   a	   prerequisite	   to	   bringing	  
together	  genes	  that	  would	  otherwise	  be	  spatially	  separated;	  and	  that	  spatial	  proximity	  permits	  the	  rapid	  
diffusion,	   and	   control	   of	   interactive	   gene	   products	   that	   would	   otherwise	   be	   unable	   to	   interact	   in	   a	  
reasonable	  biological	  time	  frame	  across	  an	  unfolded	  genome	  (Junier	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  	  
	  
But	  what	  kind	  of	  mathematics	  would	  make	  it	  possible	  to	  model	  simultaneously	  the	  effects	  of	  geometry	  
(spatial	  structure)	  on	  continuous	  functions	  such	  as	  diffusion,	  that	  in	  turn	  regulate	  on-­‐off	  gene	  regulatory	  
switches	   that	   act	   discontinuously	   or	   digitally?	   Similarly,	   in	   developmental	   biology,	   we	   now	   have	  
excellent	  data	  concerning	  the	  sets	  of	  genes	  that	  must	  be	  turned	  on	  and	  when	  they	  must	  be	  activated	  or	  
inactivated	  in	  order	  to	  produce	  proper	  embryological	  development	  (e.g.,	  Carroll,	  2005),	  yet	  the	  discrete	  
information	   generated	   from	   combinations	   of	   individual	   genes	   is	   expressed	   as	   a	   continuous	   flow	   of	  
proteins	   and	   hormones	   that	   produce	   gradients	  which	  must	   be	   reified	   as	   organized	   groupings	   of	   cells	  
that	  have	  a	  specific	  form.	  So	  once	  again,	  embryology	  is	  stymied	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  mathematical	  approaches	  
that	  can	  link	  discrete,	  continuous	  and	  geometrical	  information.	  	  
	  
Conventional	  approaches	  to	  these	  sorts	  of	  problems	  rely	  on	  modeling	  one	  aspect	  of	  the	  problem	  with	  
one	  form	  of	  mathematics,	  switching	  to	  another	  sort	  of	  mathematics	  to	  address	  the	  next	  aspect,	  and	  to	  a	  
third	  one	   to	  describe	   yet	   another.	  All	   this	   switching	   is	   an	   indication	  of	   how	  difficult	   it	   is	   to	   apply	  our	  
mathematical	   tools	   for	   addressing	   these	   problems.	   Biological	   systems	   function	   at	   all	   of	   these	   levels	  
simultaneously,	  so	  why	  cannot	  our	  mathematics?	  
	  
We	  maintain	  that	  it	  is	  not	  the	  biology	  that	  is	  too	  messy	  to	  be	  modeled	  in	  these	  cases,	  but	  the	  application	  
of	  orthodox	  mathematics	   that	   is	   inadequate,	  because	   it	   is	   inappropriate	   for	   addressing	   these	   sorts	  of	  
biological	   problems.	   This	   is	   why	   we	   need	   a	   new	   biomathematics!	   Indeed,	   we	   speculate	   that	  
complementarity	   might	   be	   the	   solution	   to	   both	   the	   biological	   and	   the	  mathematical	   problems	   here.	  
What	   we	   seem	   to	   need	   are	   the	   means	   to	   describe	   all	   of	   the	   biological	   problems	   listed	   above	   as	  






To	   summarize,	  our	   contention	   is	   that	   the	   reason	   that	  biologists	  have	   failed	   to	  develop	  a	   viable	   set	  of	  
mathematics	   methods	   appropriate	   to	   solving	   biology’s	   problems	   is	   that	   we	   have	   relied	   too	   long	   on	  
mathematics	  developed	  to	  model	  physical	  problems	  that	  are	  intrinsically	  different.	  The	  assumption	  has	  
been	  that	  biology	  can	  be	  reduced	  to	  chemistry	  and	  eventually	  to	  physics,	  and	  therefore	  that	  a	  physics-­‐
derived	  mathematics	   should	   be	   sufficient.	   But	   hierarchy	   theory	   suggests	   that	   reductionism	   can	   never	  
explain	   how	   novel	   properties	   and	   processes	   emerge.	   Biological	   entities	   have	   properties	   that	   are	  
different	  from	  chemical	  and	  physical	  ones	  and	  that	  require	  novel	  mathematics	  for	  their	  description.	  	  
	  
Thus,	  what	  we	  need	  is	  not	  more	  detailed	  physical	  models	  of	  biological	  systems	  that	  can	  handle	  greater	  
and	   greater	   amounts	   of	   detailed	   data	   from	   increasingly	   fine-­‐grained	   studies	   of	   the	   components	   of	  
systems,	   but	   ways	   of	   identifying	   the	   biological	   properties	   that	   are	   as	   unique	   to	   such	   complex	  
conglomerations	  as	  temperature	   is	  to	  a	  set	  of	  molecules.	  What	  we	  have	   lacked,	   in	  short,	   is	  a	  uniquely	  
evolutionary	  mathematics	   that	   deals	  with	   the	   emergence	   of	   organization	   from	   non-­‐random	   selection	  
among	  replicating	  variations	  within	  complex	  populations.	  	  
	  
The	   challenge	   to	   a	   novel	   biological	   mathematics,	   or	   biomathematics,	   is	   to	   invent	   new	  mathematical	  
tools	  (or	  to	  make	  effective	  use	  of	  existing	  ones),	  which	  are	  able	  to	  handle	  such	  emergent	  properties	  and	  
organizations.	   This	   will	   allow	   the	   development	   of	   a	   biologically	   relevant	   theoretical	   framework	  
integrating	   concepts	   of	   continuous	   mathematics	   with	   discrete	   mathematics,	   algebraic	   formalisms,	  
abstract	  calculi,	  logics	  and	  topological/geometrical	  principles	  in	  a	  novel	  biologically	  relevant	  framework	  
we	  call	  Integral	  Biomathics.	  
	  
The	  sixth	  and	  final	  type	  of	  problem	  deals	  with	  multi-­‐scale	  integration	  of	  mathematical	  models	  and	  the	  
study	  of	  emergence.	  It	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  development	  of	  a	  set	  of	  theories	  that	  cut	  across	  multiple	  
spatio-­‐temporal	  scales	  of	  organization.	  In	  fact,	  such	  a	  kind	  of	  mathematics,	  which	  is	  capable	  of	  unifying	  
the	  different	  domains	  of	  mathematics,	   already	  exists:	  Category	  Theory	   (cf.	   Section	  7.6.1).	   It	   allows	  an	  
approach	  to	   the	   five	  types	  of	  problems	  mentioned	  above.	  We	  believe,	  as	  Charles	  Ehresmann	  noted	   in	  
1966,	   that	  mathematics	   "is	   the	   key	   for	   the	   understanding	   of	   the	  whole	   Universe,	   unifying	   all	   human	  
thinking"	  and	  that	  "the	  theory	  of	  categories	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  most	  unifying	  trend	  to-­‐day"	  (Ehresmann,	  
1966).	   In	   the	   past	   50	   years	   new	   branches	   of	   Category	   Theory	   (CT)	   have	   been	   further	   developed:	  
monoidal	   categories	   which	   generalize	   tensor	   calculus	   and	   are	   used	   for	   instance	   in	   Categorical	   QM	  
Semantics	   (Abramsky,	   1996;	   Abramsky	   and	   Coecke,	   2007)	   and	   Quantum	   Picturalism	   (Coecke,	   2009);	  
higher	   categories	   and	   sketches	   which	   Charles	   and	   Andree	   Ehresmann	   introduced	   and	   were	   later	  
modified	  and	  developed	  by	  others	  (incl.	  their	  research	  students)	  leading	  to	  completely	  new	  sub-­‐domains	  
of	  category	  theory	  with	  applications	  in	  computer	  science	  and	  in	  the	  foundations	  of	  physics.	  Some	  of	  the	  
above	   problems	   are	   raised	   in	   the	   Memory	   Evolutive	   Systems	   (MES;	   cf.	   Section	   7.6),	   (Ehresmann	   &	  
Vanbremeersch,	  2007),	  which	  are	  based	  on	  a	  dynamic	  theory	  of	  categories	  incorporating	  time.	  Indeed	  a	  
MES	   is	   "not"	   a	   category,	   but	   an	   "Evolutive	   System",	   i.e.	  a	   family	   of	   categories	   indexed	   by	   time,	   with	  
transition	  partial	  functors	  between	  them	  modelling	  the	  changes	  over	  time,	  each	  category	  representing	  
only	   a	   snapshot	   of	   the	   configuration	   of	   the	   system	   at	   a	   given	   time.	   The	   transition	   functors	   allow	  







What	  makes	  MES	  adapted	  for	  modelling	  living	  entities	   is	  not	   just	  that	  they	  are	  ES	  (it	  could	  also	  be	  the	  
case	   for	   "mechanisms"),	   but	   their	   multi-­‐agent	   multi-­‐temporal	   self-­‐organization,	   with	   the	   interplay	  
among	  their	  agents	  (called	  Co-­‐Regulators,	  CR)	  and	  its	  capacity	  of	   learning	  based	  on	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  
flexible	  though	  robust	  and	  plastic	  memory9.	  However	  for	  MES	  to	  become	  a	  good	  formal	  methodology	  it	  
needs	  to	  evolve	  like	  a	  living	  system	  itself,	  otherwise	  it	  would	  be	  a	  dead	  end.	  Further,	  it	  is	  already	  a	  living	  
system	  itself,	  thus	  able	  to	  be	  enhanced	  and	  adapted	  to	  reflect	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  most	  recent	  findings	  in	  
biology	  in	  order	  to	  prepare	  for	  the	  discovery	  of	  new	  ones.	  This	  will	  be	  also	  the	  case	  in	  future,	  for	  we	  are	  
challenged	   to	  build	   Integral	  Biomathics	  on	   solid	   foundations.	   So,	   even	   in	   the	  best	   cases,	  MES	  will	   not	  
remain	  the	  same	  in	  the	  future.	  We	  may	  also	  experience	  some	  surprises	  on	  the	  way.	  Thus,	  the	  sixth	  and	  
last	   type	  of	  problem	  outlines	  some	   ideas,	  which	  give	  the	   INBIOSA	   incentive	  a	  push	  toward	  a	  real	   (and	  
probably	  completely	  different)	  theory	  of	  living	  systems,	  cf.	  section	  7.	  
We	  are	  aware	  that	  the	  above	  arguments	  are	  perhaps	  not	  sufficient	  to	  firmly	  underpin	  our	  position	  prior	  
to	   discussing	   the	   above	   six	   major	   problems	   within	   this	   short	   12	   months	   project.	  	   Usually,	   scientific	  
discussions	   of	   that	   kind	   take	   years	   or	   even	   decades.	  We	  will	   need	   time	   to	   systematically	   analyze	   all	  
proven	  theories,	  postulates,	  facts	  and	  assumptions	  underlying	  this	  rough	  outline	  of	  a	  research	  program	  
in	  order	  to	  "clearly	  state"	  (as	  even	  some	  of	  our	  discussants	  requested)	  the	  INBIOSA	  “roadmap”.	  	  Or	  the	  
roadmap	  may	  need	  radically	  redrawn,	  because	  of	  new	  insights	  encountered	  along	  the	  way.	  The	  reader	  
may	  also	  criticize	  the	  many	  overlapping	  issues	  in	  this	  section,	  since	  usually	  major	  problems	  of	  ambitious	  
programs	  are	  defined	  as	  disjoint	   (although	  related,	  as	  e.g.	   in	   (Hilbert,	  1902))	  entities.	  But	   this	   is	   really	  
entered	   “terra	   incognita”	   and	   only	   recently	   started.	   Thus,	   elaborating	   the	   details	   of	   the	   above	   six	  
problems	  will	  be	  continued	  in	  a	  future	  follow-­‐up	  project.	  
In	  conclusion,	  we	  feel	  compelled	  to	  think	  that	  Integral	  Biomathics	  may	  revolutionize	  mathematics	  itself	  
by	   proposing	  mathematical	  models	   based	  on	   a	   recently	   developed	  domain	   of	  mathematics	   (Category	  
Theory)	   that	   integrates	   (through	   fundamentally	   simple	   insights)	   disparate	   areas	   of	   both	  mathematics	  
and	  the	  sciences.	  Since	  we	  have	  to	  think	  about	  biological	  systems	  in	  all	  of	  these	  ways	  in	  order	  to	  model	  
them,	   and	   since	   biological	   processes	   are	   intrinsically	   carried	   out	   in	   these	   integrated	   ways	   by	   Nature	  
itself,	  it	  seems	  logical	  that	  real	  and	  useful	  connections	  must	  exist	  within	  the	  mathematical	  formulations	  
of	  these	  natural	  processes	  as	  well.	   Indeed,	  as	  we	  have	  indicated,	  we	  believe	  that	  biology	  is	  just	  one	  of	  
many	   such	   sets	   of	   emergent	   properties	   resulting	   from	   spontaneous	   organization	   within	   complex	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  The	  above	  mentioned	  transformation	  from	  scalar	  to	  vector	  could	  correspond	  to	  the	  'jump'	  from	  process	  to	  object,	  and	  vice	  
versa,	  done	  in	  MES	  to	  construct	  the	  landscape	  of	  a	  CR,	  and	  later	  realize	  the	  selected	  procedure.	  Indeed,	  the	  landscape	  of	  a	  CR	  
at	  a	  given	  time	  t	  is	  a	  category	  which	  has	  for	  objects	  the	  links	  f	  of	  the	  system	  which	  transmit	  information	  to	  the	  CR	  around	  t:	  thus	  
the	  passage	   from	   the	   system	   to	   the	   landscape	  of	   a	  CR	   transforms	   information	  processes	   f	   into	  objects.	  And	   conversely,	   the	  
procedure	   that	   the	   CR	   selects	   is	   an	   object	   Pr	   (in	   the	   memory),	   which	   is	   realized	   through	   its	   commands	   to	   effectors,	   thus	  
transformation	  of	  an	  object	  Pr	  into	  processes.	  Let	  us	  note	  that	  categories	  consider	  both	  objects	  and	  processes	  (as	  links	  between	  
the	  objects),	  and,	  through	  the	  colimit	  operation,	  transforms	  patterns	  (=	  sub-­‐networks)	  into	  higher	  objects.	  The	  situation	  is	  still	  
more	   complex	   in	   2-­‐categories,	   where	   the	   same	   element	   can	   be	   seen	   either	   as	   an	   object	   or	   a	   process.	   A	   2-­‐category	   K	   is	   a	  
category	   in	   which	   the	   sets	   Hom(A,	   B)	   of	   links	   from	   A	   to	   B	   are	   equipped	   with	   a	   composition	   law	   transforming	   them	   into	  
categories	  (with	  some	  coherence	  axioms).	  Thus	  an	  object	  g	  in	  the	  category	  Hom(A,	  B)	  is	  at	  the	  same	  time	  a	  link	  from	  A	  to	  B	  in	  K,	  
hence	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  process	  between	  them.	  Thus,	  depending	  on	  how	  it	  is	  looked	  at,	  g	  'jumps'	  from	  being	  considered	  as	  an	  
object	   to	   a	   process	   and	   vice	   versa.	   However,	   there	   might	   be	   other	   explanations	   for	   such	   phenomena,	   e.g.	   the	   WLI’s	  





systems.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  the	  principles	  that	  are	  derived	  from	  our	  studies	  of	  biomathematics	  should	  
apply	  to	  an	  understanding	  of	  how	  novel	  properties	  can	  emerge	  in	  complex	  systems	  of	  any	  kind,	  whether	  
ecological,	   social,	   behavioural,	   technological	   or	   economic.	   Thus,	   just	   as	   the	   Scientific	   Revolution	  
provided	  us	  with	  physics-­‐based	  mathematics	  that	  made	  possible	  the	  investigation	  of	  whole	  new	  realms	  
of	   science,	   so	   can	   we	   expect	   the	   development	   of	   a	   biology-­‐based	  mathematics,	   Integral	   Biomathics	  
(Simeonov,	  2010a/b;	  Simeonov	  et	  al.,	  2011),	  to	  have	  equally	  far-­‐reaching	  and	  revolutionary	  effects.	  
	  
5.	  Issues	  Affecting	  Integral	  Biomathics	  
	  
There	   are	   a	   large	   number	   of	   specific	   issues	   or	   difficulties,	   which	   impact	   directly	   or	   indirectly	   on	   the	  
development	   of	   Integral	   Biomathics.	   The	   following	   list	   is	   not	   exhaustive,	   but	   provides	   an	   important	  





Possibly	   the	   primary	   defining	   character	   of	   biological	   systems	   is	   complementarity.	   This,	   in	   itself,	   is	  
sufficient	   to	   emphasize	   that	   biology	   must	   be	   treated	   differently	   from	   physics	   or	   chemistry,	   where	  
although	   complementarity	   can	   and	   does	   exist,	   it	   is	   less	   critical.	  Mathematically,	   complementarity	  will	  
provide	  the	  biggest	  challenge	  in	  the	  conception	  of	  Integral	  Biomathics.	  	  
	  
One	   sort	  of	   complementarity	   is	  methodological,	  enabling	   relational	  data	   to	  emerge	   through	  dialogical	  
processes	   that	   juxtapose	   different	  mathematical	   approaches	   (both	   static	   and	   dynamic),	   as	   embodied	  
within	   new	   simulation	   and	   visualization	   methodologies.	   The	   complexity	   of	   biological	   functionality	  
necessitates	  the	  employment	  of	  a	  multi-­‐perspective	  set	  of	  mathematical	  approaches.	  Such	  approaches	  
can	   be	   realized	   by	   articulating	   a	   set	   of	   relations	   and	   interactions	   between	   the	   differing	   branches	   of	  
mathematics	   that	   come	   into	   play,	   as	  well	   as	   by	   developing	   new	   forms	   of	  mathematics	   driven	   by	   the	  
biology	  at	  hand.	  
	  
Another	  kind	  of	  complementarity	  is	  that	  of	  investigated	  objects	  and	  processes.	  It	  is	  comparatively	  rare	  in	  
biological	  settings	  to	  find	  a	  process	  or	  phenomenon,	  which	  is	  independent	  from	  all	  others	  and	  the	  forms	  
in	  which	  complementarity	  appears	  are	  many	  and	  varied.	  When	  we	  observe	  the	  ways	  that	  molecules	  and	  
systems	   interact	   to	   create	   complexes,	   whose	   emergent	   properties	   are	   unpredictable	   from	   their	  
individual	  components,	   then	  complementarity	  resembles	  Escher	  tilings,	   in	  which	  each	   line	  defines	  two	  
forms,	  and	  the	  overall	  design	  is	  different	  from	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  parts.	  Another	  way	  complementarity	  can	  
appear	  is	  more	  like	  the	  way	  physicists	  use	  the	  term,	  where	  something	  can	  be	  described	  both	  as	  a	  wave	  
and	  a	  particle.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  Niels	  Bohr’s	  position	  was	  that	  ideas	  of	  complementarity	  
should	  not	  be	  restricted	  to	  particle-­‐wave	  duality.	  Complementarity	  reminds	  us	  that	  we	  must	  cohesively	  
integrate	   actor-­‐centered	   first	   person	   descriptions	   and	   impartial	   third	   person	   descriptions	   in	   any	  






Any	  successful	  formulation	  of	  Integral	  Biomathics	  must	  take	  account	  of	  apparent	  dichotomies	  like	  that	  
at	   the	   intersection	   of	   reductionism	   and	   holism.	   Ideally,	   such	   a	   formulation	   would	   be	   capable	   of	   re-­‐
casting	   this,	   and	   other	   dichotomies,	   as	   complementarities,	   thus	   avoiding	   inherent	   or	   unintended	  
paradoxes.	  An	   important	  aspect	  of	   this	   relates	   to	   individuals,	   groups	  and	  evolution.	   Is	   there	  a	  way	   to	  
look	   at	   natural	   selection	   from	   both	   individual	   and	   group	   selection	   perspectives	   that	   yields	   a	   new	  
complementary	  model	  more	  powerful	  than	  either	  of	  them	  alone10	  (Fodor	  and	  Piattelli-­‐Palmarini,	  2010)?	  
And	   could	   this	   lead,	   as	   it	   did	   in	   quantum	   theory,	   to	   fascinating	   new	   conundrums	   –	   such	   as	   a	  
‘Heisenberg's	   uncertainty	   principle	   for	   biology’	   –	  in	   which,	   for	   example,	   it	   would	   only	   be	   possible	   to	  
explain	  microevolution	  based	  on	  individual	  selection	  and	  macroevolution	  based	  on	  group	  selection,	  and	  
that	  a	  population	  consisting	  of	  both	  individuals	  and	  groups	  would	  be	  amenable	  to	  both	  types	  of	  analysis,	  
but	  could	  not	  be	  completely	  described	  by	  either?	  
	  
5.2	  Scale	  and	  Hyperscale	  
	  
Confusion	  abounds	  as	  to	  the	  character	  of	  system	  scale.	  Most	  usually	  this	  concept	  is	  uniquely	  associated	  
with	   its	  counterpart	  of	  size,	  but	   this	  often	   results	   in	  a	  complete	  misunderstanding	  of	   the	   role	  of	   scale	  
and	  of	  its	  implications	  for	  system	  operation	  and	  function.	  Unfortunately,	  in	  the	  information	  sciences,	  the	  
idea	  of	   scalability	   refers	   to	  a	  capacity	   to	  change	  the	  size	  of	  a	  system	  or	  network	  without	   running	   into	  
unforeseen	  or	  undesirable	  situations	  –	  without	  any	  scalar	  effects	  appearing.	  	  
	  
Unfortunately,	  once	  more,	  the	  isolated	  Boolean	  nature	  of	  purely	  digital	  systems	  explicitly	  eliminates	  any	  
local-­‐to-­‐global	  effects:	  in	  their	  instantiation	  as	  information	  processors,	  digital	  systems	  never	  exhibit	  real	  
scale,	  no	  matter	  how	  big	   they	  may	  become.	  Much	   is	  made	  of	   the	  possibility	   that	  a	  global	   intelligence	  
could	  develop,	  or	  be	  developed,	  within	  the	  Internet.	  This	  is,	  unfortunately	  yet	  again,	  formally	  excluded	  
for	  the	  same	  reasons,	  although	  it	  could	  be	  –	  and	  possibly	  currently	  is	  –	  a	  reality	  for	  the	  extended	  global	  
system	   of	   {Internet	   +	   users}.	   Intelligence	   is	   a	   vitally	   important	   feature	   of	   any	   biological	   system.	   It	  
constitutes	   at	   the	   very	   least	   a	   capacity	   to	   operationally	   relate	   the	   lowest	   organizational	   level	   of	   an	  
organism	  to	  a	  higher	  organizational	   level,	  and/or	   levels,	   in	   support	  of	   the	  organism’s	   survival.	   Leaving	  
aside	   for	   the	  moment	  how	   a	   higher	   scalar	   level	   of	   an	  organism	  may	  emerge,	   this	   transition	   is	   always	  
associated	  with	  a	  reduction	  in	  the	  available	  degrees	  of	  freedom,	  and	  it	  naturally	  takes	  place	  through	  a	  
region	  of	  state	  space	  (or,	  rather,	  scale	  space)	  of	  great	  complexity11.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  For	  instance,	  the	  Multiplicity	  Principle,	  MP	  (Ehresmann	  &	  Vanbremeersch,	  2007)	  represents	  such	  a	  kind	  of	  complementarity:	  
the	   same	   function	  can	  be	   realized	  by	  non-­‐isomorphic	   complexes	  with	   the	  possibility	  of	   'switches'	  between	   them.	   It	   is	  at	   the	  
basis	   of	   the	   emergence	   of	   complex	   interactions	   between	   complexes	   A	   and	   B	   not	   reducible	   to	   interactions	   between	   the	  
components	  of	  A	  and	  B.	  And	  the	  existence	  of	  complex	  links	  is	  the	  characteristics	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  non-­‐reducible	  objects	  of	  
complexity	   order	   >1,	   i.e.	   complexes	   that	   have	   emergent	   properties	   unpredictable	   from	   their	   individual	   components	   but	  
dependent	  on	  the	  global	  structure	  of	  lower	  levels.	  
11	  By	  ‘complexity’	  here	  we	  refer	  to	  Rosennian	  complexity	  of	  real	  systems,	  and	  not	  the	  Kolmogorov	  complexity,	  which	  appears	  in	  
digital	   information	   processing.	   However	   the	   Kolmogoroff	   complexity	   can	   be	   generalized	   to	   hierarchical	   systems	   such	   as	  
biological	  systems	  to	  measure	  the	   'real'	  constructive	  complexity	  of	  a	  component;	  and	  it	  has	  been	  shown	  that	  the	  Multiplicity	  
Principle	   (formalizing	   the	   degeneracy	   properties	   of	   living	   systems)	   is	   necessary	   for	   the	   existence	   of	   such	   higher	   complexity	  





Consequently,	   it	   is	   virtually	   impossible	   to	   model	   mathematically	   a	   single	   (‘local’)	   scale-­‐change	   in	   an	  
organism	  without	  also	  taking	  account	  of	  its	  global	  properties.	  Although	  the	  operations	  characterizing	  an	  
organism	  at	  a	  single	  scalar	  level,	  e.g.	  that	  of	  biological	  cells,	  may	  at	  first	  sight	  appear	  intractable,	  the	  real	  
challenge	  is	  to	  somehow	  model	  the	  relations	  between	  even	  adjacent	  scales.	  The	  inter-­‐scalar	  ‘regions’	  of	  
an	   organism	   are	   archetypically	   complex,	   and	   multiply	   fractal.	   Accordingly,	   any	   approach	   to	   their	  
understanding	  requires	  close	  attention	  to	  complexity	  theory.	   If	  we	  assume	  that	   individual	  scalar	   levels	  
can	   be	   at	   least	   approximated	   by	   Newtonian	   representations,	   then	   the	   inter-­‐scalar	   regions	   are	   more	  
closely	   related	   to	   quantum-­‐mechanical	   superposition-­‐and-­‐collapse:	   first	   a	   superposition	   of	   all	   the	  
‘possible	   emergences’	   (Yardley,	   2010),	   followed	   by	   a	   collapse	   to	   the	   most	   suitable	   one.	   In	   an	  
information-­‐processing	   context	   this	   birational	   character	  may	   be	   ubiquitous.	   Pribram	   has	   suggested	   a	  
related	  model	   for	   the	   interaction	   of	   neuron	   groups	   (Pribram,	   2001),	   where	   the	   neural	   dendrites	   and	  
nucleus	   may	   be	   represented	   by	   some	   kind	   of	   (classical)	   summation	   of	   information,	   and	   where	   the	  
axonite	   distribution	  of	   the	   result	   is	   transmitted	   to	   following	  neurons	  by	   a	   ‘(real)	   simulation’	   of	   quasi-­‐
wave	  transmission	  and	  ‘collapse’.	  Another	  interesting	  theory	  of	  fractal	  space-­‐time	  and	  scale	  relativity	  for	  
biology	   was	   presented	   by	   Nottale	   and	   Auffray,	   (Nottale,	   1993;	   Auffray	   &	   Nottale,	   2008;	   Nottale,	   &	  
Auffray,	  2008).	  
	  	  
Living	  systems	  develop	  into	  multiscalar	  assemblies	  whose	  organizational	  structure	  has	  much	  in	  common	  
with	   conventional	   ideas	   of	   both	   hierarchy	   and	   heterarchy.	   However,	   where	   the	   usual	   concept	   of	  
hierarchy	  imposes	  one	  of	  two	  forms	  –	  scale	  hierarchy	  or	  specification	  hierarchy	  –	  living	  systems	  appear	  
to	  develop	  into	  a	  form	  which	  can	  most	  usefully	  described	  as	  a	  model	  hierarchy	  that	  has	  been	  described	  
as	   “a	   specification	   hierarchy	   constructed	   in	   terms	   of	   scale”12	  (Cottam	   et	   al.,	   2003,	   2004).	   Here,	   each	  
level	   of	   the	   (quasi-­‐)hierarchy	   represents	   the	   entire	   organism	   at	   a	   different	   scale.	  Whereas	   scale	   and	  
specification	   hierarchies	   are	   usually	   referred	   to	   as	   abstract	   human	   constructions,	   a	   model	   hierarchy	  
appears	  to	  successfully	  represent	  what	  a	  living	  system	  itself	  constructs.	  Each	  level	  of	  such	  an	  assembly	  is	  
partially	  enclosed	  and	  partially	   in	   communication	  with	   its	  neighboring	   scales,	  and	   the	  entire	  assembly	  
forms	  a	  ‘self-­‐correlating’	  whole	  of	  partially	  autonomous	  scaled	  ‘sub-­‐systems’.	  This	  type	  of	  structure	  not	  
only	   subsumes	   the	   idea	   of	   hierarchy,	   it	   also	   subsumes	   heterarchy	   through	   the	   variable	   nature	   of	   its	  
partial	   inter-­‐scale	   communication	   and	   consequent	   variable	   scale	   autonomy.	   The	   ‘traditionally’	  
problematic	   aspect	   of	   hierarchy	   is	   how	   to	   represent	   the	  emergence	   of	   a	   structure’s	   new	  higher	   scale	  
level	   by	   ‘upscaling’	   from	   a	   lower	   one.	   This	   ‘transitional’	   upscaling	   in	   living	   systems	   appears	   to	   be	   a	  
generic	  form	  of	  quantum	  error	  correction13,	  where	  local	  system	  information	  is	  added	  to	  a	  description	  of	  
the	  initial	  level	  to	  focus	  targeting	  on	  the	  higher	  one.	  Close	  examination	  of	  the	  properties	  and	  features	  of	  
living	   systems	  over	   the	   last	   two	  decades	  has	   indicated	   that	   this	   type	  of	  Newtonian-­‐plus-­‐quantal	   ‘two-­‐
stage	   process’	   characterizes	   all	   ‘transitional’	   upscaling	   processes,	   whether	   in	   biotic	   or	   abiotic	  
‘systems’14.	   This	   must,	   then,	   constitute	   a	   central	   issue	   in	   any	   approach	   to	   creating	   a	   mathematical	  
scheme	  for	  biology	  per	  se.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  a	  citation	  of	  Stanley	  Salthe	  who	  also	  added	  here	  when	  reviewing	  this	  paper:	  “Some	  have	  proposed	  that	  diachronic	  processes,	  
like	  evolution	  or	  development	  can	  be	  represented	  using	  the	  specification	  hierarchy,	  while	  any	  stage	  picked	  out	  for	  examination	  
would	  have	  scale	  hierarchy	  form.	  
13	  a	  suggestion	  originally	  made	  by	  Walter	  Schempp	  







However,	  as	  it	  stands	  this	  is	  insufficient,	  for	  it	  offers	  no	  advice	  at	  all	  about	  how	  changes	  in	  one	  level	  may	  
impact	  on	  its	  lower	  neighbor.	  If	  we	  take	  Rosen’s	  sole	  reference	  to	  scale	  systems	  as	  a	  lead,	  it	   is	  unclear	  
exactly	   how	   a	   suitable	   mathematical	   scheme	   may	   be	   formulated,	   because	   to	   do	   so	   requires	   us	   to	  
address	   how	   to	  mathematically	   differentiate	   or	   integrate	   a	   complementary	   pair!	   Nevertheless,	   more	  
elaborate	   categorical	   tools	   (such	   as	   sketch	   theory	   and	   its	   application	   to	   the	   complexification	  process)	  
can	  provide	  some	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  (Ehresmann	  &	  Vanbremeersch,	  2007).	  	  
	  
At	  the	  very	  least,	  any	  representation	  of	  a	  living	  entity,	  for	  example	  of	  a	  biological	  cell,	  must	  take	  account	  
of	   these	   aspects	   of	   scale.	   Although	   many	   informational	   properties	   of	   a	   cell	   may	   be	   derived	   from	  
experiments	  with	  cellular	  cultures,	  this	  in	  no	  way	  addresses	  the	  cell’s	  internal	  workings,	  and	  a	  great	  deal	  
of	  expertise	  and	  imagination	  will	  be	  required	  if	  we	  are	  to	  ‘construct’	  a	  link	  between	  these	  two,	  even	  if	  
only	  conceptually	  rather	  than	  mathematically.	  As	  seen	  from	  outside,	  an	  organism	  will	  always	  appear	  to	  
be	  a	  set	  of	  properties	  which	  operate	  at	  a	  number	  of	  different	  scales,	  and	  although	  we	  can	  attempt	  to	  
model	  these	   in	  a	   ‘global’	   representation,	  our	   ‘access’	   to	   internal	  scales	  will	  always	  be	  partial	   in	  nature	  
and	   dependent	   on	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   our	   informing	   experiments	   disrupt	   the	   organism’s	   ‘closure’	  
(Cottam	  et	  al.,	  2000).	  
	  
In	  our	  daily	  lives	  we	  view	  entities	  in	  our	  surroundings	  in	  a	  similar	  manner	  –	  as	  a	  loose	  conglomeration	  of	  
both	  ‘visible’	  and	  ‘imagined’	  multi-­‐scale	  properties	  and	  processes.	  Here	  again,	  two	  decades	  of	  research	  
have	   indicated	  that	  this	  hyper-­‐scale	   ‘picture’	  (Cottam	  et	  al.,	  2006)	   is	  not	  only	  characteristic	  of	  the	  way	  
we	   view	   an	   entity,	   but	   that	   it	   is	   intimately	   associated	  with	   the	  way	   an	   entity	   itself	   builds	   up	   its	   very	  
nature.	   Not	   only	   are	   the	   different	   scales	   of	   an	   organism	   only	   indirectly	   accessible	   from	   an	   outside	  
platform	  in	  a	  ‘vague’	  manner,	  their	  internal	  inter-­‐correlation	  is	  itself	  vague	  –	  the	  result	  of	  ‘integrating’	  its	  
different	  scales	  across	  a	  number	  of	   internal	   levels.	  Thus,	  scale,	  and	  this	  difficulty	  of	   inter-­‐scale	  transit,	  
must	  occupy	  a	  prime	  position	   in	   any	  attempt	   to	  model	  biosystems.	   The	   viability	  of	   any	  mathematical	  
approach	  must	  be	  judged	  by	  its	  ability	  to	  address	  scale	  issues	  as	  they	  unfold	  in	  time.	  It	  is	  far	  from	  clear	  
that	   this	   will	   be	   possible	   from	   either	   a	   purely	   physics-­‐based	   approach	   or	   a	   purely	   biology-­‐based	  
approach.	   Life	   itself	   appears	   ‘automatically’	   within	   Nature,	   and	   consequently	   it	   should	   appear	  
‘automatically’	   from	   any	   realistic	   model	   of	   Nature.	   Rather	   than	   beginning	   from	   a	   purely	   biological	  
ground,	   it	   seems	   that	   the	   best	   route	   would	   be	   to	   first	   create	   a	   modeling	   framework,	   which	   is	  
independent	  of	  any	  ‘biotic	  or	  abiotic’	  distinction	  –	  to	  create	  a	  framework,	  which	  is	  not	  restricted	  by	  the	  
constraints	   of	   either	   physics	   or	   biology.	   Such	   an	   enterprise,	   therefore,	   must	   encompass	   two	   quasi-­‐
independent	   features	   in	   relation	   to	   a	   specific	   target:	   first,	   a	   foundational	   framework	   within	   which	  
Newtonian	  and	  quantal	  viewpoints,	  and	  their	  more	  local	  derivatives,	  can	  successfully	  coexist;	  second,	  a	  
mathematical	  formulation	  which	  addresses	  features	  of	  current	  interest.	   It	  is	  most	  unlikely	  that	  a	  single	  
general	   mathematical	   formulation	   will	   be	   sufficient	   for	   all	   purposes15.	   Instead,	   panoply	   of	   different	  
techniques	  will	  need	   to	  be	   interlinked	   in	   Integral	   Biomathics	   through	   the	   foundational	   framework,	   to	  
provide	  access	  to	  a	  useful	  range	  of	  system	  properties.	  In	  particular,	  defining	  operative	  sets	  of	  relational	  
properties,	  drawn	   from	  the	   juxtaposition	  and	   future	  unification	  of	  differing	  mathematical	  approaches,	  
applied	  across	  multiple	  scales,	  will	  become	  a	  focus	  of	  articulating	  methodological	  complementarity.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  







5.3	  Class	  Identity	  vs.	  Individual	  Identity	  
	  
Biology	   is	   grounded	   on	   the	   maintenance	   of	   molecular	   organization	   (class	   identity),	   at	   the	   cost	   of	  
constant	  variation	  in	  the	  constituent	  molecular	  subunits.	  Low	  level	  biological	  processes	  do	  not	  follow	  a	  
rule	   of	   ‘one	   molecule,	   one	   effect’,	   but	   ‘one	   continuation	   of	   molecular	   presence,	   one	   effect’,	   where	  
individual	  molecular	  presence	  is	  often	  very	  short-­‐term.	  For	  instance,	  consider	  a	  biological	  organism	  such	  
as	   a	   human	  egg	   cell,	   containing	   about	   30,000	   genes,	  which	   encode	  protein	  molecules.	   Roughly	   3,000	  
genes	   encode	   specific	   proteins	   called	   transcription	   factors	   that	   regulate	   RNA	   transcriptions.	   These	  
transcription	  factors	  uniquely	  determine	  when	  genes	  will	  be	  turned	  on,	  for	  their	  expression,	  and	  turned	  
off,	   while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   orchestrating	   an	   exquisite	   network	   of	   transcription-­‐sequence	   regulation.	  	  
How	  is	  it	  possible	  for	  one	  transcription-­‐factor	  molecule	  for	  every	  ten	  genes	  (on	  average)	  to	  adequately	  
regulate	  the	  expression	  of	  each	  one	  of	  those	  ten	  genes	  in	  the	  succeeding	  developmental	  process?	  
	  
A	   clue	   to	   the	   answer	   to	   this	   question	   can	   be	   found	   in	   the	   observation	   that	   typical	   genomes	   in	   cells	  
contain	  extensive	  non-­‐coding,	  regulatory	  regions,	  and	  that	  these	  regions	  can	  act	  as	  enhancers,	  silencers,	  
insulators,	  and	  promoters	  of	  the	  genes.	  If	  the	  expression	  of	  each	  gene	  is	  regulated	  by	  a	  combination	  of	  
many	   different	   transcription	   factors,	   the	   accompanying	   combinatorial	   control	   may	   be	   competent	  
enough	  to	  form	  a	  consensus	  among	  the	  participating	  transcription	  factors	  as	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  gene	  
in	  the	  target	  will	  be	  expressed,	  and	  when.	  
	  
The	  flow	  of	  time	  involved	  in	  the	  developmental	  process	  can	  be	  made	  explicit	  by	  referring	  to	  the	  input-­‐
output	  relationship	  between	  transcription	  factor	  concentrations	  and	  the	  rate	  of	  protein	  production	  from	  
downstream	  genes.	  Although	  noise	   latent	   in	   the	   transcription	   factor	  molecules	   in	   the	   input	   is	   random	  
and	   rapidly	  varying,	  due	   to	   the	   stochastic	  nature	  of	  each	  biochemical	   reaction	   involved,	   this	  does	  not	  
imply	   that	   similar	   randomness	   and	   rapidity	  would	   also	   apply	   to	   the	   rate	  of	   protein	  production	  of	   the	  
output	  downstream.	  A	  relevant	  experimental	  model	  indicates	  that	  fluctuations	  in	  the	  output	  level	  of	  the	  
protein	   molecules	   are	   much	   slower	   than	   those	   of	   the	   input	   level	   of	   transcription	   factor	   molecules	  
(Rosenfeld	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Pedraza	  and	  van	  Oudenaarden,	  2005).	   	  This	  suggests	  that	  there	  must	  be	  some	  
robust	  scheme	  for	  generating	  such	  slower	  fluctuations,	   in	  which	  the	  underlying	  organization	  can	  serve	  
as	  a	  standard	  to	  which	  the	  passage	  of	  time	  in	  the	  form	  of	  fluctuations	  can	  be	  referred.	  	  
	  
The	   binding	   interaction	   between	   the	   transcription	   factors	   and	   the	  DNA	  molecule	   to	   be	   transcribed	   is	  
rather	  weak	  (of	  the	  order	  of	  4kJ/mol	  or	  less)	  due	  to	  the	  underlying	  van	  der	  Waals	  forces.	  Consequently,	  
a	  transcription	  factor	  molecule	  can	  easily	  be	  detached	  from	  the	  DNA	  by	  thermal	  fluctuations	  at	  ambient	  
temperature.	   	   If	   there	  are	  sufficient	   transcription	   factor	  molecules	   in	   the	  neighborhood,	  however,	   the	  
binding	  site	  can	  easily	  be	  ‘replenished’	  by	  another	  similar	  molecule.	  The	  functional	  unity	  of	  the	  binding	  
site	  is	  thus	  effectively	  maintained	  in	  an	  uninterrupted	  manner,	  even	  though	  the	  individual	  transcription	  
factor	  molecules	  are	  constantly	  exchanged	  (‘touch-­‐and-­‐go’).	  This	  functional	  unity	  may	  help	  to	  suppress	  







This	   kind	   of	   the	   ‘touch-­‐and-­‐go	   acrobatics’	   is	   ubiquitous	   in	   biology,	   making	   class	   identity	   far	   more	  
relevant	   than	   the	   individual	   identity,	   which	   characterizes	   typical	   physics	   or	   chemistry	   investigation	  
(though	   class	   identity	   plays	   a	   role	   in	   statistical	   physics	   and	   in	   thermodynamics).	   Class	   identity,	  
corresponding	  to	  the	  ideas	  put	  forward	  by	  Elsasser	  (Elsasser,	  1981)	  and	  Bateson	  (Bateson,	  1972,	  2002),	  
must	  become	  a	  cornerstone	  of	  Integral	  Biomathics.	  	  
	  
5.4	  First	  Person	  Perspective	  
	  
Classical	   science	   is	   based	   entirely	   on	   a	   third-­‐person	   perspective	   of	   Nature.	   This	   is	   the	   basis	   of	   its	  
objectivity,	   as	   a	  way	   of	   developing	   representations	   of	   reality,	  which	   are	   both	   independent	   of	   human	  
observer	  and	  reproducible.	  This	   is	  arguably	   the	  central	   strength	  of	  science	  and	  of	   its	  child	   technology,	  
and	  it	  depends	  on	  the	  central	  assumption	  that	  the	  entities	  or	  processes	  which	  it	  studies	  are	  incapable	  of	  
initiating	  action,	  that	  they	  are	  unconscious	  and	  to	  that	  extent	  inert.	  
	  
The	  picture	  obviously	  changes	  when	  we	  move	  to	  the	  examination	  of	  human	  affairs,	  where	  we	  assume	  
that	   ‘free	  will’	   based	   on	   first	   person	   perspective	   is	   extant	   (or	   at	   least	   there	   is	   something	  which	   from	  
outside	  resembles	   ‘free	  will’).	  This	   is	  a	  major	  problem,	  which	  faces	  practitioners	  of	  the	  social	  sciences,	  
that	  although	   reliable	  data	  may	  be	  obtained	   for	  populations,	   this	   is	  not	   the	   case	   for	   individuals.	  Here	  
again,	  class	  identity	  is	  of	  overriding	  importance.	  
	  
The	  question	  which	  now	  faces	  us	  is	  whether,	  in	  developing	  an	  Integral	  Biomathics,	  we	  should	  permit	  the	  
inclusion	  of	  first	  person	  perspectives	  or	  not?	  Historically,	  the	  study	  of	  biology	  has	  taken	  the	  same	  line	  as	  
physics	   and	   chemistry,	   in	   insisting	   that	   third	   person	   perspective	   alone	   should	   be	   taken	   into	   account.	  
Philosophically,	   this	  has	  corresponded	  with	   the	  view	   that	  mankind	   is	  unique	   in	   its	   ‘free	  will’,	   and	   that	  
consequently	   the	   non-­‐human	   first	   person	   perspective	   could	   be	   ignored.	  We	   can	   permit	   ourselves	   no	  
similar	  luxury.	  Clearly	  we	  should	  include	  first	  person	  perspective	  at	  the	  level	  of	  complete	  organisms:	  but	  
at	  the	  level	  of	  biochemicals?	  Integral	  Biomathics	  will	  need	  a	  well	  thought	  out	  internal	  framework	  to	  take	  
account	  of	  differences	   in	  the	   importance	  of	   first	  person	  perspective	  right	  across	  the	  multiple	  scales	  of	  
biology.	  The	  example	  of	  clock-­‐control	  by	  cyanobactrium	  Synechococcus	  cited	  below	  suggests	   that	  care	  
must	  be	  exercised	  even	  at	  low	  levels	  of	  organization.	  
	  
	  
Why	  do	  we	  need	  a	  First	  Person	  perspective?	  	  
	  
Probability	  theory	  is	  a	  branch	  of	  mathematics	  concerned	  with	  assigning	  a	  numerical	  value	  (a	  probability)	  
to	  a	  possible	  event.	  There	  are	  two	  main	  approaches	  to	  this	  problem,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  frequentist	  
view	  in	  which	  studies	  probabilities	  as	  frequencies	  i.e.	  the	  ratio	  of	  the	  times	  the	  event	  occurs	  over	  a	  test	  
series,	   and	  on	   the	  other	   hand,	   the	  Bayesian	   view,	   in	  which	  probability	   is	   a	  measure	  of	   the	  degree	  of	  
belief	  that	  an	  event	  will	  occur	  (Jaynes,	  2003).	  While	  the	  first	  approach	  is	  externalist,	  it	  measures	  a	  “hard	  
fact”,	   frequency,	  which	   is	   “out	   there	   in	   the	  world”,	   the	  Bayesian	  approach	   to	  probability	   is	   inherently	  
internalist	  (mental)	  because	  the	  probability	  of	  an	  event	  is	  always	  conditioned	  by	  the	  prior	  knowledge	  we	  





the	  basis	  of	  both	  the	  information	  we	  have	  (degree	  of	  belief)	  and	  the	  information	  we	  lack	  (uncertainty),	  
rather	  than	  as	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  repeated	  series	  of	  experiments.	  The	  frequentist	  view	  of	  probability	  can	  
work	   in	   those	   situations	   in	  which	  everyone	  has	   the	   same	   information,	   for	   example	  when	  we	  are	   told	  
that	  the	  probability	  of	  flipping	  a	  coin	  and	  have	  head	  is	  50%,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  perform	  that	  experiment	  a	  
number	  of	  times	  and	  arrive	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  50%	  is	  the	  limit	  value,	  so	  the	  more	  times	  one	  flips	  the	  
coin,	   the	   closer	   will	   be	   the	   outcome	   to	   the	   50%.	   But	   for	   statements	   like	   “the	   probability	   of	   rain	  
tomorrow	   is	  50%”	   the	   frequentist	   approach	  objectivist	  point	  of	   view	   is	   ill	   suited	  because	   it	   cannot	  be	  
tested.	  There	  is	  only	  one	  “tomorrow”,	  so	  we	  cannot	  make	  ensembles	  of	  tomorrows	  in	  order	  to	  find	  the	  
limit	   value	   of	   the	   outcome.	   This	   kind	   of	   probability	   relies	   on	   prior	   beliefs	   already	   present	   in	   the	  
forecaster’s	  mind.	  To	  put	  it	  simply,	  when	  the	  “game”	  cannot	  be	  repeated,	  the	  probability	  of	  an	  outcome	  
reflects	  the	  fraction	  of	  paths	  leading	  to	  this	  outcome.	  Our	  capacity	  to	  understand	  the	  dynamics	  and	  the	  
sensitivity	   to	   the	   initial	   conditions	   of	   what	   is	   encoded	   in	   the	   internalist	   approach	   to	   probability	  
(Sornette,	  2000)	   is	   limited.	  To	   sum	  up,	  Bayesian	   (internalist,	   subjectivist	  or	   classical)	  probability	   is	  not	  
restricted,	  as	  the	  frequentist	  or	  objectivist	  view	  is,	  to	  situations	  in	  which	  the	  repetition	  of	  large	  numbers	  
of	   equiprobable	   events	   is	   viable.	   It	   must	   be	   said	   that	   while	   a	   purely	   Bayesian	   approach	   may	   pose	  
computational	  problems	  for	  large	  models	   it	  may	  always	  be	  used	  as	  an	  insightful	  guiding	  principle,	  that	  
can	  result	  in	  explicit	  ways	  to	  model	  internal	  knowledge	  in,	  for	  example,	  neural	  systems.	  In	  this	  line,	  the	  
paper	  of	  Fiorillo	  provides	  a	  new	  perspective	  to	   information	  processing	  in	  neural	  systems	  that	  relies	  on	  
first-­‐person	   Bayesian	   approach,	   (Fiorillo,	   2012).	   In	   addition,	   Gomez-­‐Ramirez	   and	   Sanz	   formally	   define	  
“The	   Internal	   Model	   Principle”	   and	   postulate	   it	   as	   a	   guide	   for	   investigating	   how	  much	   knowledge	   a	  
biological	  system	  has	  of	  itself,	  (Gomez-­‐	  Ramirez	  &	  Sanz,	  2012).	  
	  
5.5	  Biological	  Time	  
	  
The	  Flow	  of	  Time	  	  
There	   are	   two	  quite	   different	   versions	   of	   the	   flow	  of	   time.	  One	   is	   the	   flow	  of	   time	   exclusively	   in	   the	  
present	  tense,	  which	  Newton	  took	  as	  a	  serious	  matter	  as	  demonstrated	  in	  his	  propositions	  made	  in	  the	  
present	   tense	   in	  Principia.	  Another	  one	   is	   the	   flow	  of	   time	  crossing	  different	   tenses,	   say	   from	  past	   to	  
present	  to	  future,	  which	  has	  been	  the	  main	  concern	  of	  philosophers	  including	  Aristotle	  and	  McTaggart.	  	  
The	  idea	  of	  the	  uniformity	  of	  the	  flow	  of	  time	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  Newtonian	  time	  because	  of	  the	  ubiquity	  
of	  the	  presumed	  homogenous	  fluxionum	  in	  the	  present	  tense.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  uniformity	  has	  already	  
equipped	  itself	  with	  the	  arrow	  of	  time	  implicitly	  since	  the	  flow	  has	  originally	  been	  conceived	  of	  based	  on	  
the	  constant	  rotation	  of	  the	  Earth	  that	  is	  totally	  empirical.	  	  	  
Yet,	  at	  the	  quantum	  level	  micro-­‐time	  reversals	  are	  also	  at	  play.	  Rössler	  in	  his	  discussion	  of	  Endophysics	  
suggests	   that	   “there	   is	   a	   macro	   dynamics	   (the	   coarse-­‐grained	   responses	   of	   the	   dissipative	   structure	  
called	   the	   ‘observer’),	   and	   there	   is	   an	   underlying,	  much	   faster	  microdynamics”.	   	   Even	   the	  most	   rapid	  
macro	  change	  in	  the	  observer	  lasts	  several	  orders	  of	  magnitude	  longer	  than	  a	  micro	  time	  slice	  does.	  	  The	  






Physical	  laws	  remain	  invariant	  under	  the	  inversion	  of	  time.	  However,	  it	  would	  be	  next	  to	  impossible	  to	  
properly	   comprehend	   how	   the	   flow	   of	   time	   conceived	   in	   the	   present	   tense	   alone	   could	   be	   reversed	  
without	  referring	  to	  past	  and	  future.	   If	  both	  past	  and	  future	  are	  referred	  to	  when	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  
flow	   is	   addressed,	   it	   will	   not	   be	   the	   flow	   of	   time	   unique	   to	   the	   present	   tense.	   Hence,	   a	   challenging	  
question	  is	  how	  to	  conceive	  of	  the	  flow	  of	  time	  crossing	  different	  tenses.	   In	  other	  words,	  time	  itself	   is	  
already	   dynamic	   in	   its	   capacity	   of	   integrating	   different	   tenses.	   Physics	   has	   unwittingly	   dismissed	   the	  
presence	   of	   such	   question.	   	   Thus	   we	   also	   need	   to	   address	   mathematical	   approaches	   to	   hyper-­‐scale	  
issues,	   where	   the	   lowest	   level	   has	   different	   properties	   to	   other	   scales.	   Alternately	   the	   nature	   of	  
biological	  change	  over	  a	  human	  lifetime	  needs	  to	  be	  enfolded.	  An	  additional	  time-­‐related	  factor	   is	  the	  
Libet’s	  delay	  and	  how	  it	  impacts	  cognition	  and	  environmental	  response.	  
How	  should	  we	  study	  time	  in	  biology?	  The	  nature	  of	  biological	  time	  is	  of	  fundamental	  importance	  to	  the	  
formulation	   of	   Integral	   Biomathics.	   As	   usual,	   whether	   for	   time	   or	   any	   other	   parameter,	   to	  measure	  
differences	  we	   need	   an	   invariant	   reference.	   In	   the	   scheme	   of	   classical	  mechanics,	   Newton,	   following	  
Ptolemy,	  conceived	  of	  the	  invariant	  “clockwork”	  of	  celestial	  bodies	  as	  a	  reliable	  reference,	  and	  posited	  
the	  flow	  of	  time	  based	  on	  repeated	  cycles	  of	  the	  celestial	  clockwork	  motion.	  The	  flow	  of	  time	  derived	  in	  
this	  way	  has	  been	  treated	  as	  being	  specific	  to	  the	  physicist	  instead	  of	  to	  the	  clockwork	  itself.	  A	  serious	  
question	  now	  arises:	  is	  it	  only	  human	  beings	  that	  experience	  the	  flow	  of	  time	  in	  nature?	  
	  
A	  Lesson	  from	  Cyanobacteria	  
	  
One	  empirical	  response	  is	  the	  circadian	  oscillation	  observed	  in	  cyanobactrium	  Synechococcus	  elongatus	  
–	   the	  most	   primitive	  photosynthetic	   bacterium	   (Kageyama	  et	   al.,	   2006).	   Cyanobacteria	   can	  move	   and	  
read	  the	  circadian	  clocks	  they	  carry.	  The	  essence	  of	  the	  circadian	  oscillation	  is	  in	  a	  monomer	  shuffling	  of	  
the	   protein	   called	   KaiC	   hexamer.	   The	   experimental	   background	   of	   the	   monomer	   shuffling	   is	   of	   a	  
predecessor	  hexamer	  K-­‐K-­‐K-­‐K-­‐K-­‐K	  being	  alternated	  by	  the	  successor	  K*-­‐K-­‐K-­‐K-­‐K-­‐K,	  then	  by	  K*-­‐K*-­‐K-­‐K-­‐K-­‐K	  
.	   .	   .	   and	   so	   on,	   where	   K	   is	   a	   monomeric	   KaiC	   unphosphorylated	   subunit	   and	   K*	   is	   the	   similar	  
phosphorylated	  subunit	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  ATP	  as	  the	  phosphate	  source.	  When	  the	  hexamer	  reaches	  K*-­‐
K*-­‐K*-­‐K*-­‐K*-­‐K*,	   it	  starts	  dephosphorylation	  back	  to	  K-­‐K-­‐K-­‐K-­‐K-­‐K.	  What	  is	  peculiar	  here	  is	  that	  although	  
the	   KaiC	   hexamer	   does	   not	   undergo	   the	   monomer	   shuffling	   during	   the	   phase	   of	   dephosphorylation	  
(from	  K*-­‐K*-­‐K*-­‐K*-­‐K*-­‐K*	  to	  K-­‐K-­‐K-­‐K-­‐K-­‐K),	  the	  phosphorylation	  phase	  (from	  K-­‐K-­‐K-­‐K-­‐K-­‐K	  to	  K*-­‐K*-­‐K*-­‐K*-­‐
K*-­‐K*)	  does	  require	  the	  monomer	  shuffling	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  hexamer	  recruits	  the	  monomers	  to	  be	  
phosphorylated	   from	   the	   outside	   and	   lets	   the	   unphosphorylated	   ones	   disperse.	   This	   has	   been	  
experimentally	  confirmed	  (Kageyama	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  The	  KaiC	  hexamer	  remains	  as	   it	   is,	  even	  though	  the	  
monomeric	  KaiC	  subunits	  are	  constantly	  exchanged.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  KaiC	  hexamer	  sets	  itself	  to	  be	  
an	  invariant	  reference	  to	  specify	  time	  constantly	  passing	  away,	  in	  sharp	  contrast	  to	  Newtonian	  time.	  	  
Although	  Newton	  could	  not	  move	  celestial	  bodies,	  the	  KaiC	  hexamers	  in	  cynanobacteria	  can	  both	  read	  
and	  move	  its	  clock.	  The	  class	  identity	  of	  the	  hexamer	  outlives	  the	  individual	  identity	  of	  each	  monomeric	  






Alternatively,	   if	  we	   focus	  upon	   the	   individual	   identities	  of	   the	  monomeric	  KaiC	   subunits	  both	  entering	  
and	  leaving,	  these	  can	  be	  associated	  with	  the	  flow	  of	  time.	  The	  agent	  responsible	  for	  implementing	  the	  
flow	  here	  is	  cyanobacteria	  themselves,	  instead	  of	  the	  physicist	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Newtonian	  time.	  
	  
	  
Integrating	  Mathematical	  Symbolism	  and	  Physical	  Internalism	  
	  
Once	   the	   flow	  of	   time	   is	   naturalized,	   the	  material	   substrate	   supporting	   its	   carrier	  will	   become	  a	   sign,	  
that	   is,	  something	  having	  the	  causal	  capacity	  of	  relating	  itself	  to	  something	  else.	  Rudimentary	  types	  of	  
sign	  have	   already	  been	  available	   in	  physics,	   but	  have	   so	   far	   failed	   to	   receive	  due	  attention.	  A	   case	   in	  
point	  is	  found	  in	  thermodynamics.	  	  
	  
Consider,	  for	  example,	  Boyle-­‐Charles	  law	  of	  the	  ideal	  gas	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  equation	  PV=RT,	  in	  which	  P	  
is	   pressure,	   V	   is	   volume,	   T	   is	   temperature	   and	  R	   is	   the	   gas	   constant.	   The	   equation	   by	   itself	   is	   under-­‐
complete,	  in	  that	  if	  any	  one	  of	  the	  three	  variables	  is	  fixed,	  there	  is	  ambiguity	  in	  specifying	  the	  values	  of	  
the	  remaining	  two	  variables.	  The	  situation	  is	  different,	  however,	  if	  all	  three	  variables	  in	  whatever	  natural	  
settings	   are	   fixed	   in	   the	   course	   of	   time.	   Although	   the	   physicist	  may	   say	   that	   the	   three	   variables	   are	  
determinable	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  principle	  once	  thermodynamics	  is	  grounded	  upon	  statistical	  mechanics,	  the	  
minimal	   specification	   of	   thermodynamics	   as	   a	   fundamental	   ingredient	   of	   empirical	   sciences	   remains	  
independent	   of	   statistical	   mechanics.	   	   But	   even	   at	   the	   minimal	   specification	   level,	   each	   variable	   is	  
‘competent	  enough	  to	  determine	  its	  own	  value’	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  two	  others	  to	  fulfill	  the	  Boyle-­‐Charles	  
law.	  	  Each	  thermodynamic	  variable	  has	  the	  capacity	  of	  detecting	  the	  others	  internally	  and	  specifying	  its	  
own	  value	  accordingly.	  This	  is	  equivalent	  to	  saying	  that	  a	  thermodynamic	  variable	  is	  a	  sign	  on	  its	  own	  –	  
always	  referring	  to	  the	  activity	  of	  something	  relating	  itself	  to	  something	  else.	  	  
	  
The	   likelihood	   of	   the	   action	   of	   signs	   in	   the	   empirical	  world	   now	  opens	   up	   a	   novel	   vista	  within	  which	  
mathematical	  expertise	  could	  be	  extended	  to	  meet	  the	  challenge	  of	  how	  signs	  could	  be	  symbolized.	  	  
	  
Summarizing,	  we	  conclude	  the	  following:	  
	  
i) biological	  systems	  have	  internal	  clocks,	  and	  processes	  synchronize	  with	  them,	  and	  
	  
ii) physical	   variables	  affect	  each	  other	  –	  particularly	   in	  a	   complex	  way	  within	   (or	  among)	  
living	  things	  –	  so	  we	  can	  refer	  to	  them	  as	  signs,	  for	  they	  have	  a	  deeper	  meaning	  for	  an	  
individual	  organism,	  and	  their	  understanding	  demands	  better	  interpretation	  schemes.	  	  
	  
Underlying	  this	  perception	  is	  the	  appraisal	  of	  first	  person	  descriptions.	  The	  presence	  of	  an	  internal	  clock	  
in	  each	  biological	  system	  lends	  it	  a	  self-­‐supporting	  temporal	  identity,	  and	  a	  self	  is	  unquestionably	  related	  
to	  first	  person	  descriptions,	  which	  we	  cannot	  then	  avoid.	  	  Physical	  variables	  which	  affect	  each	  other,	  like	  
the	   three	   thermodynamic	   variables	   of	   the	   Boyle-­‐Charles	   law,	   are	   not	  mechanistically	   controlled	   from	  
outside,	  but	  from	  inside	  through	  the	  agential	  activity	  of	  detecting	  and	  fulfilling	  the	  law.	  Such	  an	  agential	  







A	   crucial	   question	   here	  would	   be	   how	   to	   accommodate	   signs	   perceivable	   in	   first	   person	   descriptions	  
with	   third	   person	   descriptions,	   the	   latter	   of	   which	   are	   inevitable	   to	   any	   explanatory	   model.	   One	  
prerequisite	  when	  entering	  the	  symbolization	  of	  a	  sign	  is	  to	  specify	  the	  sign’s	  concrete	  material	  nature.	  	  
	  
A	  relevant	  example	  here	  is	  the	  synthesis	  of	  meta-­‐stable	  products	  in	  chemical	  evolution	  as	  attempted	  in	  
the	   laboratory.	   A	  meta-­‐stable	   product	   (as	   the	  material	   partial	   carrier	   of	   the	   preceding	   reaction)	   is	   a	  
material	   embodiment	   of	   past	  memory,	   and	   at	   the	   same	   time	   it	   directs	   the	   succeeding	   reaction	   to	   a	  
limited	  extent.	  	  Such	  a	  meta-­‐stable	  product	  is	  nothing	  but	  a	  sign,	  which	  relates	  the	  preceding	  reaction	  to	  
the	  succeeding	  one.	  The	  action	  of	  signs	   is	  already	  operative	   in	  the	  successive	  synthesis	  of	  meta-­‐stable	  
products,	  unless	  it	  is	  methodologically	  eliminated	  by	  integrating	  each	  individual	  action	  in	  the	  statistical	  
ensemble	  of	  the	  similar	   individual	  actions,	  as	   is	  often	  attempted	   in	  statistical	  mechanics.	   In	  this	  sense,	  
meta-­‐stable	   products	   may	   serve	   as	   a	   mediator	   between	   non-­‐life	   and	   life.	   Meta-­‐stable	   products	  
themselves	  are	  already	  the	  material	  embodiment	  of	  history	  and	  memory.	  The	  relevant	  question	  at	  this	  




The	  functioning	  and	  survival	  of	  living	  systems	  necessitates	  a	  kind	  of	  long	  term	  "memory",	  which	  can	  be	  
purely	   innate	   or	   may	   develop	   over	   time	   for	   better	   adaptation.	   For	   instance,	   bacteria	   engage	   in	  
metabolic	  activity,	  reproduce	  and	  repair	  damaged	  DNA.	  All	  these	  activities	  are	  autonomously	  controlled	  
by	   their	   genetic	   'program',	   which	   serves	   as	   a	   memory	   of	   the	   organism's	   ancestry.	   An	   animal	   with	   a	  
rudimentary	   nervous	   system,	   such	   as	   a	   fish	   or	   a	   lizard,	   receives	   information/stimuli	   about	   its	  
environment	   and	   its	   internal	   states	   (e.g.,	   hunger	   or	   pain),	   and	   may	   remember	   them	   for	   later	  
recognition;	   it	  has	  some	   innate	  behaviours,	  but	   is	  also	  able	   to	   learn	  new	  skills	  and	  behaviours,	  and	  to	  
evaluate	   them.	  More	   highly	   developed	   animals	   (mammals,	   birds,	   octopi)	   are	   capable	   of	   developing	   a	  
semantics,	   which	   may	   modulate	   their	   actions	   according	   to	   their	   circumstances	   and	   allow	   for	  
communication.	  
	  
An	  organism’s	  memory	  plays	  an	  essential	  role	  in	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  system,	  by	  allowing	  it	  to	  recognize	  
objects	  and	  events	  which	  were	  met	  previously,	  and	  to	  select	  procedures	  that	  were	  already	  used,	  while	  
taking	  into	  account	  previous	  results.	  Such	  a	  memory	  is	  not	  rigid	  like	  a	  computer	  memory,	  but	  it	  is	  robust	  
(meaning	   that	   it	  maintains	   its	   contents	   in	   spite	   of	   disturbances),	   and	   plastic	   enough	   to	   adapt	   to	   the	  
context.	  Its	  'records'	  can	  be	  innate	  or	  they	  can	  be	  formed,	  for	  example,	  when	  triggered	  by	  an	  event	  to	  
remember	  features	  of	  the	  environment.	  	  
	  
Other	  triggers	  may	  take	  the	  form	  of	  internal	  configurations,	  or	  situations	  the	  system	  does	  not	  recognize,	  
along	  with	   the	  procedures	   it	   develops	   to	   react	   to	   a	   situation	   in	   an	  adaptive	  manner.	   These	   ‘memory’	  
records	  can	  be	  more	  or	  less	  complex,	  and	  their	  internal	  organization	  may	  vary	  to	  facilitate	  adaptation	  to	  








We	   create	  models	   of	   the	   world,	   which	   are	   as	   fully	   explicit	   as	   possible,	   but	   the	   real	   world	   that	   they	  
represent	  –	  or	  our	  perception	  of	  it	  –	  is	  always	  to	  some	  extent	  vague.	  	  Models	  can	  capture	  very	  well	  any	  
generic	   or	   coarse	   aspects	   of	   a	   phenomenon,	   but	   do	   not	   capture	   the	   details	   so	   well.	   Some	   of	   these	  
details,	  however,	  may	  be	  very	  important,	  and	  may	  even	  trigger	  emergent	  behaviour.	  Observed	  systems	  
will	   be	   vague	   when	   they	   can	   be	   affected	   by	   small-­‐scale	   events	   which	   occur	   during	   experimental	  
observation,	  and	  which	  can	  be	  obscured	  by	  historical	  contingencies,	  where	  these	  are	  not	  embodied	   in	  
the	   models’	   boundary	   conditions.	   This	   means	   that	   we	   must	   be	   very	   aware	   of	   the	   scale	   of	   our	  
observations	  with	  regard	  to	  that	  of	  an	  observed	  system	  and	  of	  how	  that	  may	  be	  impacted	  by	  events	  at	  
other	   scales.	   Our	   observational	   frame	   is	   imposed	   upon	   an	   observed	   system,	   and	   this	   makes	   the	  
interaction	   less	   than	   objective;	   our	   observations	  may	   deform	   the	   observed	   system,	  marking	   it.	   	   How	  
should	  this	  be	  taken	   into	  account,	  most	  specifically	   in	  the	  case	  of	  biological	  systems?	   	   In	  addition,	   the	  
observed	   system	   may	   be	   in	   the	   process	   of	   changing	   at	   a	   scale	   which	   is	   greater	   than	   that	   of	   our	  
observational	   time-­‐frame,	   in	  which	  case	  we	  may	  well	   carefully	  and	  accurately	  measure	  aspects	  of	   the	  
observed	  system	  that	  are	  ultimately	  of	  little	  relevance,	  even	  though	  these	  measurements	  provide	  values	  
for	  variables	  in	  our	  model.	  	  
	  
Biological	  phenomena	  in	  particular	  will	  be	  vague	  with	  respect	  to	  our	  models	  of	  them	  because	  they	  are	  
affected	  by	  history	  and	  because	  they	  will	  usually	  be	  changing	  at	  time-­‐scales	  both	  smaller	  and	  larger	  than	  
our	   observational	   timeframe.	   Models	   are	   limited	   generally;	   they	   cannot	   be	   constructed	   so	   as	   to	  
maximize	  accuracy,	  precision	  and	  generality.	  In	  particular,	  “models	  proposed	  by	  those	  who	  enter	  biology	  
by	  way	  of	  physics	  often	  sacrifice	  realism	  to	  generality	  and	  precision”,	  (Levins,	  1968).	  Thus,	  any	  aspect	  of	  
the	   system	  being	  modeled	   that	   is	   not	   in	   the	   focus	  will	   remain	   vague	   in	   the	   view	  of	   that	  model.	   This	  
especially	  applies	  to	  complex	  systems,	  which	  are	  subject	  to	  many	  different	  sorts	  of	  modeling.	  
	  
5.8	  Quantum	  Effects	  in	  Biology	  
	  
The	   grounding	   of	   any	   embodiment	   of	   a	   biological	   system	   lies	  within	  Quantum	  Mechanics	   (QM)	   (Ball,	  
2011).	   At	   first	   sight	   we	   might	   expect	   that	   quantum	   effects	   and	   biology	   would	   occupy	   completely	  
different	   worlds.	   We	   cannot,	   however,	   blindly	   eliminate	   quantum	   effects	   from	   our	   investigations	   of	  
biology	  without	  good	  reason.	  Here	  again,	  the	  question	  is	  primarily	  one	  of	  scale.	  It	  would	  be	  fatuous	  to	  
investigate	  the	  biochemical	  basis	  of	  life	  without	  even	  considering	  the	  relevance	  of	  QM,	  but	  should	  this	  
also	   apply	   to	   descriptions	   of	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   organs	   or	   complete	   organisms	   operate?	   A	   first	  
consideration	  is	  clearly	  the	  size	  of	  the	  entity	  we	  are	  thinking	  about:	  it	  would	  be	  natural	  to	  assume	  that	  it	  
is	  only	  small	  things	  that	  are	  influenced	  by	  QM,	  even	  though	  some	  evidence	  of	  large	  scale	  entanglement	  
has	  been	  published	  (Ghosh	  et	  al.,	  2003).	  A	  second	  consideration	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  processes	  we	  are	  
considering.	   If	   inorganic	   chemical	   reactions	   can	   be	   described	   without	   recourse	   to	   QM,	   why	   would	  
organic	   chemical	   reactions	   be	   any	   different?	   But,	   are	   interactions	   involving	   enzyme	   catalyzation	   as	  
simple	  as	  inorganic	  reactions?	  The	  principle	  of	  macromolecular	  self-­‐assembly	  was	  first	  used	  by	  Michael	  





Suspicions	  of	  the	   influences	  of	  QM	  in	  biology	  abound,	  but	   it	   is	  difficult	  to	  obtain	  conclusive	  hard	  data.	  
Many	  birds	  navigate	  by	  using	  the	  Earth’s	  magnetic	  field	  to	  direct	  their	  migrations.	  It	  is	  known	  that	  their	  
magnetic	   sensors	   are	  affected	  by	   the	   incidence	  of	   light	  on	   their	   retinas,	   and	   the	   suggestion	  has	  been	  
made	  that	  the	  result	  is	  an	  entangled	  pair	  of	  electrons	  (Ritz	  et	  al.,	  2004)	  with	  a	  coherent	  lifetime	  of	  tens	  
of	  microseconds	   (Gauger	   et	   al.,	   2011).	  More	   prosaically,	  QM	  effects	   in	   biomaterials	   are	   now	  of	   great	  
significance	   to	   the	  electronics	   industry,	  where	  nature-­‐inspired	  organic	   semiconductors	   are	  of	   growing	  
importance	   (Smits	   et	   al.,	   2008;	  Glowacki	   et	   al.,	   2011).	   Prime	  examples	  of	   the	   links	  between	  quantum	  
coherence	  and	  entanglement	  with	  photosynthesis	  at	  the	  biophysical	  and	  biochemical	  level,	  providing	  a	  
base	  for	  ‘green’	  quantum	  computing	  and	  ‘green’	  photovoltaics,	  can	  be	  found	  in	  (Engel	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Lee	  
et	  al.,	  2007;	  Sension,	  2007;	  Scholes,	  2009;	  Sarovar	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Panitchayangkoon	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Collini	  et	  
al.,	  2010).	  	  
	  
However,	  a	  central	  question	  concerns	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  mathematical	  descriptions	  must	  themselves	  
be	  based	  on	  QM.	  The	  difficulties	   in	  finding	  mechanisms	  responsible	  for	  the	  phenomenal	  experience	  of	  
consciousness	   based	  on	   classical	  mechanics,	   in	   particular	   its	   unity,	   attracted	  many	   researchers	   to	   the	  
possibility	   of	   quantum	   mechanical	   explanation.	   Several	   authors	   proposed	   quantum	   mechanical	  
explanation	   of	   consciousness	   or	   cognitive	   functions	   of	   the	   brain	   in	   the	   1970's	   (Pribram	   et	   al.,	   1974;	  
Hameroff,	  1974;	  Frohlich,	  1975).	  The	  attempts	  to	  apply	  quantum	  mechanics	  have	  been	  hampered	  by	  the	  
relatively	   large	  size	  of	   the	   functional	  units	  of	   the	  brain,	   so	   long	  as	   this	   role	  was	  given	   to	   the	  neurons.	  
Hameroff's	  idea	  was	  to	  identify	  as	  units	  much	  smaller	  microtubules,	  and	  this	  raised	  hope	  of	  applicability	  
of	  quantum	  descriptions.	   In	  cooperation	  with	  Penrose,	  whose	  writing	  for	  the	  general	  audience	  greatly	  
contributed	   to	   popularization	   of	   this	   approach	   (Penrose,	   1994),	   Hameroff	   developed	   a	   model	   of	  
consciousness	   based	   on	   such	   description	   (Hameroff	   &	   Penrose,	   1996;	   Hameroff,	   1998).	   The	   main	  
obstacle	  to	  becoming	  acceptable	  for	  the	  majority	  of	  those	  interested	  in	  consciousness	  studies,	  was	  the	  
difficulty	   of	   justifying	   physically	   unrealistic	   assumption	   of	   maintaining	   quantum	   coherence	   for	  
sufficiently	  long	  period	  of	  time	  at	  realistic	  temperatures.	  More	  than	  a	  decade	  later,	  only	  sporadically	  has	  
the	  issue	  of	  coherence	  and	  the	  model	  returned	  to	  discussion.	  	  
	  
However,	   more	   recently	   the	   relationship	   with	   QM	   has	   been	   examined	   from	   a	   different	   perspective.	  
Schroeder	  (2009)	  proposed	  considering	  a	  model	  of	   information	  integration16	  in	  the	  brain	  based	  on	  the	  
assumption	   that	   the	  mechanism	   is	  exhibiting	   the	   formal	  characteristics	  of	   coherence	  expressed	   in	   the	  
mathematical	  structures	  used	  in	  QM,	  but	  without	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  brain	  or	   its	  functional	  units	  
are	  quantum	  mechanical	  systems.	  This	  formal	  characteristic	  (direct	  product	  irreducibility)	   is	  a	  common	  
property	  of	  the	  structures	  describing	  geometric,	  as	  well	  as	  many	  other	  systems,	  which	  do	  not	  have	  any	  
relationship	   with	   QM.	   Moreover,	   in	   this	   perspective	   it	   is	   not	   the	   brain,	   which	   exhibits	   quantum-­‐
mechanical	  properties,	  but	  quantum	  mechanical	  description	  which	  reflects	  the	  cognitive	  functions	  of	  the	  
brain.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Information	   integration	  has	  become	  the	  central	   theme	  of	  Tononi's	  concept	  of	  consciousness.	  However,	  all	   that	  he	  and	  his	  
collaborators	   contributed	   so	   far	   were	   either	   very	   general	   statements	   referring	   to	   phenomenal	   experience	   of	   unity	   of	  
consciousness	  (Edelman	  &	  Tononi,	  2001), or	  to	  identifying	  the	  integration	  with	  statistical	  synchrony	  of	  neural	  firings	  in	  terms	  of	  
entropy,	   (Laureys	  &	  Tononi,	  2008).	  There	  were	  some	  recent	  efforts	   in	   investigating	  the	  theoretical	  and	  empirical	  evidence	  of	  
information	  integration	  (Seth	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  Barett	  &	  Seth,	  2011),	  but	  neither	  they,	  nor	  Tononi,	  or	  anyone	  else,	   incl.	  (Sloman	  &	  






There	  are	  also	  other	  possible	  ways	  of	  developing	  new	  perspectives	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  QM	  and	  
biology.	   In	   particular,	   in	   a	   categorical	   model	   such	   as	   MES	   (Ehresmann	   &	   Vanbremeersch,	   2007;	   cf.	  
Section	   7.6)	   quantum	   entanglement	   can	   be	   modeled	   as	   a	   special	   form	   of	   categorical	   colimit.	   Such	  
colimits	  impose	  constraints	  on	  the	  lower	  logics	  (up	  to	  the	  molecular	  level),	  where	  they	  play	  an	  important	  
role.	   At	   the	   higher	   levels,	   entanglement	   can	   play	   a	   role	   only	   through	   lower	   order	   processes;	   indeed,	  
during	   the	   interplay	   of	   the	   logics,	   there	   is	   a	   risk	   of	   decoherence	   because	   of	   the	   variety	   of	   higher	  
constraints.	  	  
At	   these	  higher	   levels,	  what	   is	   important	   for	   living	  systems	   is	   the	  existence	  of	  multiform	  components,	  
which	   can	   operate	   through	   two	   non-­‐connected	   decompositions	   (this	   "degeneracy"	   property	   is	  
formalized	   in	   the	  Multiplicity	   Principle).	  MP	   allows	   for	   the	   emergence	   of	   structures	   and	   processes	   of	  
increasing	   complexity	   order	   in	  MES	   and	   provides	   flexibility	   and	   robustness	   to	   the	   system	   (cf.	   Section	  
7.6).	  Now,	  MP	  is	  itself	  a	  consequence	  of	  QM	  (Ehresmann	  &	  Vanbremeersch,	  2002).	  Indeed	  QM	  implies	  
that	  MP	  is	  satisfied	  at	  the	  lower	  particle-­‐atom	  level,	  from	  which	  higher	  levels	  have	  evolved	  by	  iterated	  
complexification	  processes.	  As	  complexification	  preserves	  MP,	  it	  is	  also	  satisfied	  at	  higher	  levels,	  hence	  
in	   living	   systems.	   It	   explains	  how	  quantum	  properties	   (entanglement,	   non-­‐localization)	   allow,	   through	  
the	  MP,	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  higher	  and	  higher	  processes	  up	  to	  consciousness	  
To	  conclude,	  entanglement	  has	  its	  role	  at	  the	  lower	  levels,	  but	  the	  characteristics	  of	  life	  depend	  more	  on	  
the	  (somewhat	  'opposite')	  degeneracy/multiplicity	  principle,	  which	  is	  itself	  deduced	  from	  QM	  properties	  
at	  the	  lower	  level.	  However	  if	  there	  is	  any	  evidence	  implying	  constraints	  on	  the	  higher	  levels	  that	  realize	  
entanglement	  through	  higher	  order	  processes,	  we	  should	  take	  it	  into	  account	  in	  our	  model.	  Our	  general	  
point	   of	   view	   must	   be	   an	   open	   one,	   permitting	   investigation	   of	   QM	   relevance	   at	   every	   level	   of	  
mathematical	  representation.	  
	  
5.9	  Biotic	  vs.	  Abiotic	  Systems	  
	  
If	  we	  wish	  to	  move	  beyond	  the	  issues	  raised	  by	  Salthe,	  who	  noted	  that	  “Today,	  curiously,	  living	  systems	  
cannot	   be	   said	   to	   be	   anything	   more	   than	   dissipative	   structures	   informed	   internally	   by	   genetic	  
information.	  	  There	  is	  not	  really	  anything	  substantially	  different	  from	  abiotic	  systems	  in	  them	  other	  than	  
greater	  stability	  due	  to	  this	  internal	  information.”,	  we	  need	  to	  decide	  on	  a	  level	  at	  which	  to	  start.	  If	  we	  
think	  in	  terms	  of	  independent	  living	  entities	  (ignoring	  viruses,	  prions)	  then	  what	  these	  have	  in	  common	  
is	  that	  they	  are	  based	  on	  the	  cell.	  Thus	  we	  become	  interested	  in	  characterising	  the	  living	  cell.	  Cells	  stand	  
at	  a	  particular	   level:	   they	  are	  omnipresent	   in	  animals	  and	  plants	   (from	  the	  single	  celled	  amoeba	  to	  all	  
plants	   to	   all	   classes	   of	   animals):	   indeed	   they	   are	   just	   about	   all	   that	   is	   omnipresent,	   and	   they	   are	  
constituents	   of	  multicellular	   animals.	   	   So	   our	   first	   actual	   suggestion	   for	   a	   biomathics	   is	   that	   it	   should	  
reflect	  this.	  But	  what	  does	  that	  actually	  imply?	  	  
	  
We	  can	  characterize	  a	  cell	  by	  its	  boundary,	  B.	  This	  provides	  a	  division	  of	  space:	  we	  have	  in(B)	  and	  out(B),	  
and	  we	  have	  B	  itself.	  We	  have	  mechanisms	  for	  crossing	  this	  boundary	  both	  from	  in(B)	  to	  out(B)	  and	  from	  
out(B)	   to	   in(B).	  We	  then	  need	  to	  consider	   the	  nature	  of	  B,	   in(B),	  out(B),	  crossings	   from	   in(B)	   to	  out(B)	  





stands,	  it’s	  quite	  like	  Spencer-­‐Brown’s	  Laws	  of	  Form	  (1972),	  which	  implies	  that	  it	  can	  be	  used	  a	  basis	  for	  
logic).	   The	   system	   needs	  much	   in	   addition	   (at	   least):	   events,	   time,	  mechanisms	   for	   examining	  what’s	  
happening	  inside	  the	  cell	  (which	  might	  well	  be	  based	  on	  the	  same	  abstraction),	  mechanisms	  governing	  
movement	   and	   transfer	   across	   the	   cell	  membrane,	   and	  mechanisms	   for	  putting	   cells	   together.	   In	   this	  
area,	  the	  work	  of	  Cardelli	  (2005,	  2008)	  provides	  one	  possible	  way	  forward,	  although	  it	  is	  more	  oriented	  
towards	  a	  purely	  computational	  approach.	  At	  a	  lower	  level,	  there	  are	  internals	  that	  can	  cope	  with	  (e.g.)	  
protein/protein	  interactions	  in	  the	  style	  of	  Hong	  (2005a/b),	  as	  well	  as	  abstractions	  that	  can	  stand	  in	  for	  
diffusible	  chemicals,	  concentration	  gradients,	  perhaps	  gravity,	  and	  other	  physical	   issues,	  and	  at	  higher	  
levels	   there	   are	   multi-­‐cellular	   organisms.	   Inside	   the	   cell,	   we	   have	   protein	   interactions,	   as	   well	   as	  
influences	  from	  enegry	  chnages	  (etc.)	  from	  outside	  the	  cell.	  These	  are	  unlikely	  to	  be	  precisely	  defined	  or	  
replicatable:	  protein	  interactions	  rely	  on	  reactive	  surfaces	  being	  brought	  into	  close	  proximity	  with	  each	  
other,	  while	   they	  are	  moving	   in	  aqueous	  solution,	  and	  having	   their	   shapes	   influenced	  by	   local	  electric	  
fields	  caused	  by	  other	  proteins	  and	  external	  forces.	  	  
	  
One	   can	   argue	   that	   cells	   perform	   information	   processing	   as	   well	   (deciding	   to	   move,	   or	   to	   engulf	   a	  
particle,	  or	  create	  a	  protein),	  however,	  it	  is	  not	  necessarily	  possible	  to	  separate	  out	  that	  the	  cell	  does	  in	  
order	  to	  survive	  and	  live,	  and	  what	  it	  does	  from	  an	  information	  processing	  view:	  we	  need	  to	  be	  careful	  
not	  to	  enforce	  our	  own	  narrow	  interpretations	  of	  their	  activity	  too	  strongly.	  	  
	  
Thus,	   there	   is	   a	   whole	   level	   (or	   indeed	   several	   levels)	   inside	   the	   cell	   that	   we	   could	   conceivably	   put	  
together	  to	  determine	  the	  activity	  of	  a	  cell.	  Yet	  while	  the	  cell	   lives,	   its	  behaviour	  appears	  to	  possess	  a	  
unity	  that	  (in	  some	  sense)	  belongs	  to	  the	  cell,	  and	  not	  to	   its	  numerous	  constituents.	  At	  a	  higher	   level,	  
the	  same	  is	  true	  for	  multicellular	  organisms:	  they	  possess	  a	  unity	  thet	  belongs	  to	  the	  organism,	  and	  not	  
the	  its	  constituent	  cells,	  or	  their	  constituent	  elements.	  At	  death,	  this	  ceases	  to	  be	  true.	  Cells	  appear	  to	  
have	   a	   more	   purposeful	   behaviour	   than,	   say,	   a	   protein.	   Whatever	   the	   cell	   is	   doing,	   its	   behaviour	   is	  
always	  subordinate	  to	  its	  main	  goal:	  survival.	  This	  holds	  for	  all	  higher	  levels	  of	  cellular	  organization	  up	  to	  
communities,	   societies	   and	  nations.	   Clarifying/rendering	   a	   “crisper”	   notion	  of	   purposeful	   behaviour	   is	  
part	  of	  the	  early	  research	  agenda	  of	  INBIOSA.	  
	  
	  
6.	  The	  Grand	  Challenge	  	  
	  
This	  section	  addresses	  three	  major	  questions	  or	  grand	  challenge	  issues	  in	  the	  sciences	  of	  complexity	  that	  
underlie	   biology	   and	   the	   related	   study	   of	   living	   entities.	   The	   first	   issue	   is	   the	   relevance	   of	   a	   more	  
complete	  understanding	  of	  biological	  complexity	  and	  the	  increasing	  complexity	  of	  artificial	  (engineered)	  
systems	   to	   the	   progress	   of	   science.	   The	   second	   question	   is	   why	   a	   paradigmatically	   radical	   shift	   in	  
methodology	  is	  critical	  to	  progress	  in	  biology.	  The	  third	  issue	  is	  the	  potential	  impact	  of	  a	  revolutionary	  
advance	   in	   biology	   on	   all	   sciences	   and	   technologies	   involving	   life-­‐like	   or	   life-­‐enabled	   complexity.	   A	  
discussion	  of	  these	  issues	  is	  followed	  by	  a	  recommendation	  for	  a	  new	  strategic	  collaboration	  framework	  
to	   support	   the	   advancement,	   articulation	   and	   development	   of	   new	   theoretical	   and	   computational	  







6.1	  The	  Relevance	  of	  Complexity	  to	  the	  Problems	  of	  Science	  
	  
We	  begin	  by	  examining	  the	  historical	  trajectory	  of	  science	  and	  how	  that	  changed	  dramatically	  with	  the	  
invention	  of	  mathematical	  physics.	  Next	  we	  examine	  the	  current	  impasse	  in	  the	  progress	  of	  biology	  and	  
other	  sciences	  involving	  life-­‐like	  complexity	  or	  life-­‐enabled	  complexity.	  We	  then	  conclude	  with	  the	  role	  
of	  mathematics	  in	  the	  development	  of	  complexity	  sciences.	  	  
	  
6.1.1	  The	  Trajectory	  of	  Science:	  the	  Transformation	  of	  Methodological	  Paradigms	  from	  
Descriptive	  to	  Mathematical	  	  
	  








The	  schematic	  trajectory	  of	  science	  presented	  above	  is	  a	  simplification	  of	  much	  more	  complex	  system.	  A	  
more	  complete	  model	  of	  science,	  as	  a	  highly	  complex	  system	  of	  thought,	  a	  noetic	  system	  in	  itself,	  would	  
illustrate	   how	   the	   process	   is	   simultaneously	   cyclic,	   recursive	   and	   unpredictable	   in	   the	   sense	   of	  
generating	   novel	   emergent	   structures	   (predicting	   new	   phenomena)	   from	   its	   own	   mathematical	  
grammars.	   The	   power	   of	   mathematics	   (mathematical	   language	   and	   its	   grammars)	   to	   transform	   the	  
methodological	   paradigm	   of	   physics	   was	   first	   demonstrated	   by	   James	   Clerk	   Maxwell	   with	   his	  
revolutionary	   use	   of	   the	   differential	   equations	   that	   effectively	   described	   electromagnetic	   field	  
phenomena	  to	  predict	  the	  existence	  of	  electromagnetic	  waves	  and	  the	  electromagnetic	  nature	  of	  light,	  
both	   phenomena	   then	   unknown	   to	   experimental	   physics	   (Arianhod,	   2006).	   The	   subsequent	  
experimental	   observation	   of	   radio	   waves	   enabled	   the	  modern	   world	   of	   telecommunications	   and	   the	  
concept	  of	   the	   radiation	  of	   light	   led	   to	   the	   science	  of	  quantum	  physics.	   The	  paradigm	  shift	   in	  physics	  
from	  concrete	  models	  to	  mathematical	  imagination	  created	  the	  methodology	  of	  modern	  mathematical	  
physics.	  	  
	  
The	  science	  of	  biology	  awaits	  a	  similar	  transformation.	  	  Biology	  needs	  a	  new	  mathematics	  allowing	  for	  a	  
new	  form	  of	  computing	  that	  will	  permit	  us	  to	  model	  the	  emergence	  of	  new	  structures	  carrying	  out	  novel	  
processes	  as	  a	  result	  of	  innovative	  forms	  of	  organization	  within	  complex	  systems.	  At	  that	  point,	  we	  will	  
be	   on	   the	   verge	   of	   a	   transformation	   in	   biology	   as	   profound	   as	   that	   in	   physics.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	  
transformative	   paradigm	   shift	   in	   biology	   requires	   the	   development	   of	   mathematics	   appropriate	   to	  
biology	   that	   is	   motivated	   by	   problems	   that	   are	   biological	   in	   their	   origins	   and	   nature,	   just	   as	   the	  
mathematics	  appropriate	  to	  physics	  was	  physical	  in	  its	  origin	  and	  nature	  (Root-­‐Bernstein,	  2012).	  	  
	  
Observation	  of	  new	  phenomena	  à	  speculative	  concepts/	  hypotheses/	  theories	  à 	  
new	  mathematical	  formalisms	  à 	  predictive	  conjecture	  à	  empirical	  demonstration	  and	  






6.1.2	  The	  Impasse	  in	  Biology	  and	  the	  Need	  for	  Convergent	  Theoretical	  Synthesis	  	  
	  
Much	   progress	   has	   been	   made	   in	   biology.	   The	   last	   fifty	   years	   have	   generated	   a	   huge	   amount	   of	  
information	   on	   life	   processes.	   DNA,	   the	   genome	   and	   systems	   biology	   have	   had	   huge	   success	   in	  
extending	   our	   understanding	   of	  many	   of	   the	   basic	   processes	   in	   living	   cells	   and	   tissues.	   But	   in	   recent	  
years,	   research	   seems	   to	   have	   concentrated	   on	  more	   and	  more	   detailed	  molecular	   understanding	   of	  
these	   processes,	   without	   managing	   to	   pull	   these	   together	   across	   scales	   of	   space	   and	   time,	   without	  
increasing	   our	   overall	   understanding	   of	   the	   nature	   of	   these	   processes,	   or	   of	   how	   they	   make	   living	  
organisms	  actually	  live.	  Developing	  a	  set	  of	  theories	  that	  cut	  across	  these	  levels	  aims	  to	  fill	  that	  space.	  
The	   sciences	   of	   living	   systems	   are	   stalled	   at	   the	   most	   basic	   stages	   of	   observation	   and	   speculative	  
ontologies/hypotheses/theories.	   The	   energetic	   and	   optimistic	   application	   of	   the	   highly	   successful	  
Newtonian	   and	   von	   Neumann	   paradigms	   of	   physics	   and	   computation	   have	   not	   really	   enabled	   a	  
breakthrough	   in	   the	   understanding	   of	   living	   systems	   as	   distinct	   from	   non-­‐living	   matter.	   Mechanistic	  
models	   are	   still	   dominating	  biology	  and	   science.	   	   To	  make	  new	   inroads	   into	  biological	   study	  we	  must	  
move	  to	  new	  forms	  of	  dynamic	  relational	  models	  that	  enfold	  multiple	  mathematical	  approaches.	  
Funded	   research	   is	   producing	   ever	  more	   detailed	   reductionist	   descriptions	   of	   biological	   systems,	   but	  
failing	  to	  produce	  the	  understanding	  and	  insight	  that	  would	  be	  necessary	  for	  real	  progress.	  The	  central	  
idea	   behind	   our	   proposal	   is	   therefore	   to	   develop	   theoretical	   foundations	   that	   can	   bring	   together	   the	  
huge	   range	   of	   biological	   (genetic.	   molecular,	   protein-­‐based)	   knowledge	   by	   developing	   theories	   that	  
cross	  boundaries.	  	  Mainstream	  research	  appears	  to	  be	  about	  building	  up	  more	  and	  more	  knowledge	  in	  
the	  hope	  that	  one	  day	  it	  might	  be	  altogether	  made	  sense	  of.	  In	  Physics,	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  belief	  in	  clear	  
underlying	   principles	   that	   drives	   fundamental	   research.	   In	   Biology,	   such	   principles	   seem	   to	   be	   more	  
difficult	   to	   find,	   and	   are	   often	   seen	   as	   less	   important,	   if	   only	   because	   clinical	   work	   has	   different	  
aspirations	  from	  pure	  science.	  
	  
6.1.3	  The	  Evolution	  of	  Mathematics	  in	  the	  Development	  of	  Science	  
	  
There	   are	   many	   scientific	   problems	   a	   new	   mathematics	   of	   biology	   (biomathematics)	   would	   have	   to	  
address.	  How	   to	  model	   self-­‐emergent	   sets	   (origins	  of	   first	   cells;	   self-­‐assembly	  of	   viruses,	   etc.)	  How	   to	  
have	   such	   self-­‐emergent	   sets	   carry	   out	   functions	   selecting/rejecting	   among	   possible	   components;	  
minimizing	   what	   a	   physicist	   thinks	   of	   as	   free	   energy.	   How	   to	   create	   a	   mathematics	   that	   can	  
simultaneously	  deal	  with	  continuous	  variations	  in	  chemical	  kinetics	  yet	  yield	  information	  about	  modular	  
probabilities	   within	   complex	   systems	   to	   prune	   out	   huge	   numbers	   of	   possibilities	   at	   each	   step	   of	  
hierarchical	  assembly.	  The	  new	  mathematics	  would	  preferably	  incorporate	  the	  work	  that	  has	  been	  done	  
on	  understanding	  hierarchical	  systems,	  emergent	  properties	  and	  complexity	  theory.	  	  	  
	  
Current	  approaches	   to	   these	   sorts	  of	  problems	   rely	  on	  modeling	  one	  aspect	  of	   the	  problem	  with	  one	  
form	  of	  mathematics,	   switching	   to	   another	   sort	   of	  mathematics	   to	   address	   the	  next	   aspect,	   and	   to	   a	  





are	  for	  addressing	  these	  problems.	  Biological	  systems	  function	  at	  all	  of	  these	  levels	  simultaneously,	  and	  
so	  must	  our	  mathematics.	  A	  new	  mathematics	  would	  therefore	  be	  integrative.	  
	  
In	   a	   nutshell,	   mathematics	   will	   be	   required	   to	   expand	   its	   descriptive	   capability.	   The	   traditional	  
mathematical	   disciplines	   have	   been	   well	   versed	   with	   monologic	   discourses	   and	   formalization	   in	   an	  
unsurpassed	  manner,	  while	  the	  real	  processes	  operating	  in	  biology	  are	  dialogic	   in	  maneuvering	  a	  wide	  
variety	  of	   resource	  explorations	  and	  exploitations	  among	   the	  participating	  material	   agencies.	  A	  major	  
theme	  of	  the	  upcoming	  biomathematics	  we	  call	  Integral	  Biomathics,	  should	  be	  how	  to	  reach	  monologic	  
discourses,	   starting	   from	   the	   dialogic	   dynamics	   anchored	   upon	   the	   real	  material	  world	  without	   being	  
entrapped	  by	  easy	  static	  or	  statistical	  artifacts.	  One	  breakthrough	  that	  might	  be	  expected	   is	  extending	  
the	  scope	  of	  category	  theory	  as	  a	  mediator	   integrating	  the	  primitive	  nascent	  categories	   in	  the	  dialogic	  
dynamic	  domain	  into	  the	  full-­‐blown	  formal	  categories	  in	  the	  monologic	  descriptive	  enterprises.	  
	  
6.2	  The	  Radical	  Paradigm	  
	  
We	   suggest	   a	   new	   collaborative	   pathway	   in	   this	   section	   –	   convergent	   theoretical	   synthesis	   –	   as	   a	  
paradigm	   shift	   and	   an	   alternative	   to	   the	   current	   heavy	   emphasis	   on	   empirical	   research	   in	   order	   to	  
accelerate	   progress	   in	   these	   sciences.	   The	   envisioned	   research	   program	   is	   not	   an	   extension	   of	   the	  
existing	  paradigm	   in	  which	   the	  principles	  underlying	   the	  successful	  models,	  philosophical	  assumptions	  
and	  computational	  approaches	  of	  physics	  are	  assumed	  to	  apply	  as	  the	  foundations	  of	  biology.	   It	   is	  not	  
that	  we	  are	  suggesting	  that	  the	  laws	  of	  Physics	  do	  not	  apply	  to	  biology!	  However,	  we	  propose	  that	  there	  
are	   additional	   deep	   laws	   that	   apply	   to	   biological	   systems	  as	  well.	   The	   current	   paradigm	   has	   failed	   in	  
substantial	  ways	  to	  advance	  life	  sciences.	  The	  understanding	  of	  living	  processes	  has	  not	  been	  amenable	  
to	   orthodox	   mathematical	   modeling	   and	   logic	   despite	   enormous	   advances	   in	   computational	   and	  
experimental	   tools.	   Von	   Neumann	   computing	   is	   practically	   unable	   to	   address	   the	   complexity	   of	  
interactions	   involved	   in	   even	   the	   simplest	   molecular	   expressions.	   Therefore,	   INBIOSA	   focuses	   on	  
challenging	  the	  central	  reductive	  and	  simplification	  assumptions	  of	  classical	  science.	  
	  
6.2.1	  A	  New	  Trajectory:	  Towards	  Theoretical	  Foundations	  for	  Biology	  	  
	  
This	   concept	   is	   best	   expressed	   as	   a	   transposition	   of	   the	   modeling	   assumptions	   that	   enabled	   the	  










Non-­‐living	  systems	  (Newton):	  
	   Apparent	  complexity	  of	  observable	  phenomena	  à	  	  
	   	   	   Modeled	  effectively	  by	  simplistic	  minimalist	  formalisms	  	  
Living	  systems	  (Darwin):	  
	   Apparent	  simplicity	  of	  observable	  behaviour	  and	  development	  à	  	  





Nevertheless	  the	  physical	  sciences	  have	  lead	  to	  the	  development	  of	  new	  observational,	  analytical	  and	  
computational	  tools	  applicable	  to	  modern	  experimental	  biology.	  This	  has	  in	  turn	  enabled	  the	  collection	  







These	  technologies	  have	  in	  turn	  enabled	  the	  evolution	  of	  many	  disciplines	  and	  sub-­‐disciplines	  of	  biology	  
founded	  upon	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  paradigms,	  hypotheses	  and	   theories	  based	  upon	  on	   specific	   (narrow)	  
evidential	   bases.	   There	   is	   great	   need	   for	   convergent	   theoretical	   syntheses	   (Kant,	   1999)	   to	   reduce	   the	  
number	  of	  plausible	  theories	  and	  to	  synthesize	  across	  paradigms.	  Such	  tests	  of	  convergence	  have	  been	  
the	  pillar	  of	  scientific	  advance	  in	  astronomy,	  geology	  and	  biology	  (Donald,	  2004).	  In	  biology	  theoretical	  
integration	   and	   synthesis	   will	   enable	   more	   precise	   conceptual	   models	   for	   the	   newly	   observed	   key	  







These	  new	  conceptual	  models	   in	  turn	  will	  enable	  new	  mathematical	   formalisms	  will	  be	  the	  developed	  
for	  each	  process	  with	  a	  possible	  integrated	  mathematics	  from	  which	  all	  processes	  can	  be	  derived	  (Root-­‐







In	   particular,	   there	   could	   be	   a	   possible	   paradigm	   change	   to	   development,	   not	   evolution	   as	   the	   basic	  
orientation	  of	  biology.	  The	  groundwork	  was	  laid	  by	  A.	  I.	  Zotin	  in	  the	  1960’s	  in	  Russia	  (Zlotin,	  1972).	  It	  is	  
thought	  of	  (if	  at	  all)	  as	  a	  ‘dismal	  science’,	  as	  it	  is	  based	  in	  thermodynamics	  and	  focuses	  on	  the	  processes	  
of	  senescence	  (Salthe,	  1993)	  and	  complexity	  (Salthe,	  2005a).	  Developmental	  Biology	  is	  not	  informed	  by	  
this	   possible	   theoretical	   basis,	   and	   has,	   indeed,	   no	   theoretical	   basis	   of	   its	   own.	   This	   approach	   is	  
grounded	  in	  a	  basic	  perspective	  opposite	  to	  the	  ‘growth	  ideology’	  of	  our	  culture,	  and	  it	  would	  be	  truly	  a	  
radical	  departure.	  
	  
Actually,	  developmental	  and	  evolutionary	  biology	  represent	  a	  complementary	  pair.	  Development	  is	  the	  
process	  underpinned	  by	  genetics.	   It	   is	  genetics	   that	  determines	  the	  response	  to	  an	  event,	  at	  a	  certain	  
level,	  since	  it	  determines	  what	  the	  protein	  structures	  will	  be,	  that	  will	  detect	  the	  changes	  that	  constitute	  
events,	  as	  well	  as	  determining	  the	  reaction	  cascades	  that	  eventually	  result	  in	  action	  after	  an	  event.	  
	  
Observation	  of	  new	  phenomena	  à	  convergent	  theoretical	  synthesis	  à	  new	  
mathematical	  formalisms	  à	  	  predictive	  conjecture	  à 	  	  empirical	  demonstration	  and	  
verification	  à	  	  theoretical	  foundation	  for	  practical	  applications	  
	  
Observation	  of	  new	  phenomena	  à	  speculative	  concepts/	  hypotheses/	  theories	  à	  new	  
mathematical	  formalisms	  à	  predictive	  conjecture	  à 	  empirical	  demonstration	  and	  verification	  
à	  theoretical	  foundation	  for	  practical	  applications	  
Observation	  of	  new	  phenomena	  à	  convergent	  theoretical	  synthesis	  à	  new	  
mathematical	  formalisms	  à 	  predictive	  conjecture	  →	  empirical	  demonstration	  and	  






6.2.2	  The	  Entailments	  of	  Complexity	  
	  
The	  traditional	  aim	  of	  science	  and	  the	  technological	  tools	  and	  processes	  that	  it	  enables,	  is	  the	  increase	  in	  
our	  control	  over	  matter.	  This	  power	  rests	  entirely	  in	  the	  predictability	  entailments	  of	  the	  sciences,	  as	  we	  
know	   them	   today.	   An	   understanding	   is	   scientific	   according	   to	   its	   power	   of	   predictability.	  Our	   historic	  
understandings	  of	  the	  world	  around	  us	  (including	  our	  more	  recent	  understandings	  of	  human	  language,	  
thought,	   consciousness	   and	   foresight)	   are	   based	   on	   the	   canon	   of	   predictability.	   That	   canon	   together	  
with	  the	  mathematical	  innovations	  that	  enabled	  precision	  in	  predictability	  have	  been	  highly	  effective	  as	  
we	  advanced	  our	  understandings	  in	  the	  traditional	  domains	  of	  physics,	  chemistry,	  biology,	  neuroscience,	  
economics	   and	   in	   the	   varied	   technological	   and	   engineering	   domains	   that	   are	   derived	   from	   those	  
sciences	  and	  upon	  which	  our	  material,	  economic	  and	  social	  progress	  have	  depended.	  	  
	  
We	  are	  entering	  a	  new	  era,	  however,	  in	  which	  we	  seek	  to	  make	  even	  further	  interventions	  in	  the	  ways	  
of	  nature	  and	  expand	  the	  potential	  for	  yet	  further	  material	  and	  social	  progress	  in	  the	  man-­‐made	  world.	  
What	   we	   have	   discovered	   is	   that	   we	   now	   have	   to	   address	   real	   complexity	   rather	   than	   an	   apparent	  
complexity	   that	   can	   be	   reduced	   to	   simpler	   manageable	   and	   hence	   predictable	   entities.	   We	   are	   not	  
surprised	   that	   nature	   presents	   such	   challenges,	   but	   we	   are	   realizing	   now	   that	   the	   pervasive	   and	  
information-­‐intensive	   infrastructure	   of	   our	   built	  worlds	   (at	   all	   scales)	   is	   exhibiting	   the	   same	   features:	  
unpredictable	  interaction	  between	  components	  and	  sub-­‐systems	  of	  exceedingly	  complicated	  systems.	  	  
	  
The	   extraordinary	   capacity	   of	   all	   living	   entities	   to	   restructure	   themselves	   in	   order	   to	   address	   both	  
internal	  and	  external	  stresses	  in	  ways	  that	  evade	  understanding	  is	  based	  on	  the	  canon	  of	  predictability.	  
Biology	  as	  the	  study	  of	  living	  entities	  is	  the	  science	  that	  has	  faced	  the	  complexity	  phenomenon	  from	  its	  
outset.	   Physics	   took	   somewhat	   longer	   to	   confront	   irreducible	   and	   irresolvable	   complexity	   in	   its	  
formulations	  of	  non-­‐equilibrium	  thermodynamics	  to	  account	  for	  its	  theories	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  matter	  
from	  energy	  and	  of	  life	  from	  matter,	  (Chaisson,	  2002).	  	  
	  
The	  problems	  in	  biology	  and	  other	  fields	  of	  life-­‐enabled	  complexity	  are	  not	  about	  the	  energy-­‐budgets	  of	  
structured	  matter,	  as	  physics	  might	  be	  concerned	  with	  but	  about	  the	  complex	  of	  processes	  that	  enable	  
life	  and	  its	  continuing	  evolution	  in	  human	  culture	  and	  technology.	  	  
	  
The	   bottom	   line	   is	   that	   even	   understanding	   complexity	   will	   not	   allow	   us	   to	   avoid	   the	   emergence	   of	  
unpredictable	  properties	  or	  the	  illusion	  that	  we	  can	  manage	  the	  outcomes	  of	  emergence.	  	  
	  
How	  essential	  it	  is	  then	  to	  understand	  the	  conditions,	  under	  which	  emergence	  of	  new	  properties	  occurs	  
in	   biological	   systems	   (natural	   and	   synthetic)	   and	   in	   technologically	   complex	   engineered	   systems.	   Our	  
challenges	  will	  be	  how	  to	  manage	  emergence	  and	  to	  perhaps	  to	  shape	  the	  envelope	  of	  possibilities.	  The	  







6.2.3	  Bridging	  the	  Complexity-­‐based	  Disciplines	  	  
The	  theoretical	  syntheses	  and	  mathematics	  that	  are	  derived	  from	  transdisciplinary	  studies	  of	  the	  above	  
five	   grand	   scientific	   challenges	   have	   the	   potential	   to	   be	   applied	   to	   an	   understanding	   of	   how	   novel	  
properties	   can	   emerge	   in	   complex	   systems	   of	   any	   kind,	   whether	   ecological,	   social,	   behavioural,	  
technological	  or	  economic	  (Root-­‐Bernstein,	  2012).	  There	  are	  therefore	  many	  opportunities	  to	  advance	  
understanding	  simultaneously	  by	  transferring	  new	  insights	  from	  a	  simpler	  kind	  of	  complexity	  to	  advance	  
research	  in	  higher	  complexity	  regimes.	  	  We	  give	  our	  highest	  priority	  therefore	  to	  research	  spanning	  and	  
integrating	  the	  insights	  to	  be	  gained	  from	  both	  engineered	  and	  natural	  systems	  of	  complexity.	  	  	  
INBIOSA	  proposes	  the	  development	  of	  bridges	  with	  EU	  Future	  and	  Emerging	  technology	  (FET)	  programs	  
addressing	   the	   design	   of	   complex	   interacting	   engineered	   systems.	   Adoption	   of	   the	   INBIOSA	  
institutionalization	   agenda	   (summarized	  below)	   can	   greatly	   assist	   FET	   programs	   that	   are	   beginning	   to	  
address	   the	   problems	   of	   emergence	   of	   undesirable	   properties	   in	  what	  may	   be	   considered	   extremely	  
complex	  engineered	   systems.17	  These	  efforts	  would	  benefit	   from	   the	   innovative	  perspectives	  of	   those	  
who	   have	   articulated	   theories	   for	   a	   wide	   variety	   of	   emergent	   phenomena	   in	   biology,	   which	   involve	  
much	  greater	  complexity	  than	  those	  in	  human-­‐designed	  technologies.	  Mapping	  a	  new	  generation	  of	  bio-­‐
inspired	   emergence	   theories	   to	   complexity	   issues	   in	   engineered	   systems	   would	   accelerate	   design	  
solutions	  as	  rapidly	  as	  new	  mathematical	  formalisms	  were	  developed	  and	  tested.	  Conversely,	  adoption	  
of	  an	  internalist	  perspective	   involving	  our	  reflection	  upon	  the	  process	  of	  creating	  and	  operating	  a	  vast	  
network	   of	   human-­‐intelligence	   driven	   self-­‐organizing	   engineered	   systems	  might	   give	   us	   some	   insight	  
into	  how	  biological	  complexity	  in	  nature	  works.	  	  
	  
The	  salient	  aspect	  of	  this	  argument	  was	  captured	  by	  Simeonov’s	  Flagship	  Proposal	  (Simeonov,	  2010a):	  
	  
“…	  we	  cannot	  truly	  rely	  on	  these	  machines	  to	  autonomously	  discover	  and	  explore	  new	  worlds	  
which	  are	  impenetrable	  for	  us.	  They	  simply	  lack	  the	  ability	  to	  grow,	  develop	  and	  evolve	  under	  
the	  two	  other	  fundamental	  capabilities	  that	  living	  systems	  possess:	  effectiveness	  and	  innate	  
adaptability/learning	  (without	  any	  human	  intervention).	  “	  	  
	  
However	   if	   we	   include	   the	   capabilities	   of	   effectiveness	   and	   innate	   adaptability/learning	   available	  
through	  human	  intervention	  we	  might	  have	  much	  to	  learn	  from	  such	  biosynthetic	  complexity.	  	  Take	  for	  
example	   telecommunications	   networks.	   We	   have	   entered	   an	   engineering	   era	   distinguished	   by	   an	  
entirely	   new	   systems	   phenomenon:	   exceedingly	   complex	   interactive	   networks	   of	   computers	   and	  
communicating	   devices.	   Such	   complex	   systems	   provide	   a	   new	   observational	   platform	   enabling	   the	  
opportunity	  to	  explore,	  from	  the	  inside	  out,	  how	  exceedingly	  complex	  systems	  develop	  new	  properties.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  The	  FET	  consultation	  on	  evolvability	  raised	  further	  concerns	  that	  FET	  research	  projects	  pursuing	  advancements	  in	  collective	  
adaptive	   systems	   are	   failing	   to	   address	   deeper	   fundamental	   issues	   in	   complexity	   engineering	   involving:	   the	   long-­‐term	  
controllability	  of	  autonomous	  artificial	  systems;	  artificial	  chemistries	  that	  may	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  re-­‐write	  the	  operating	  system,	  
or	  control	  system	  in	  which	  it	  is	  embodied;	  the	  need	  to	  understand	  emerging	  complexity	  in	  modern-­‐world	  systems	  at	  the	  level	  of	  





While	  not	  natural	  emergence	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  living	  systems,	  it	  is	  observable	  engineered	  emergence,	  the	  
manipulation	   or	   re-­‐configuration	   of	   technological	   capabilities	   towards	   an	   overt	   human	   purpose.	  
Pioneering	   research	   on	   “recommendation	   architecture”	   has	   challenged	   von	   Neumann	   computer	  
architecture	  as	  the	  way	  towards	  higher-­‐performance	  global	  telecommunications	   infrastructures	  and	  at	  
the	   same	   time	   provided	   theoretical	   insights	   into	   neural	   cognitive	   processes	   otherwise	   unavailable	   to	  
experimental	   biology.	   	   INBIOSA	   believes	   that	   the	   time	   has	   come	   to	   discover	   universal	   “emergence”	  
principles	  in	  the	  interaction	  between	  the	  human	  mind	  and	  its	  engineering	  goals	  for	  complex	  systems	  of	  
all	   kinds	   through	   the	   new	   observational	   platforms	   being	   offered	   by	   complex	   engineered	   systems	   at	  
many	  scales.	  	  
	  
6.3	  Institutionalizing	  the	  Lessons	  of	  the	  First	  Scientific	  Revolution	  	  
	  
We	   believe	   that	   convergent	   theoretical	   synthesis	   and	   innovative	   mathematics	   hold	   the	   keys	   to	  
transformative	  progress	  in	  biology	  and	  the	  other	  sciences	  and	  technologies	  of	  complexity.	  How	  then	  do	  
we	   propose	   to	   create	   the	   conditions	   for	   focusing	   resources	   and	   talent	   upon	   these	   processes	   in	   the	  
context	   of	   extreme	   disciplinary	   specialization	   and	   the	   massive	   commitment	   of	   resources	   to	  
observational,	   clinical	   and	   experimental	   methodologies?	   The	   first	   principle	   that	   we	   propose	   as	   a	  
foundation	   for	   transformative	   research	   is	   that	   of	   universality:	   that	   there	   is	   a	   commonality,	   a	  
transdisciplinarity,	   an	   integrative	   view	   of	   what	   can	   be	   perceived	   by	   human	   intelligence	   that	   must	  
assimilate	   the	   knowledge	   gained	   from	   research	   in	   all	   disciplines.	   Hence,	   our	   proposals	   recognize	   the	  
variety	   and	   theoretical	   complementarity	   of	   complex	   systems,	   i.e.	   there	   are	   many	   kinds	   of	   complex	  
systems,	  from	  relatively	  simple	  ones	  to	  ultra-­‐complex	  ones.	  What	  they	  have	  in	  common	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  
develop	   novel	   (i.e.	   unanticipated)	   properties	   from	   their	   own	   self-­‐organizing	   capabilities.	   We	   can	  
currently	  identify	  at	  least	  seven	  distinct	  kinds	  of	  complex	  self-­‐organizing	  systems	  based	  on	  their	  distinct	  
forms	  of	  semiosis,	  i.e.	  classes	  of	  communicating	  meaning	  with	  signs,	  (Logan,	  2007):	  
	  
Kind	  of	  Self-­‐organizing	  System/Discipline	   Form	  of	  Semiosis	  (communicating	  meaning	  through	  signs)	  
	  
molecular	  biology	   digital	  transmission	  of	  information	  by	  DNA	  
cellular	  biology	  and	  ecology	  	   process	  by	  which	  receptors	  of	  prokaryotes	  interpret	  signals	  
from	  the	  environment	  	  
developmental	  biology	   epigenesis	   of	   the	   phenotype	   from	   the	   DNA	   influenced	   by	  
signals	  from	  the	  environment	  	  
neurocognitive	  science	  	   biosemiosis	   of	   learning	   by	   virtue	   of	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	  
central	  nervous	  system	  in	  animals	  	  
cognitive	  evolution	  	   transition	   from	   percept-­‐based	   thought	   to	   concept-­‐based	  
symbolic	   thought	   that	   emerged	   contemporaneously	   with	  
human	  speech	  	  
distributed	  cognitive	  evolution	  and	  sociology	  	   human	  culture,	  a	  symbolic	  thought	  based	  phenomenon	  	  
Semiotics	   science,	   mathematics,	   technologies	   and	   economies,	   as	  
products	  of	  the	  human	  mind	  generated	  through	  signs	  both	  






Focusing	  on	  biology,	   INBIOSA	  has	   identified	  five	  principal	  phenomena	  in	  biology	  towards	  which	  efforts	  
at	  theoretical	  convergence	  and	  the	  development	  of	  an	  innovative	  mathematics	  should	  be	  focused	  in	  the	  
immediate	  future:	  
1.	  the	  autopoiesis	  (self-­‐construction)	  of	  cellular	  life;	  
2.	  the	  emergence	  of	  modules	  of	  hierarchy	  in	  all	  complex	  systems;	  	  
3.	  the	  varieties	  of	  modalities	  of	  communication	  within	  and	  between	  hierarchical	  levels	  of	  living	  
systems;	  
4.	  the	  transformations	  of	  information	  processes	  from	  scalar	  to	  vector/tensor	  quantities;	  and	  
5.	   integrated	   mathematical	   approaches	   that	   can	   link	   discrete,	   continuous	   and	   geometrical	  
information	  simultaneously.	  
	  
6.4	  A	  New	  Strategic	  Collaboration	  Framework	  	  
	  
INBIOSA	   is	   the	   first	   formal	   attempt	   to	   provide	   a	   collaboration	   framework	   to	   support	   the	  
advancement,	   articulation	   and	   development	   of	   new	   theoretical	   foundations	   for	   biology.	   	  We	  have	  
drawn	  together	  a	  community	  of	  researchers	  to	  provide	  guidance	  on	  both	  the	  scientific	  and	  institutional	  
steps	  required	  for	  a	  continuing	  scientific	  deliberation	  of	  paradigm	  shifting	  alternatives.	  	  	  
	  
It	  is	  clear	  however,	  that	  the	  disciplinary	  structure,	  vocabularies	  and	  inertial	  belief	  patterns	  of	  academic	  
research	   invite	   premature	   closure	   to	   cross-­‐disciplinary	   debate	   and	   paradigm-­‐transforming	   challenges.	  	  
INBIOSA	   therefore	   proposes	   that	   FET	   continue	   to	   provide	   an	   institutional	   setting	   conducive	   to	   the	  
research	  agenda	  we	  have	  proposed	  to	  address	  fundamental	  questions	  relevant	  to	  the	  broader	  field	  of	  
complexity	  sciences.	  The	  FET	  program	  itself	  recognizes	  the	  acute	  need	  for	  a	  continuing	  process	  enabling	  
scientific	  deliberation	  of	  paradigm	  shifting	  theoretical	  research.	   	  The	  EC	  report	  on	  the	  Future	  Internet18	  
makes	   the	  extra-­‐ordinary	  and	  rarely	   recognized	  point	  about	   the	  contingency	  of	   future	  progress	  at	   the	  
economic	   enterprise	   level	   on	   “new	   scientific	   foundations	   to	   produce	  Enterprise	   Systems	   offerings	   that	  
are	  rested	  on	  and	  subject	  to	  the	  rigour	  of	  science”:	  
	  
“More	   fundamentally,	   a	   science	   base	   is	   required	   for	   the	   development	   of	   the	   next-­‐generation	  
Internet-­‐based	   Enterprise	   Systems	   able	   to	   cope	   with	   a	   new	   set	   of	   complex	   issues	   and	  
requirements,	   while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   ensuring	   reliability,	   flexibility,	   scalability	   and	   other	  
qualities	  that	  have	  made	  the	  Internet	  such	  an	  indispensable	  tool	  for	  businesses	  and	  society.”	  
	  
The	   existence	   of	   such	   a	   process	   will	   help	   to	   overcome	   a	   historic	   weakness	   in	   enabling	   challenges	   to	  
orthodoxies,	  strengthening	  the	  climate	  for	  new	  paradigms	  and	  enabling	  new	  cross-­‐disciplinary	  and	  inter-­‐
disciplinary	  syntheses	  in	  support	  of	  convergent	  paradigms.	  A	  first	  step	  in	  this	  direction	  was	  made	  in	  the	  
panel	  discussions	  during	  the	  iBioMath	  2011	  workshops	  in	  San	  Jose	  (California)	  and	  Paris	  and	  the	  ACIB-­‐11	  
research	   forum	   in	   Stirling,	   UK.	   	   The	   broad	   range	   of	   disciplinary	   response	   to	   these	   workshops	  
demonstrates	  the	  latent	  interest	  of	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  research	  communities	  involved	  with	  theoretical	  and	  
practical	  development	  of	  complex	  systems	  of	  all	  levels.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





INBIOSA	   therefore	   proposes	   an	   expanded	   program	   of	   consultations	   and	   collaboration	   with	   relevant	  
scientific	  and	  engineering	  communities	  focused	  on	  three	  objectives:	  
	  
1. Identifying	   the	   scientific	   challenges	   in	   biological	   and	   artificial	   systems	   information	  
processing;	  
2. Confirming	  support	  for	  the	  relevance	  of	  INBIOSA	  Grand	  Challenge	  Goals	  to	  the	  research	  
objectives	  their	  expert	  communities;	  
3. Commitment	  to	  joint	  development	  of	  an	  integrated	  research	  agenda.	  
	  
INBIOSA	  suggests	  consideration	  of	  a	  conceptual	  model	  for	  such	  an	  institutional	  framework	  based	  on	  the	  
concept	  of	  emergent	  complex	  systems	  itself.	   In	  other	  words,	  to	  mimic	  in	  the	  larger	  world,	  the	  thought	  
processes	  and	  structures	  that	  enable	  the	  emergence	  of	  new	  ideas	  in	  the	  human	  mind.	  The	  table	  below	  
lists	  potential	   fields	  of	  research	  addressing	  complexity	   issues.	  The	   institutional	  challenge	   is	  to	  recreate	  
the	   individual	   thought	  process	  of	  performing	   the	  necessary	  convergent	   synthesis	  of	   theory	  underlying	  
the	  complexity	  of	  living	  systems	  at	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  total	  societal	  effort	  in	  the	  relevant	  sciences.	  In	  other	  
words,	   the	  co-­‐ordination	  (but	  not	  the	  control)	  of	   the	  many	  modules	  of	   thought	  that	  could	  be,	  but	  are	  
not	  being	  brought	  together	  into	  a	  more	  coherent	  model	  of	  life	  itself.	  	  
	  
This	   would	   involve	   co-­‐coordinating	   efforts	   through	   FET	   programs	   and	   academic	   interdisciplinary	  
collaborations	  guided	  by	  the	  principle	  of	  synthesis.	  Implementing	  such	  co-­‐ordination	  is	  the	  institutional	  
challenge.	  The	  form	  of	  structure	  and	  communication	  that	  would	  most	  benefit	  this	  process	  is	  not	  known	  
yet.	   What	   is	   known	   is	   that	   existing	   processes	   of	   collaboration	   and	   disciplinary	   integration	   and	   co-­‐
ordination	  do	  not	  support	  such	  synthesis	  and	  mathematical	  innovation.	  
	  
The	  following	  table	  summarizes	  the	  fields	  to	  be	  engaged,	  the	  problems	  identified	  for	   joint	  activity	  and	  























The	  Reflective	  Collective	  Intellect:	  A	  preliminary	  schematic	  framework	  for	  enabling	  the	  emergence	  of	  
a	  new	  scientific	  discipline	  of	  the	  complexity	  of	  natural	  and	  engineered	  systems	  –	  Integral	  Biomathics	  
	  
Discipline/Organization	   Knowledge	  Problems	   Required	  Interdisciplinary	  
Science	  Research	  Activity	  
Theoretical	  biology	  
	  
Understanding	  how	  different	  levels	  interact	  (molecular,	  
genomic,	  intracellular,	  extracellular,	  multicellular,	  organ	  
level,	  whole	  organism	  level,	  ecosystems)	  
Development	  of	  multi-­‐level/multi-­‐
temporal	  modelling	  synthesizing	  all	  
levels	  and	  time	  scales	  
Biosemiotics	  
	  
Understanding	  the	  different	  nature	  of	  all	  levels	  of	  	  
abiotic,	  biotic	  and	  symbolic	  communications	  relevant	  to	  
self-­‐organizing	  entities	  
Process-­‐based	  modeling	  




How	  to	  formalize	  biological	  problems	  that	  currently	  exist	  
in	  two	  or	  more	  essentially	  unrelated	  domains	  of	  
mathematics	  
a)	  Develop	  mathematics	  beyond	  
autopoetic	  sets	  along	  the	  line	  of	  
category	  theory	  and	  MES	  theory,	  
using	  recent	  domains	  able	  to	  unify	  
probability	  theory,	  hierarchy	  
theory,	  network	  theory,	  
vector/tensor	  calculus,	  logic,	  
topology	  and	  others.	  
b)	  Invent	  new	  mathematical	  
methods	  and	  tools	  beyond	  a)	  	  
Health	  sciences	   The	  lack	  of	  theoretical	  advances,	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  naive	  
immune	  inspired	  approach	  and	  the	  limited	  application	  of	  
Artificial	  Immune	  Systems	  have	  limited	  immune	  systems	  
research.	  	  
Devise	  multi-­‐scale	  models	  of	  pathologies	  and	  human	  
anatomy/physiology	  accelerating	  therapeutic	  research;	  
discovery	  of	  new	  pharmaceuticals	  and	  medical	  devices	  
fostering	  an	  integrative	  approach	  to	  health	  care.	  	  	  
Similar	  to	  theoretical	  biology,	  but	  
with	  an	  emphasis	  on	  pathogenesis	  
and	  the	  means	  to	  
eradicate/reverse	  the	  degeneration	  
processes	  with	  minimal	  side	  effects	  
while	  mobilizing	  and	  enforcing	  




Potential	  instability	  of	  highly	  complex	  systems	  as	  they	  
increase	  in	  scale	  and	  complexity	  
How	  do	  biological	  systems	  
integrate	  across	  multiple	  levels	  to	  
produce	  long-­‐living	  robust	  systems	  




Reconfiguration	  approaches	  to	  meet	  increasing	  flexibility	  
in	  demand	  patterns	  and	  system	  reliability	  
As	  above	  
Cognitive	  science	   How	  could	  the	  self	  emerge?	  What	  could	  be	  the	  material	  
requirement	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  most	  primitive	  
cognitive	  unit?	  
How	  could	  consciousness	  be	  
related	  to	  cognition?	  Is	  cognition	  
equivalent	  to	  measurement?	  
Synthetic	  biology	   Knowing	  how	  to	  build	  synthetic	  biology	  systems;	  
Understanding	  how	  to	  control	  a	  synthetic	  biological	  
system	  in	  order	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  its	  capabilities	  
Using	  the	  Mathematics	  and	  
semiotics	  to	  help	  create	  systems	  




Unpredictability	  of	  self-­‐replicating,	  high	  plasticity	  and	  
self-­‐healing	  and	  programming	  functionalities	  
Complex	  Systems	  
Unconventional	  Computing	  
New	  studies	  of	  heterogeneous	  
systems.	  
Studies	  of	  information	  processing	  
in	  living	  systems:	  re-­‐interpretation	  
of	  biological	  computing.	  
Other	  (economy,	  finances,	  
other	  complex	  technology	  
disciplines.	  	  







7.	  Towards	  a	  General	  Theory	  of	  Living	  Systems	  (GTLS)	  	  
	  
This	   section	   describes	   the	   effort	   to	   formalize	   a	   general	   theory	   of	   living	   systems	   from	  what	   we	   have	  





We	   focus	   on	   evolving	   integral	   models	   of	   life	   as	   an	   integration	   of	   both	   descriptive	   and	   explanatory	  
models.	   An	   advantage	   of	   recruiting	   descriptive	   models	   amenable	   to	   first-­‐person	   experience	   is	   to	   go	  
beyond	  being	  entrapped	  by	  easy	  syntactic	   integrations	  unique	   to	  explanatory	  models	   limited	   to	   third-­‐
person	  descriptions,	  i.e.	  non-­‐reductionist	  and	  both	  endo-­‐	  and	  exophysical	  approaches	  to	  the	  emergence	  
and	  development	  of	  dynamic,	  ordered	  hierarchical	  systems.	  These	  are	  facets	  of	  biological	  systems	  that	  
no	  one	  can	  model	  at	  present.	  	  
	  
The	   elements	   we	   want	   to	   address	   have	   applications	   to	   "intelligent	   systems"	   of	   all	   kinds,	   including	  
AI/ALife	   systems	  and	  emergent	  ecologies,	  etc.	  All	   these	   systems	  can	  be	  demonstrated	   to	  have	   similar	  
features	  and	  functions	  (albeit	  at	  different	  levels	  of	  organization).	  	  
	  
To	  address	  these	  issues,	  we	  postulate	  the	  development	  of	  a	  'dynamic	  model’	  of	  the	  entangled	  system	  'in	  
the	   making',	   trying	   to	   size	   up	   the	   successive	   specifications	   of	   its	   logic	   and	   semantics	   over	   time	  
(Ehresmann	  &	  Vanbremeersch,	  2007).	  At	  each	  time,	  we	  assume	  the	  overall	  ('global')	  logic	  of	  the	  system	  
to	   result	   from	   the	   interplay	   among	   a	   hierarchy	   of	   'local'	   logics	   and	   process	   event	   driven	   non-­‐local	  
crossovers,	   each	   with	   its	   own	   temporality,	   complexity	   and	  multiform	   components.	   Furthermore,	   this	  
interplay	   is	   reckoned	   to	   become	   flexible	   through	   'switches'	   between	   different	   decompositions	   of	  
multiform	  components,	  allowing	   for	  a	  kind	  of	   fitness	   selection	  between	   them	  to	  preserve	  as	  much	  as	  
possible	  of	  the	  local	  logics.	  While	  the	  local	  logics	  resort	  to	  'classical'	  computations,	  the	  real	  challenge	  is	  
to	   deal	   with	   their	   interplay,	   in	   particular	   how	   to	   handle	   switches	   between	   different	   possible	  
decompositions	   of	   a	   multiform	   component,	   and	   with	   their	   non-­‐local	   'quantum'	   entanglements	  
(Ehresmann	  &	  Vanbremeersch,	  2002,	  s.	  Appendix	  A2).	  
	  
The	   INBIOSA	   initiative	   suggests	   a	   radical	   approach	   to	   theoretical	   biology,	   biomathematics	   and	   bio-­‐
computation	  in	  the	  long	  term	  that	  can	  be	  supported	  by	  a	  transitional	  strategy	  in	  the	  short	  and	  middle	  
term	  by	   addressing	   looming	   problems	   in	   complex	   interacting	   artificial	   systems	   that	   deserve	   attention	  




This	   section	  explores	   the	   reasons	  why	   the	  core	  question	   stated	   in	   the	  previous	   section	  has	   long	  been	  






The	   history	   of	   science	   is	   a	   constant	   tension	   between	   those	   who	   would	   understand	   the	   world	   by	  
examining	   its	   pieces	   (Democritus)	   and	   those	   who	   would	   understand	   it	   by	   studying	   its	   processes	  
(Heraclitus).	  Erwin	  Chargaff	  wrote	  a	  very	  insightful	  (and	  unpopular)	  book	  about	  this	  conflict	  as	  it	  applies	  
to	  molecular	  biology	  called	  Heraclitean	  Fire	  (Chargaff,	  1978).	  The	  importance	  of	  making	  this	  distinction	  
is	   that	   this	   book	   at	   present	   reads	   as	   if	   molecular	   biologists	   are	   studying	   cascades	   of	   molecular	  
processes/changes,	   but	   in	   fact	   they	   are	   not,	   because	   these	   are	   only	   a	   small,	   low	   level	   part	   of	   the	  
organism,	  and	  they	  ought	  to	  be	  examining	  the	  whole	  system.	  At	  least	  they	  have	  moved	  beyond	  simply	  
looking	  at	   specific	  molecules,	  but	   they	   still	  make	   the	  often-­‐repeated	  error	  of	   thinking	   that	   if	   they	  can	  
isolate	   parts	   of	   the	   system	   that	   participate	   in	   the	   processes,	   the	   processes	   themselves	   will	   become	  
clear.	  This	   is	   the	  epitome	  of	   the	   reductionist	   fallacy.	  The	   individual	  pieces	  of	  a	   clock	  do	  not	  predict	  or	  
explain	  its	  “clockness”,	  which	  resides	  instead	  in	  the	  way	  its	  organization	  permits	  it	  to	  carry	  out	  a	  specific	  
process.	   	  The	   importance	   of	   making	   this	   distinction	   is	   that	   the	   mathematics	   used	   to	   model	   most	  
biological	  processes	  have	   likewise	  developed	  from	  reductionist	  approaches,	  having	  been	  developed	  to	  
model	  a	  Newtonian	  “clockwork	  universe”.	  	  Reading	  the	  clock	  is	  irrelevant	  to	  a	  Newtonian	  universe	  since	  
every	  inhabitant	  in	  the	  universe	  is	  no	  more	  than	  part	  of	  the	  single	  gigantic	  clock	  available	  there.	  	  	  
	  
Despite	  the	  unquestioned	  success	  of	  the	  “omics”	  revolutions	  the	  paradigm	  shift	   in	  biology	  comparable	  
to	   those	   invoked	   by	   the	   theory	   of	   relativity	   and	   the	   quantum	   theory	   in	   physics	   has	   not	   yet	   been	  
achieved.	  Addressing	  the	   issues	  of	  parts	  of	  a	  clock,	  clockness	  and	  reading	  clocks	  discussed	  earlier	  may	  
provide	  a	  key	  to	  engineering	  such	  a	  change	  in	  view.	  	  
	  
How	  can	  we	  describe	  the	  synchronization	  of	  two	  adjacent	  clocks	  without	  relying	  upon	  Newtonian	  time?	  
Just	   as	   physics	   has	   adopted	   novel	   forms	   of	   mathematical	   modeling	   that	   explicitly	   reject	   mechanistic	  
reductionism,	  so	  must	  biology	   if	   it	   is	  to	  deal	  with	  similarly	  complex	  systems	  comprised	  of	  components	  
that	  have	  multiple	  states	  and	  vary	  constantly	  in	  number	  and	  composition	  through	  time.	  
	  
Another	   point	   that	   needs	   to	   be	  made	   explicitly	   is	   the	   necessity	   of	   taking	   into	   account	   hierarchies	   of	  
organization.	  Biology	   is	   not	   chemistry,	   which	   is	   not	   physics.	   Chemistry	   becomes	   chemistry	   and	   not	  
physics	  at	   the	  point	  where	  we	  can	   ignore	   the	  physical	  properties	  of	   the	  components	   carrying	  out	   the	  
chemistry.	  Biology	  becomes	  biology	  and	  not	  chemistry	  when	  we	  can	  ignore	  the	  chemical	  properties	  of	  
the	   components	   carrying	   out	   the	   biology.	   Yet,	   this	   is	   not	   reductionism.	   Simple	   hierarchical	   reasoning	  
leads	   us	   to	   conclude	   that	   we	   can	   recognize	   a	   new	   level	   of	   organization	   when	   the	   principles	   and	  
properties	  and	  models	  that	  worked	  for	  the	  previous	  level	  of	  organization	  can	  be	  ignored19.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  
say	  that	  biological	  systems	  are	  not	  comprised	  of	  chemicals	  that	  obey	  the	  laws	  of	  physics,	  but	  to	  say	  that	  
biological	  systems	  are	  recognizably	  biological	  because	  they	  have	  organizational	  properties	  and	  patterns	  
that	  allow	  them	  to	  carry	  out	  processes	  that	  cannot	  be	  accounted	  purely	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  physics	  and	  
chemistry	   of	   their	   individual	   components.	   Here	   we	   often	   have	   interspersed	   interactions	   from	   higher	  
layers	  of	  organization.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  We	  don’t	  need	  an	  understanding	  of	  nuclear	  physics	  to	  describe	  the	  kinetics	  of	  a	  chemical	  reaction;	  we	  don’t	  need	  to	  know	  
the	  movements	  of	  every	  molecule	  in	  a	  gas	  to	  measure	  its	  temperature;	  we	  don’t	  need	  an	  understanding	  of	  electron	  shells	  to	  





Consequently,	  what	  we	  need	  to	  describe	  and	  explain	  this	  “native	  biology”	  is	  the	  application	  of	  areas	  of	  
mathematics	  not	  previously	  applied	  to	  it	  and	  the	  development	  of	  new	  ones,	  as	  well	  as	  of	  new	  forms	  of	  
computing	  that	  permit	  us	  to	  model	  the	  emergence	  of	  new	  biological	  properties	  and	  patterns	  resulting	  in	  
the	   carrying	   out	   of	   novel	   processes	   as	   a	   result	   of	   innovative	   forms	   of	   organization	   within	   complex	  
systems.	  	  This	  kind	  of	  mathematical	  formalism	  is	  expected	  to	  enable	  us	  to	  answer	  the	  question:	  “What	  
exactly	   is	   so	   typical	   and	   unique	   for	   living	   systems	   that	   does	   not	   occur	   in	   non-­‐living	   ones?”	   We	   do	  
however	   recognize	   that	   attacking	   this	   question	   should	   proceed	   under	   the	   constraint	   of	   the	  
impredicativity.	  	  That	  is	  equivalent	  to	  practicing	  whatever	  theoretical	  synthesis	  is	  to	  be	  framed	  in	  third	  
person	  descriptions	  without	  forgetting	  about	  inevitable	  interferences	  from	  first	  person	  descriptions.	  
	  
The	  reason	  that	  biology	  has	  failed	  to	  develop	  a	  viable	  set	  of	  mathematical	  theories	  is	  therefore	  a	  result	  
of	   having	   attempted	   to	   treat	   its	   universal,	   hierarchically-­‐unique,	   organizationally-­‐derived	   processes	   in	  
terms	  of	  reductionistic	  principles	  derived	  from	  studying	  the	  chemical	  particles	  upon/from	  which	  these	  
processes	  emerged.	  Additional	  confusion	  comes	  from	  the	  usage	  of	  wrong	  and	  mixed-­‐up	  definitions.	  We	  
wish	  to	  know	  how	  the	  reaction	  cycle	  could	  emerge.	  	  
	  
In	   fact,	   the	   reaction	   cycle,	   as	   a	   higher	   level	   organization	   compared	   to	   the	   constituent	   individual	  
molecules,	   raises	   a	   serious	   question	   of	   how	   the	   identity	   of	   the	   higher	   level	   can	   come	   to	   outlive	   the	  
identity	  of	  each	  constituent	  molecule	  in	  the	  lower	  level.	  Once	  it	  emerges,	  what	  kinds	  of	  problem	  would	  
remain?	   Hierarchy	   theory	   suggests	   that	   reductionism	   can	   never	   explain	   how	   novel	   properties	   and	  
processes	  emerge20.	  	  
	  
What	  we	  need	   is	   not	  more	  detailed	  models	   that	   can	  handle	   greater	   and	  greater	   amounts	  of	   detailed	  
data	   from	   increasingly	   fine-­‐grained	   studies	   of	   the	   components	   of	   systems,	   but	   ways	   of	   identifying	  
properties	   that	   are	   as	   unique	   to	   such	   complex	   conglomerations	   as	   temperature	   is	   to	   a	   set	   of	  
molecules.	  In	   short,	   what	   we	   lack	   is	   a	   uniquely	   developmental	   mathematics	   that	   deals	   with	   the	  
emergence	   of	   organization	   from	   non-­‐random	   selection	   among	   replicating	   variations	   within	   complex	  
populations	  of	  living	  entities.	  Could	  it	  be	  possible	  to	  have	  a	  type	  of	  mathematics	  that	  may	  support	  the	  
robust	   transformation	   from	   non-­‐cyclic	   to	   cyclic	   reaction	   network	   (Yardley,	   2010)	   in	   a	   sense	  
approachable	  empirically?	  What	  then	  would	  the	  mathematics	  of	  emergent	  properties	  and	  organization	  
look	  like?	  Biology	  is	  only	  one	  case	  of	  such	  emergent	  properties	  resulting	  from	  spontaneous	  organization	  
within	  complex	  systems.	  Political	  and	  economic	  systems	  are	  two	  others.	  
	  
Josephson's	   emergence	   approach	   suggests	   how	   to	   join	  mathematics	   and	   biology	   using	   signs/symbols	  
(semiosis),	  along	  the	  same	  path	  that	  the	  fundamental	  concepts	  of	  natural	  numbers,	  Euclidean	  geometry,	  
algebra	  and	  logic	  were	  developed:	  "By	  retreating	  into	  symbolism	  one	  escapes	  inconvenient	  facts	  about	  
the	  world	  and	  is	  able	  to	  create	  a	  system	  that	  has	  a	  certain	  resemblance	  to	  the	  world	  even	  though	  there	  
is	  no	  exact	  correspondence."	  	  (Josephson,	  2012)	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





The	   principles	   that	   are	   derived	   from	   our	   studies	   should	   apply	   to	   an	   understanding	   of	   how	   novel	  
properties	   can	  emerge	   in	   complex	   systems	  of	   any	   kind21,	  whether	   ecological,	   social,	   behavioural,	   and	  
possibly	  even	  technological.	  
	  
Among	  other	  things,	  we	  would	  conjecture	  that	  such	  a	  new	  mathematics	  would	  not	  be	  related	  to	  digital	  
computation.	  Biological	   systems	   invariably	   involve	   weak	   interactions	   and	   complementarity	   between	  
molecules	   and	   systems	   that	   are	   in	   dynamic	   motion.	   Such	   systems	   have	   characteristics	   shared	   with	  
analogue	   systems	   as	   well	   as	   digital	   ones	   in	   the	   light	   of	   appreciating	   a	   novel	   source	   of	   cohesion.	  The	  
analogue	   side	   of	   computing,	   while	   not	   entirely	   novel,	   has	   largely	   been	   ignored	   since	   the	   digital	  
revolution.	  We	  will	  not	  make	  progress	  in	  modeling	  and	  understanding	  complex,	  emergent	  living	  systems	  
until	  we	  have	  computational	  systems	  that	  are	  based	  on	  similar	  principles.	  
	  
Again,	   many	   systems	   besides	   biological	   ones	   are	   analogue22 .	  Most	   functions	   describing	   weather,	  
economic	   indicators,	   etc.	   are	   also	   analog.	   It	   might	   therefore	   be	   possible	   to	   create	   a	   revolution	   in	  
modeling	   across	   many	   disciplines	   by	   focusing	   on	   developing	   analogue	   modeling	   tools	   for	   biological	  
systems.	  
	  
However,	   the	   replacement	   of	   digital	   by	   analog	   might	   not	   provide	   the	   ultimate	   solution	   for	   biology.	  
INBIOSA	   is	   in	   favor	   of	   integrative	   approaches	   combining	   the	  benefits	   of	   both	  worlds,	   but	  we	  need	   to	  
turn	   our	   attention	   to	   analog	   computation	   and	   its	   derivatives,	  which	   appear	   to	   be	  more	   adequate	   for	  
explaining	  biological	  phenomena.	  Yet,	  we	  should	  not	  forget	  that	  analog	  modes	  of	  operation	  can	  be	  also	  
reductionist.	  So,	  a	  major	  question	  on	  the	  way	  to	  answer	  is:	  Where	  is	  the	  border	  between	  reductionism	  
and	  holism?	  How	  can	  we	  find	  out	  whether	  a	  model	  entails	  all	  necessary	  variables	  and	  constraints?	  	  
	  
How	   could	   we	   evaluate	   the	   roles	   of	   indefiniteness	   or	   potentiality	   and	   transform	   the	   indefiniteness?	  
Perhaps	  we	  should	  make	  sure	  that	  such	  a	  model	   is	  capable	  of	  evolving	  and	   include	  more	  components	  
approaching	  the	  real	  world	  situation	  in	  a	  series	  of	  iterations.	  	  
	  
7.3	  The	  Road	  Ahead	  	  
	  
One	  possible	  breakthrough	  for	  cultivating	  the	  central	  task	  of	   INBIOSA	  research	  further	  may	  be	   in	  sight	  
once	  we	  pay	  attention	  to	  the	  exchange	  of	  material,	   (ubiquitous	   in	  biology),	  as	  a	  demonstration	  of	   the	  
interplay	  between	   first	   and	   third	  person	  descriptions.	  A	  helpful	   example	   is	   the	  monetary	  economy.	  A	  
unique	  property	   of	   the	  monetary	   economy	   is	   the	  occurrence	  of	   something	   called	  paper	  money	   as	   an	  
institutional	  means	  capable	  of	  paying	  for	  any	  kind	  of	  debt.	  To	  be	  sure,	  the	  paper	  money	  is	  by	  itself	  of	  no	  
value	   as	   a	   physical	   body	   and	   cannot	   serve	   even	   as	   a	   substitute	   for	   a	   soft	   facial	   tissue,	   while	   some	  
interesting	   figures	   are	   printed	   on	   its	   surface	   in	   many	   cases.	   Nonetheless,	   paper	   money	   used	   in	   the	  
process	  of	  exchanging	  its	  ownership	  does	  serve	  as	  a	  means	  of	  being	  exchanged	  for	  whatever	  goods	  or	  
services	  of	  equal	  value	  are	  printed	  on	  the	  paper.	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  including	  future	  Internet	  infrastructures,	  virtual	  communities	  and	  extra-­‐terrestrial	  life	  
22	  In	   fact,	  everything	   is	  analogue	  at	  a	  Newtonian	   level.	  At	  a	   lower	   level	  systems	  may	  be	  grainy	   (discrete),	  but	  one	   	   	  needs	  to	  






The	   paper	  money	   keeping	   its	   designated	   value	   right	   in	   the	   process	   of	   exchanging	   its	   ownership	   is	   a	  
prerequisite	   to	   the	  operation	  of	   the	  monetary	  economy,	  and	   the	  monetary	   stock	   in	   the	  hand	  of	  each	  
economic	   subject	   is	  merely	   a	   consequential	   derivative	   from	   the	   process	   (Matsuno,	   1978).	  When	   one	  
tries	   to	   address	   the	  monetary	   economy	   computationally	   or	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   experiencing	   the	  
monetary	  transactions	  internally,	  we	  need	  to	  pay	  attention	  to	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  monetary	  flow	  in	  the	  
exchange.	   Furthermore,	   since	   no	   one	   except	   the	   central	   bank	   sanctioned	   by	   a	   nation	   state	   or	   a	  
sovereign	  union	  can	  issue	  and	  destroy	  the	  paper	  money,	  each	  economic	  subject	  other	  than	  the	  central	  
banks	   is	   under	   the	   inevitable	   constraint	   of	   fulfilling	  monetary	   flow	   continuity	   from	  each	  participatory	  
perspective.	   Fulfilling	  monetary	   flow	   continuity	   is	   the	   computational	   task	   each	   economic	   agent	  must	  
assume.	  What	  upholds	  the	  computational	  task	  is	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  body	  facilitating	  the	  exchange	  of	  the	  
monetary	   ownership,	   rather	   than	   the	   identity	   of	   the	   paper	   money	   itself.	   Thus,	   the	   basic	   dynamic	  
predicate	  coping	  with	  the	  monetary	  economy	  computationally	  must	  be	  the	  monetary	  flow	  rather	  than	  
the	  monetary	  stock,	   the	   latter	  of	  which	  may	  be	   regarded	  as	  merely	  an	   instantaneous	  snapshot	  of	   the	  
flow	   variable	   to	   be	   recorded.	   The	   appraisal	   of	   the	   priority	   of	   monetary	   flow	   necessitates	   the	  
involvement	   of	   first	   person	   descriptions,	   since	   referring	   to	   the	   active	   agency	   (assuming	   first-­‐person	  
status)	  maneuvering	  the	  monetary	  flow	  from	  within	  is	  required	  there.	  	  Each	  economic	  subject	  is	  always	  
busy	  with	  and	  serious	  about	  how	  to	  maintain	  monetary	  flow	  continuity	  by	  any	  means.	  
	  
In	  essence,	   the	  keeper	  of	  a	   retail	   store	   is	  busy	   in	  managing	  his	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  business	   so	  as	   to	   clear	   the	  
draft	  to	  be	  expired	  by	  the	  end	  of	  month,	  while	  a	  certified	  public	  accountant	  (CPA)	   is	  quietly	  vigilant	   in	  
observing	   whether	   the	   double-­‐entry	   bookkeeping	   to	   be	   prepared	   by	   the	   storekeeper	   by	   the	   end	   of	  
month	  would	  actually	  let	  both	  the	  ends	  literally	  meet.	  Here,	  the	  storekeeper’s	  activity	  is	  in	  first	  person	  
descriptions,	  whereas	  the	  CPA’s	  observation	  of	  the	  bookkeeping	  is	  in	  third	  person	  descriptions.	  	  
	  
Both	  of	  them	  are	  involved	  in	  computation	  in	  one	  form	  or	  another.	  	  Above	  all,	  the	  computation	  specific	  
to	  the	  storekeeper	  is	  definitely	  in	  first	  person	  descriptions.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Once	  it	  is	  properly	  perceived,	  the	  monetary	  economy	  in	  the	  making	  should	  be	  accessible	  in	  first	  person	  
descriptions,	  while	  the	  record	  is	  also	  legitimately	  approachable	  in	  third	  person	  descriptions.	  Despite	  that,	  
third	  person	  descriptions	  alone	  cannot	  be	  good	  enough	  for	  appreciating	  the	  priority	  of	  the	  flow	  variables	  
since	   the	   simultaneous	   participation	   of	   the	   stock	   variables	   would	   also	   be	   made	   inevitable	   there.	  
Computation	  in	  terms	  of	  flow	  variables	  as	  the	  most	  fundamental	  predicates	  thus	  makes	  the	  distinction	  
between	  first	  and	  third	  person	  descriptions	  indispensible.	  	  
	  
What	  is	  concretely	  at	  stake	  is	  computation	  underlying	  the	  implementation	  of	  empirical	  flow	  continuity	  
processing	  various	  flows	  as	  the	  most	  fundamental	  dynamic	  predicates.	  The	  occurrence	  of	  the	  exchange	  
of	  material	  in	  the	  empirical	  world	  is	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  the	  likelihood	  of	  letting	  the	  flow	  variables	  
be	  irreducibly	  fundamental.	  This	  perception	  suggests	  to	  us	  that	  such	  computation	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  flow	  
variables	  accessible	  exclusively	   in	   first	  person	  descriptions	   could	  have	  been	  operative	  even	  ever	   since	  
the	   verge	   of	   the	   origin	   of	   life	   on	   Earth	   because	   of	   the	   ubiquity	   of	   the	   exchange	   of	   material.	   	   The	  
remaining	  problem	  may	  be	  how	  to	  implement	  the	  scheme	  in	  an	  explicit	  manner	  as	  reminding	  us	  of	  the	  






We	   are	   all	   economic	   agents;	   all	   of	   us	   participate,	   in	   some	   way	   or	   another,	   in	   trading,	   producing	   or	  
consuming	   goods	   and	   services.	   It	   goes	   without	   saying	   that	   this	   poses	   an	   unprecedented	   problem	   in	  
terms	  of	  dimensionality	  and	  complexity	  in	  modeling	  of	  systems	  such	  as	  national	  economies.	  	  
	  
The	  mechanistic	   view	  of	   economy	  assumes	   that	   agents	   and	   the	   economy	  performed	  by	   them	   can	  be	  
separated.	   In	   this	   classical	   view,	   the	   economy,	   for	   example	   the	   market	   economy,	   pursues	   a	   natural	  
course	   towards	   equilibrium.	   The	   equilibrium	   hypothesis	   is	   needed	   in	   order	   to	   be	   able	   to	   obtain	   the	  
analytical	  solutions	  to	  the	  complicated	  models	  formulated	  in	  ordinary	  or	  partial	  differential	  equations.	  
	  
This	   approach,	   by	   emphasizing	   idealistic	   conditions	   (perfect	   competition,	   perfect	   knowledge	   of	   all	  
agents	  etc.)	  in	  order	  to	  make	  the	  modeling	  problem	  tractable,	  sacrifices	  a	  more	  realistic	  account	  of	  how	  
complex	   systems,	   like	   consumers,	  banks	  or	   institutions,	   adapt	  and	   react	   to	   the	  dynamic	  patterns	   that	  
they	  create	  through	  their	  interactions.	  
	  
This	  is	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  why	  economic	  science	  has	  a	  layer	  of	  complexity	  that	  natural	  science	  does	  not	  
have:	   agents	   elaborate	   purposive	   actions	   and	   strategies	   that	   try	   to	   cope	  with	   potential	   outcomes	   of	  
their	  own	  actions,	  as	  they	  interact	  with	  other	  agents.	  For	  example,	  when	  an	  agent	  e.g.	  Goldman	  Sachs,	  
predicts	  patterns	  in	  stock	  prices,	  that	  prediction	  is	  drastically	  modifying	  the	  pattern	  itself	  because	  other	  
agents	  will	  try	  to	  adapt	  to	  the	  potential	  outcome	  of	  that	  action.	  It	  is	  known	  that	  herding	  behaviours	  like	  
panic	  or	  euphoria	  may	  produce	  qualitative	   changes	  of	   regime	   in	   the	   systems	   that	   seem	   to	  be	   related	  
with	   financial	  booms	  and	  busts.	  With	   this	  example	  we	  want	   to	  suggest	   that	  Economic	  Science,	  as	  any	  
other	  social	  science	  that	  wants	  to	  model	  behaviour	  of	  complex	  systems	  (humans),	  is	  in	  sorely	  need	  of	  a	  
new	  methodology.	  
	  
Therefore,	  we	  need	  a	  complex	  organic	  approach	  able	  to	  revisit	  and	  elaborate,	  inside	  a	  new	  theoretical	  
framework	   grounded	   in	   empirical	   data,	   concepts	   such	   as	  meta-­‐stability/meta-­‐instability,	   catastrophes	  
and	  bifurcations.	  
	  
7.4	  The	  Junctions	  
7.4.1	  Back	  to	  Aristotle?	  
	  
The	   forerunners	  who	  recognized	  the	  significance	  of	   irreversibility	   latent	   in	   time	   include	  Heraclitus	  and	  
Aristotle.	  In	  particular,	  Aristotle	  made	  a	  remark	  on	  irreversibility	  when	  stating	  “The	  now	  in	  one	  sense	  is	  
the	   same,	   but	   not	   the	   same	   in	   another”	   or	   “While	   passing	   away	   constantly,	   time	   remains	   as	   time”	  
according	  to	  Heidegger’s	  translation.	  This	  statement	  may	  look	  contradictory	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  principle	  
of	   contradiction	  whose	   significance	   Aristotle	   certainly	   recognized.	   The	   principle	   says	   that	   one	   cannot	  
both	  affirm	  and	  deny	  the	  same	  thing	  in	  the	  same	  respect	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  The	  remedy	  Aristotle	  came	  
up	  with	  was	   the	   infamous	  entelecheia	  or	   telos	   at	  which	  when	   reached	  all	   of	   the	   likely	   contradictions	  
would	  disappear	  in	  a	  wholesale	  manner.	  Although	  Aristotelian	  physics	  based	  upon	  entelecheia	  has	  lost	  
its	  influence	  since	  the	  advent	  of	  Galilean	  physics,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  irreversibility	  itself,	  noted	  
by	   Aristotle,	   would	   also	   lose	   its	   significance.	   Quite	   the	   contrary,	   Aristotle’s	   remark	   on	   subjective	  





7.4.2	  Back	  to	  Plato?	  
	  
When	  searching	  for	  new	  mathematical	  formalisms	  in	  biology	  it	  might	  be	  beneficial	  to	  take	  into	  account	  
the	   paradigm	   change	   imposed	   by	   the	   discovery	   of	   the	   universal	   machine	   and	   the	   mathematics	  
associated	  with	  it	  so	  far:	  that	  is,	  recursion	  theory	  and	  theoretical	  computer	  science.	  This	  might	  be	  useful	  
independently	  of	  the	  mechanist	  hypothesis	  in	  the	  sciences	  of	  life	  and/or	  mind.	  If	  the	  mechanist	  thesis	  is	  
correct,	   we	   can	   assume	   that	   the	   formalism	   we	   are	   searching	   for	   is	   already	   part	   of	   the	   very	   rich	  
mathematics	  of	  computer	  science	  taking	  the	  word	  in	  a	  broad	  sense.	   If	  the	  mechanist	  thesis	   is	  refuted,	  
then	  a	  good	  understanding	  of	  machines	  and	  their	  limitations	  can	  only	  help	  in	  developing	  another,	  better	  
formalism	  for	  non-­‐mechanically	  emulable	  processes.	   Indeed,	   the	   larger	  part	  of	  computability	   theory	   is	  
already	   a	   study	   of	   the	   infinite	   ladder	   of	   non-­‐computable	   functions,	   and	   the	   study	   of	   degrees	   of	   non-­‐
algorithmic	  solubility.	  In	  fact,	  "computability	  theory"	  is	  really	  the	  study	  of	  the	  non-­‐computable	  functions	  
and	  processes,	  and	  the	  very	  existence	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  universality	  is	  made	  possible	  conceptually	  by	  the	  
fact	   that	   programmable	   processes	   have	   intrinsically	   non-­‐computable	   effects,	   as	   Turing’s	   non-­‐halting	  
machine	  problem	  already	   illustrates.	  The	  study	  of	   computer	   science	   leads	  by	   itself,	   for	   this	   reason,	   to	  
the	   study	   of	   *partial*	   computability 23 ,	   and	   degrees	   on	   non-­‐computability	   and	   non-­‐machine	  
'emulability'.	  Marchal	  shows	  in	  a	  direct	  way	  that	  IF	  we	  are	  machines	  (whatever	  "we"	  might	  means,	  as	  far	  
as	  "we"	  have	  consciousness),	  then	  the	  physical	  laws	  cannot	  be	  computable	  or	  Turing	  emulable	  (Marchal,	  
1998).	  Despite	  this,	  it	  is	  also	  obvious	  that	  many	  biological	  phenomena	  are	  mechanical	  in	  their	  nature,	  for	  
instance	   the	   reproduction	  process,	   self-­‐regeneration	   and	  embryogenesis.	   The	   conceptual	   problems	  of	  
reproduction	  and	  self-­‐regeneration	  were	  not	  solved	  either	  by	  Descartes,	  despite	  his	  many	  attempts,	  nor	  
by	  the	  embryologist	  Driesch	  who	  concluded	  on	  the	  presence	  of	  some	  unknown	  vitalist	  force.	  But	  those	  
problems	  have	  been	  solved	   in	   the	  humble	  opinion	  of	   the	  present	  authors	  both	   in	   theory	  and	  practice	  
(Case,	   1971;	   Marchal,	   1992).	   The	   basic	   idea	   is	   very	   simple,	   and	   has	   many	   very	   deep	   consequences,	  
including	  eventually	  the	  possible	  refutability	  of	  mechanism	  or	  of	  the	  Aristotelian	  conception	  of	  reality.	  In	  
a	  nutshell,	  the	  solution	  for	  self-­‐duplication	  or	  for	  any	  more	  general	  formal	  self-­‐transformation	  T	  is	  given	  
by	  the	   idea	  to	  apply	  a	  duplicator	  operator	  of	   ‘itself’.	   If	  Dx	  gives	  xx	   (or	  T(xx)),	   that	   is	   if	  DA	  gives	  AA	  (or	  
T(AA))	  and	  DB	  gives	  BB	  (or	  T(BB)),	  then	  what	  is	  it	  that	  will	  give	  DD?	  Obviously	  DD	  will	  give	  DD.	  And	  this	  
solves	  the	  problem	  of	  self-­‐reproduction.	  Or	   it	  will	  give	   in	  the	  general	  case	  T(DD),	  which	  gives	   in	  turn	  a	  
general	   solution	   for	   arbitrary	   computable	   self-­‐transformations.	   This	   technique	   has	   been	   used	   to	  
implement	  "amoeba"	  (a	  self-­‐reproducing	  program)	  and	  "planarian",	  a	  program	  that	  can	  be	  cut	  in	  pieces	  
such	   that	   each	   piece	   regenerates	   the	   missing	   parts.	   It	   presupposes	   the	   existence	   of	   discretely	  
standardized	  cellular	  components.	  	  	  
	  
The	  same	  kind	  of	  "diagonalization"	  (going	  from	  x	  to	  xx,	  and	  applying	  the	  result	  to	  itself)	  is	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  
whole	   field	  of	   self-­‐reference	   theory,	   and	   it	   has	  been	   shown	   that	  machines	   are	   able	   to	   introspect	   and	  
even	  to	  discover	  what	  the	  laws	  of	  physics	  have	  to	  be,	  in	  case	  that	  the	  mechanistic	  hypothesis	  is	  correct.	  
This	   leads	   to	   a	   total	   reversal	   of	   the	  Aristotelian	  paradigm	  and	   shows	   that	   the	  Platonist	   conception	  of	  
reality	  is	  closer	  to	  the	  mechanist	  consequences	  than	  the	  Aristotelian.	  Somehow	  the	  physical	  reality	  is	  no	  
longer	   primary	   but	   appears	   to	   be	   the	   border	   of	   a	   Universal	   Mind,	   which	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   the	  
mathematical	  structure	  describing	  the	  highly	  structured	  potentiality	  of	  a	  universal	  machine.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






This	  insight	  is	  helpful	  to	  (re-­‐)formulate	  the	  classic	  old	  "mind-­‐body"	  problem	  in	  a	  mathematical	  way,	  and	  
many	   promising	   results	   have	   already	   been	   obtained	   here.	   It	   shows,	   notably,	   that	   being	   a	   machine	  
necessarily	  entails	  that	  physics	  cannot	  be	  entirely	  computational.	  And	  this	  in	  turn	  can	  be	  extended	  to	  life	  
processes	   –	   despite	   the	   mechanist	   initial	   assumptions.	   Paradoxically,	   this	   makes	   mechanism	   a	   very	  
general	   vaccine	   against	   reductionist	   thought	   in	   general.	   Thus,	   Universal	   Machines	   already	   defeat	   all	  
reductionist	  theories	  concerning	  their	  behaviour	  and	  thought	  processes.	  
	  
The	  “physics	  of	  machines”	   is	   thus	  offered	   in	  two	  parts:	  a	  provable	  part	  and	  an	  unprovable	  part	  of	   the	  
machine.	  And	  this	  motivates	  a	  theory	  of	  qualia	  as	  an	  implicit	  addition	  as	  it	  were	  extending	  the	  theory	  of	  
quanta	  (or	  talia	  in	  Latin),	  which	  is	  the	  one	  we	  use	  to	  test	  mechanism,	  and	  also	  to	  measure	  our	  degree	  of	  
non-­‐Turing	  emulability	  in	  case	  that	  mechanism	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  wrong.	  All	  of	  this	  exemplifies	  also	  
that	  the	  difference	  between	  natural	  and	  artificial	  is	  an	  artificial	  one,	  and	  thus	  is	  natural	  for	  any	  creature	  
developing	   a	   self-­‐centered	   conception	   of	   its	   surroundings.	   Just	   as	   Jacques	   Lafitte	   already	   foresaw	   in	  
1911	  and	  published	  in	  1932,	  that	  machines	  are	  natural	  collateral	  extensions	  of	  life,	  and	  biology	  cannot	  
really	  be	  separated	  from	  engineering	  and	  computer	  science	  studies	  (Lafitte,	  1932).	  
	  
We	  have	  by	  now	  isolated	  and	  implemented	  eight	  modal	  logics	  which	  are	  variants	  of	  the	  Gödelian	  type	  of	  
self-­‐reference,	  which	  makes	  it	  possible	  to	  handle	  the	  two	  notions	  of	  first	  person	  and	  third	  person	  point	  
of	   view	   for	  machines	  with	   or	  without	   oracles24	  (Marchal,	   1998;	   Chaitin,	   2011).	   Further	   research	   here	  
would	  consist	  in	  developing	  a	  flexible	  categorical	  semantics,	  based	  on	  linear	  logic	  and	  sketches	  theory,	  
allowing	   some	   “fuzzification”	   of	   those	   logics,	   and	   allowing	   the	   ideal	   case	   of	   correct	   self-­‐referencing	  
logics	   to	   be	   extended	   to	  machines	   capable	   of	   self-­‐revision	   and	   self-­‐updating.	  We	   thus	   have	   found	   an	  
interesting	   link	  between	   the	   logic	   of	   first	   person	   knowledge	   and	   time-­‐duration,	  which	  makes	   such	   an	  
extension	   naturally	   embeddable	   into	   the	   Integral	   Biomathics	   of	   the	   INBIOSA	   project.	   We	   anticipate	  
fruitful	   consequences	   for	  anchoring	   Integral	  Biomathics	  as	  a	  major	  bridge	  across	  engineering,	  biology,	  
computer	  science,	  mathematical	  logic	  and	  category	  theory.	  	  
	  
We	   expect	   also	   some	   deep	   clarification	   on	   more	   philosophical	   issues	   related	   to	   Fredkin’s	   Digital	  
Philosophy25	  (Fredkin	  1990;	  Fredkin	  1992),	  Chaitin’s	  Omega	  Theory	   (Chaitin,	  2006)	  and	  a	  possible	  shift	  
from	  an	  Aristotelian	  towards	  a	  more	  Platonist	  or	  Neoplatonist	  conception	  of	  reality,	  which	  would	  lead	  to	  
a	  very	  important	  new	  emphasis	  on	  fundamental	  biology	  on	  the	  part	  of	  physics.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  An	  oracle	  is	  a	  machine	  that	  computes	  a	  single	  arbitrary	  (non-­‐recursive)	  function	  from	  naturals	  to	  naturals	  (Turing,	  1939).	  In	  
other	   words,	   is	   just	   another	   name	   for	   non-­‐trivial	   meta-­‐level	   heuristics	   that	   lies	   outside	   an	   object-­‐level	   theory.	   In	   Integral	  
Biomathics,	   we	   regard	   “oracles”	   truly	   lying	   beyond	   the	   object-­‐level	   (scientific	   and/or	  mathematical)	   theories	   such	   as	   group	  
theory	  and	  QM.	  In	  other	  words,	  an	  oracle	  is	  anything	  that	   is	  or	  can	  lead	  to	  a	  true	  statement	  that	  cannot	  be	  reached	  within	  a	  
formalized	  (syntactic)	  system	  of	  the	  said	  theory.	  Oracles	  are	  part	  of	  all	  human	  knowledge	  that	  cannot	  be	  proven	  within	  any	  of	  
the	  currently	  known	  formal	  systems;	  i.e.	  they	  contain	  “true”	  statements	  that	  cannot	  be	  proven	  in	  the	  Gödelian	  sense.	  	  All	  our	  
theories	  will	  remain	  incomplete,	  but	  as	  they	  become	  richer,	  what	  once	  lied	  outside	  a	  given	  theory	  will	  become	  part	  of	  the	  (still	  
incomplete)	  new	  theory.	  	  
25	  Fredkin's	  Finite	  Nature	  Hypothesis	  states	  that	  ultimately	  all	  quantities	  of	  physics,	  including	  space	  and	  time,	  are	  discrete	  and	  
finite	  (Fredkin	  1990;	  Fredkin	  1992).	   It	  suggests	  that	  all	  measurable	  physical	  quantities	  arise	  from	  some	  Planck	  scale	  substrate	  
for	   multiverse	   information	   processing.	   Also,	   the	   amount	   of	   information	   in	   any	   small	   volume	   of	   space-­‐time	   continuum	   is	  






7.4.3	  Back	  to	  Kant?	  
	  
Although	  the	  critical	  thought	  of	  Kant	  was	  intended	  as	  a	  restoration	  of	  Newtonian	  paradigm	  of	  certainty	  
questioned	   by	   Hume	   and	   in	   consequence	   led	   to	   conclusions	   limiting	   our	   access	   to	   knowledge	   of	   the	  
world	   as	   it	   is	   –	   which	   may	   go	   beyond	   interests	   of	   this	   study	   –	   his	   greatest	   and	   most	   universal	  
achievement	   was	   the	   recognition	   of	   conditions	   for	   the	   acquisition	   of	   knowledge.	   The	   pessimistic	  
conclusions	  of	  Kant	  have	  been	  based	  on	   the	  assumption	   that	   the	  necessity	  of	   the	   intervention	  of	   the	  
Twelve	   Categories	   of	   Understanding	   shaping	   or	   forming	   Sensibilities	   (or	   we	   could	   say	   perceptions)	  
obstruct	   the	   access	   to	   things	   as	   they	   are.	  However,	   it	  may	   be	   reinterpreted	   simply	   as	   self-­‐referential	  
character	  of	  knowing.	  To	  know	  something,	  we	  have	  to	  employ	  our	  knowledge,	  considered	  by	  Kant	  as	  a	  
priori	  to	  avoid	  problem	  of	  circularity.	  For	  us,	  it	  should	  not	  be	  a	  surprise,	  as	  it	  is	  yet	  another	  expression	  of	  
autopoiesis,	  a	  characteristic	  of	  all	  living	  systems.	  We	  can	  attempt	  to	  change	  our	  perspective	  and	  instead	  
of	  escaping,	  engage	  in	  resolving	  the	  issue	  of	  self-­‐reference,	  for	  instance	  by	  investigating	  the	  mechanisms	  
in	  the	  brain	  responsible	  for	  these	  categories,	  but	  in	  terms	  transcending	  classical	  conceptual	  framework.	  
Such	  a	  framework	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  study	  of	   information,	  which	  gives	  a	  more	  general	  view	  of	   living	  
systems,	  but	  includes	  cognition	  as	  one	  of	  many	  functions	  of	  the	  higher	  organized	  forms.	  
	  
Kant	   believed	   that	   the	   statements	   of	   Euclidean	   geometry	   are	   synthetic,	   but	   a	   priori,	   and	   that	   they	  
condition	  in	  a	  necessary	  way	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  spatial	  relations.	  Non-­‐Euclidean	  geometries	  have	  
shown	  that	  we	  can	  go	  beyond	  these.	  It	  is	  true	  that	  our	  scientific	  analysis	  in	  science	  is	  guided	  by	  Boolean	  
form	  of	  logic,	  which	  seemed	  necessary,	  but	  quantum	  mechanics	  shows	  that	  logic	  of	  events	  in	  the	  micro-­‐
world	   is	   non-­‐Boolean,	  which	   does	   not	   preclude	   their	   comprehension.	   Thus,	   if	   we	   can	   go	   beyond	   the	  
limits	  of	  the	  categories	  of	  understanding,	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  we	  cannot	  reach	  the	  level	  of	  
perspective	  in	  which	  we	  can	  understand	  understanding.	  Moreover,	  we	  can	  expect	  that	  in	  an	  autopoietic	  
process	   this	  may	   allow	  us	   to	  make	  our	   understanding	   essentially	   deeper.	   Conditions	   for	   transcending	  
limits	  of	   the	  mechanisms	  of	  understanding	  consist	   in	   formulation	  of	  a	  conceptual	   framework	   in	  which	  
living	   systems	   are	   both	   subjects	   and	   objects	   of	   inquiry.	   The	   concept	   of	   information	   is	   present	   in	   the	  
study	   of	   such	   systems	   at	   every	   level	   of	   organization,	   and	   therefore	   it	   is	   a	   natural	   candidate	   for	   this	  
conceptual	   framework.	   Schroeder	   (2009)	   considered	   also	   a	   secondary	   concept	   of	   information	  
integration,	   which	   allows	   the	   introduction	   of	   quantum	   logics	   into	   the	   study	   of	   consciousness,	   thus	  
extending	  classical,	  Boolean	   logic	  without	   the	  necessity	   to	   involve	  quantum	  mechanical	  description	  of	  
the	  system.	  The	  work	  includes	  a	  theoretical	  mechanism	  of	  processing	  information	  at	  this	  extended	  level.	  	  
	  
This	   leads	   to	   another	   generalization,	   which	   allows	   the	   consideration	   of	   a	   wider	   class	   of	   theoretical	  
processing	   devices	   corresponding	   to	   geometric,	   topological	   and	   other	   relations.	   This	   conceptual	  
framework	   opens	   the	   way	   for	   studies	   of	   all	   varieties	   of	   categories	   of	   understanding	   in	   terms	   of	  
theoretical	   brain	   mechanisms.	   However,	   understanding	   of	   the	   implementation	   of	   such	   theoretical	  
mechanisms	  in	  the	  brain	  will	  probably	  be	  impossible	  without	  resolving	  the	  more	  fundamental	  problem	  
of	  the	  description	  of	  a	   living	  system	  in	  terms	  of	   information	  and	   its	  processing,	  where	  the	  autopoietic	  






No	  matter	  what	  solutions	  are	  proposed,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  recognize	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  lesson	  from	  
the	   great	   synthesis	   of	   Kant,	   and	   from	   its	   errors.	   Our	   comprehension	   of	   the	  world	   is	   conditioned	   and	  
shaped	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   we	   are	   living	   systems,	   which	   are	   creating	   their	   (our)	   own	   tools	   for	   this	  
comprehension	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  participating	  in	  the	  world.	  Thus,	  development	  of	  our	  knowledge	  is	  
a	  subject	  of	  an	  autopoietic	  process.	  	  
	  
What	   we	   know	   cannot	   be	   separated	   from	   how	   we	   know.	   From	   this	   point	   of	   view,	   biology	   has	   the	  
potential	   to	   inform	   and	   guide	   other	   disciplines,	   in	   particular	   those	   considered	   more	   fundamental.	  
Maybe	   better	   understanding	   of	   our	   understanding	   can	   bring	   solutions	   to	   the	   problems	   studied	   by	  
physics	  and	  mathematics.	  
	  
7.5	  What	  Can	  We	  Do	  Now?	  
	  
It	  is	  essential	  for	  this	  review	  that	  we	  recognize	  both	  perspectives	  taken	  on	  science,	  that	  of	  Plato	  and	  that	  
of	  Aristotle.	  	  While	  empiricism	  has	  been	  dominating	  science	  ever	  since	  Galileo	  and	  Newton,	  the	  idealistic	  
view	  was	  abandoned	  for	  a	  very	  long	  time.	  	  Now	  in	  the	  age	  of	  logic,	  computation,	  immersive	  reality	  and	  
virtual	  worlds,	  Neoplatonism	  can	  have	  a	  renaissance.	  	  Instead	  of	  Plato	  vs.	  Aristotle,	  both	  viewpoints	  are	  
suddenly	   legitimate	  and	  arguable	  under	  Kant.	  But	  we	  also	   recognize	  both	   their	   unity	   and	  antagonism	  
with	  Hegel	   and	   Schelling.	   The	   issue	   of	   “assumed	   objectivity”	   becomes	   disputable	   again	   –	   and	   taboos	  
such	  as	  the	  suggestion	  that	  the	  way	  of	  natural	  sciences	  is	  the	  only	  one	  that	  can	  be	  taken	  seriously	  are	  
being	  questioned	  again	  (Fasching,	  1996).	  We	  welcome	  the	  return	  of	  scientific	  disputes,	   for	   it	   is	   indeed	  
dangerous	  to	  have	  a	  “thinking	  monoculture.”	  After	  many	  years	  of	  research,	  we	  still	  do	  not	  know	  what	  
reality	  is	  (Fasching,	  2000;	  2003).	  Therefore,	  there	  will	  be	  no	  taboo	  questions	  on	  the	  INBIOSA	  path.	  Note	  
also	  that	  the	  position	  stated	  cautiously	   in	  section	  7.4.2	  above	   is	  only	  that,	   IF	  mechanism	  is	  true,	  THEN	  
we	  are	  in	  a	  Platonist	  arithmetical	  video	  game.	  But	  it	  does	  NOT	  say	  that	  mechanism	  is	  true.	  	  
	  
When	  questioning	  the	  foundations	  of	  biology,	  we	  are	  going	  to	  leave	  no	  stone	  unturned,	  including	  those	  
on	  which	  we	  stand	  and	  will	   step	  on	   in	   future.	  Dogmas	  will	  not	  be	  accepted.	  We	  will	  also	  consider	  the	  
implications	  of	  modern	  physics	   for	   this	  work.	   In	  particular,	  we	  realize	   the	   likely	   relevance	  of	  quantum	  
theory	   (QT)	   to	   biology	   and	   the	   chance	   for	   a	   fruitful	   dialogue	   between	   physicists	   and	   biologists,	  
specifically	  about	  quantum	  entanglement	  and	  quantum	  coherence	  which	  are	  considered	  by	  some	  to	  be	  
the	  key	  to	  life	  and	  consciousness,	  despite	  the	  unsettled	  state	  of	  physics	  in	  this	  area.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  it	  
could	  greatly	  benefit	  biology	   to	   take	  note	  of	  QT	   in	  accounting	   for	   living	  processes	   (Schrödinger,	  1945;	  
McFadden,	   2002;	   Ho,	   2008).	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   biology	   could	   help	   explaining	   QT	   (Pattee,	   1971;	  
Josephson,	  2012),	  an	  argument,	  which	   is	  relevant	  to	  Salthe’s	  Hierarchy	  Theory	  (Salthe,	  1985).	  Yet,	   it	   is	  
Hierarchy	  Theory	  that	  erects	  the	  main	  problem	  to	  QM	  effects	  at	  above	  the	  microscopic	  scale26.	  If	  there	  
are	   three	   levels	   separated	   by	   scale,	   such	   as	   [biological	   cell	   [macromolecule	   [atom]]]	   and	   there	   are	  
occasional	  effects	  on	  atoms	  by	  QM	  fluctuons	  (in	  Conrad’s	  terminology),	  this	  might	  have	  fleeting	  effects	  
on	  several	  out	  of	  thousands	  of	  macromolecules.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Any	  level	  constructs	  an	  interpretation	  of	   lower	  level	  effects	  (which	  do	  not	  penetrate	  as	  such	  to	  a	  higher	  level),	  while	  being	  
governed	  by	  boundary	  conditions	  imposed	  by	  higher	  levels.	  The	  levels	  are	  screened	  off	  from	  each	  other	  dynamically;	  otherwise	  





But	   the	   question	   is	   what	   would	   be	   the	  likelihood	   of	   significant	   effects	   on	   one	   cell?	   It	   is	   not	   easy	   to	  
resolve	  this	  conflict	  between	  Hierarchy	  Theory	  and	  most	  QM	  interpretations.	  	  
	  
An	   interesting	   example	   in	   this	   respect	   is	   an	   unorthodox	   theory	   related	   to	   a	   key	   concept	   in	   quantum	  
mechanics,	  –	  entanglement	  and	  the	  EPR	  paradox	  (Einstein,	  Podolski	  &	  Rosen,	  1935).	  One	  interpretation	  
of	  this	  entanglement	  is	  known	  as	  the	  "Everettian	  heresy",	  (Osnaghi	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  In	  1957,	  Hugh	  Everett,	  
III,	   proposed	   a	   new	   interpretation	   of	   quantum	   mechanics	   questioning	   the	   orthodox	   view	   of	   the	  
Copenhagen	  school,	  proposing	  a	  "relative	  state"	  formulation	  (Everett,	  1957a/b;	  Everett,	  1973),	  denying	  
the	  existence	  of	  a	  separate	  classical	  realm	  from	  the	  QM	  one	  and	  asserting	  a	  state	  vector	  for	  the	  whole	  
Universe.	   According	   to	   this	   theory,	   known	   as	   the	   theory	   of	   universal	  wave	   function,	   the	   state	   vector	  
never	   collapses,	   and	  hence	   reality	   as	   a	  whole	   is	   scale-­‐free	  and	   rigorously	  deterministic.	   Everett’s	   idea	  
correlates	   to	   Hierarchy	   Theory	   because	   it	   is	   higher	   levels	   that	   govern	   the	   lower	   ones	   by	   imposing	  
boundary	  conditions	  constraining	  them.	  	  
	  	  
This	  reality,	  which	  is	  described	  jointly	  by	  the	  dynamical	  variables	  and	  the	  state	  vector,	  is	  not	  the	  reality	  
we	  customarily	  think	  of,	  but	  is	  a	  reality	  composed	  of	  many	  worlds27	  as	  a	  source	  of	  potential	  splitting	  to	  
come	  in	  the	  development	  of	  time.	  By	  virtue	  of	  the	  temporal	  development	  of	  the	  dynamical	  variables	  the	  
state	   vector	   decomposes	   naturally	   into	   orthogonal	   vectors,	   reflecting	   a	   continual	   splitting	   of	   the	  
universe	   into	   a	  multitude	   of	  mutually	   unobservable	   but	   equally	   real	   worlds	   in	   retrospect,	   in	   each	   of	  
which	   every	   good	   measurement	   has	   yielded	   a	   definite	   result	   with	   the	   aid	   of	   the	   environmental	  
decoherence	   and	   in	   most	   of	   which	   the	   familiar	   statistical	   quantum	   laws	   hold28.	   Should	   we	   dare	   to	  
question	  the	  foundations	  of	  modern	  science?	  Yes,	  because	  this	  makes	  it	  science.	  And	  it	  is	  our	  job	  to	  ask	  
questions.	  Everett’s	  theory	  is	  interesting	  for	  biologists	  because	  it	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  solve	  the	  riddle	  of	  
entanglement	   in	  a	  rational	  (humanoid)	  manner	  without	   invoking	  laws	  except	  for	  those	  specific	  to	  QM,	  
dispensing	   with	   the	   demarcation	   line	   separating	   the	   quantum	   and	   the	   classical.	   The	   "relative	   state"	  
vector	  implies	  that	  the	  two	  measurements	  in	  the	  EPR	  experiment	  are	  each	  simultaneously	  connected	  (or	  
even	   integrated!),	   by	   their	   very	   definition,	   with	   the	   observer,	   and	   hence	   automatically	   correlated.	   In	  
other	  words,	  the	  fact	  that	  an	  observed	  object	  state	  (psi-­‐object)	   is	  a	  function	  of	  BOTH	  the	  capital	  wave	  
function	  of	   the	  whole	   universe	   (Psi-­‐universe)	  AND	   the	  observer's	   own	   to	   himself	   unknown	   state	   (psi-­‐
obs)	  in	  the	  formalism	  of	  quantum	  mechanics	  was	  the	  solution,	  (Rössler,	  2011).	  	  
	  
Perhaps	   the	   “many	   worlds”	   theory	   is	   only	   a	   (first	   person)	   subjective	   reality	   incompatible	   with	   (third	  
person)	   objective	   physics?	   But	   isn’t	   that	   another	   explanation	   for	   the	   information	   integration	   that	  
Schroeder	   speaks	   about	   in	   his	   “quantum	   logic/coherence	   without	   quantum	   mechanics”	   (Schroeder,	  
2009),	  cf.	  sections	  5.8	  and	  7.4.3?	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 The	  phrase	  "many-­‐worlds"	  is	  due	  to	  Bryce	  DeWitt,	  who	  was	  responsible	  for	  the	  wider	  popularization	  of	  Everett's	  theory. 
28	  Note	   that	   Everett's	   theory	   is	   only	   one	   of	   a	   number	   of	   alternative	   interpretations	   of	   quantum	   theory	   dealing	   with	   the	  
measurement	  paradox.	  Roger	  Penrose	  listed	  six	  types	  of	  interpretation	  in	  his	  book	  "The	  Road	  to	  Reality"	  (Penrose,	  2005,	  p.786),	  
the	  last	  of	  which,	  calling	  for	  further	  theorizing	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  reality,	  has	  a	  number	  of	  variations.	  The	  list	  includes	  the	  many	  
worlds	  interpretation	  of	  Everett-­‐Wheeler,	  which	  Penrose	  lists	  as	  second.	  The	  only	  reason	  for	  selecting	  Everett	  in	  this	  example	  is	  
that	  entanglement	   is	  connected	  with	  the	  observer	  as	  a	   living	  system	  and	  the	  state	  vector,	  which	  unifies	  the	  classical	  and	  the	  
quantum	  world.	  A	  unifying	   theory	   is	   a	   clear	  objective	  of	   Integral	  Biomathics.	  But	   there	  might	  be	  better	   arguments	   than	   the	  





This	  question	  shows	  how	  we	  are	  going	  to	  attack	  the	  riddles	  of	  biology:	  by	  being	  open	  to	  and	  discussing	  
any	   good	   idea.	   This	   holds	   particularly	   for	   the	   enigma	   of	   life,	   the	   genetic	   system,	   enabling	   the	  
preservation	  of	  historical	  events.	  	  
	  
The	  interpersonal	  (de)coherences	  in	  our	  INBIOSA	  discussion	  circle	  could	  be	  exemplified	  metaphorically	  
by	  the	  following	  citation	  of	  one	  of	  our	  members	  about	  another	  one29:	  	  
	  
"Matsuno	   takes	   chemical	   reactions	   generally	   to	   be	  mediated	   by	  QM	   coherence	  with	   the	   end	  
products	  falling	  into	  decoherence.	  This	  signals	  an	  escape	  from	  externalist	  'statistical	  mechanics’	  
into	  a	  QM	   'internalist’	  mode	  of	   seeing	   the	  physical	  world.	  Matsuno	  argues	   that	  achieving	  QM	  
coherence	  of	   chemical	   reactants	   can	  be	   seen	  as	  a	  process	  of	  mutual	   internal	  measurement	   -­‐-­‐	  
which	   we	   will	   note,	   would	   be	   a	   semiotic	   process	   -­‐-­‐	   one	   which	   antedates	   the	   origin	   of	   life."	  
(Salthe,	  2008,	  p.	  145)	  	  
	  
In	   short,	   we	   have	   discovered	   an	   interesting	   theoretical	   co-­‐relation	   between	   such	   ideas	   in	   biology	   as	  
internalism	   (Matsuno,	   1989,	   1996,	   2003;	   Rössler,	   1998;	   Salthe,	   2001),	   quantum	   coherence	   (Matsuno,	  
2000;	  Schroeder,	  2009),	  emergence	  and	  self-­‐organization	  (Salthe	  &	  Matsuno,	  1995),	  development	  and	  
evolution	   (Salthe,	   1993;	   Salthe,	   2010),	   perception/semiosis	   (Salthe,	   2005b),	   cognition,	   consciousness,	  
first	  person	  descriptions	  (Matsuno,	  2003),	  information,	  information	  integration	  and	  the	  way	  we	  use	  it30	  
when	  we	  actively	  participate	  in	  structuring	  the	  universe	  (Schroeder,	  2011),	  making	  science	  and	  so	  on:	  all	  
this	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  Integral	  Biomathics.	  But	  isn’t	  that	  a	  perpetual	  interaction	  and	  circulation	  of	  
Plato,	  Aristotle,	  Kant,	  Hegel,	  Schelling	  and	  others?	  	  
	  
Which	  are	  the	  major	  challenges	  on	  the	  three	  junctions	  described	  in	  the	  previous	  sections?	  	  
	  
Aristotle:	  A	  new	  challenge	  awaiting	  us	  will	  be:	  how	  to	  appreciate	  the	  class	  identity	  that	  can	  outlive	  the	  
individual	   identities	   in	  our	   current	  practice	  of	   the	  empirical	   sciences?	   In	  physics,	   it	  has	  been	  common	  
practice	   to	  conceive	  of	   the	  class	   identity	  of	   the	  atoms	  or	  molecules	  of	   the	  same	  kind	  only	   in	   terms	  of	  
their	  individual	  indistinguishability.	  However,	  once	  we	  enter	  the	  biological	  realm,	  the	  situation	  becomes	  
drastically	  changed.	  Even	   if	   the	  physicist	  cannot	  distinguish	  this	   from	  the	  outside,	   there	  arises	   the	  not	  
unlikely	   possibility	   that	   a	  material	   body	  may	  maintain	   its	   identity	   through	   a	   constant	   exchange	   of	   its	  
constituent	  material	  subunits.	  	  
	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  Everett's	  theory	  is	  contrasted	  with	  decoherence	  interpretations	  (listed	  third	  by	  Penrose,	  although	  he	  considers	  it	  a	  pragmatic,	  
and	  now	  most	  common	  interpretation)	  that	  Matsuno	  is	  drawing	  upon.	  We	  often	  have	  disjoint	  and	  even	  rival	  views	  presented	  in	  
INBIOSA	  (which	  is	  also	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  project).	  The	  important	  issue	  is,	  however,	  the	  consent	  that	  quantum	  entanglement	  
is	   likely	  to	  be	  relevant	  in	  biology,	  and	  it	  could	  be	  that	  through	  biology	  it	  will	  be	  possible	  to	  get	  a	  clearer	  insight	  into	  which	  of	  
these	  interpretations	  is	  best	  for	  living	  systems,	  or	  whether	  some	  new	  interpretation	  will	  emerge.	  






1. Does	   the	  exchange	  of	  materials	  assume	  an	   irreducibly	   fundamental	   significance,	  even	  without	  
prior	   participation	   of	   possible	   cellular	   structures?	   (This	   question	   is	   related	   to	   another	   basic	  
question	  seen	  e.g.	  by	  Putnam	  of	  whether	  the	  exchange	  of	  materials	  could	  be	  as	  fundamental	  a	  
property	  as	  (in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  material	  body	  referred	  to	  in	  isolation)	  its	  inertia.)	  
2. What	  could	  the	  principal	  characteristic	  of	  a	  material	  body,	  whose	  class	  identity	  can	  outlive	  the	  
individual	  identities	  of	  the	  constituent	  material	  subunits,	  be?	  
3. How	  does	  the	  flow	  of	  time	  unique	  to	  cyanobacteria	  differ	  from	  a	  similar	  flow	  of	  time	  so	  obvious	  
to	   the	   physicist	   (except	   for	   Boltzmann)?	   (The	   question	   is	   how	   cyanobacteria	   experience	  what	  
the	  physicist	   calls	   time,	   rather	   than	  how	   the	  physicist	   reads	   time	   into	  what	   cyanobacteria	  are	  
doing.)	  
4. How	   influential	   could	   the	   likely	   existing	   network	   of	   the	   various	   biological	   clocks	   be	   on	   the	  
distinction	  between	  the	  class	  identity	  and	  the	  individual	  identities?	  (Even	  in	  cynanobacteria,	  the	  
clockwork	  of	  the	  KaiC	  protein	  requires	  ATP	  as	  the	  phosphate	  source,	  and	  this	  again	  requires	  a	  
different	  kind	  of	  clocks	   for	   its	  own	  synthesis.	  The	  activity	  of	  signs	  also	  requires	  an	  attribute	  of	  
time,	   e.g.	   an	   activity	   through	   some	   sort	   of	   medium.	   The	   same	   applies	   to	   action,	   reaction,	  
synchronization	   and	   the	   like.	   The	   question	   is:	   from	   where	   can	   we	   recruit	   what	   is	   eventually	  
called	  time	  that	  could	  apply	  to	  whatever	  material	  agencies?)	  
5. How	  can	  we	  describe31	  the	  synchronization	  of	  various	  clocks	  of	  material	  origin	  without	  relying	  
upon	  the	  equation	  of	  motion?	  (If	  we	  employ	  a	  form	  of	  the	  equation	  of	  motion	  for	  describing	  the	  
possible	  scheme	  of	  synchronization,	  this	  would	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  self-­‐defeating	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  
has	   already	   assumed	   the	   flow	   of	   time	   equated	   to	   the	   displacements	   of	   the	   state	   variables	   –	  
unless	  time	  does	  not	  flow	  in	  physics	  as	  Boltzmann	  claimed.)	  	  
6. How	  can	  we	  estimate	  the	  robustness	  of	  a	  complex	  network	  of	  various	  clocks	  operating	  upon	  the	  
distinction	   between	   the	   class	   identities	   and	   the	   individual	   identities32?	   (An	   answer	   to	   this	  
question	  may	  be	  relevant	  to	  how	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  each	  biological	  species	  including	  ours	  can	  
remain	   robust	   in	   the	   whole	   network.	   Addressing	   this	   kind	   of	   problem	   is	   possible	   in	   the	  
framework	  of	  the	  present	  methodology	  since	  the	  flow	  of	  time	  is	  here	  tentatively	  attributed	  to	  
each	   material	   body’s	   capability	   of	   making	   a	   distinction	   between	   the	   class	   identity	   and	   the	  
individual	  identities.)	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  Note:	   Here	   is	   a	   deep	   confusion	   that	   is	   inevitable	   for	   all	   of	   us	  who	   can	   speak.	   All	   of	   us	   are	   inclined	   to	   think	   that	   time	   is	  
irreducibly	   fundamental	   unless	   asked	   otherwise.	   However,	   this	   strange	   stipulation	   simply	   does	   not	   apply	   to	   biological	  
organisms	  other	   than	  our	  human	  beings.	   Time	   for	   us	   is	   a	   representation	  of	   something	   enigmatic.	  All	   of	   the	  other	  biological	  
organisms	  experience	  that	  “something”	  directly	  without	  using	  the	  tag	  “time”	  as	  we	  do.	  The	  underlying	  question	  is:	  how	  can	  we	  
distinguish	  time	  as	  a	  representation	  from	  the	  original	  object	  to	  be	  represented	  eventually	  as	  time	  by	  us.	  
32	  For	  instance,	  individual	  dogs	  are	  always	  "dog-­‐like",	  even	  if	  the	  internal	  clocks	  vary	  from	  one	  dog	  to	  another.	  A	  dog	  is	  "dog-­‐
like"	  in	  the	  human	  frame	  of	  mind,	  not	  in	  the	  dog’s	  mind.	  In	  a	  sense	  dog-­‐like-­‐ness	  is	  a	  timeless	  abstraction.	  But,	  individual	  dogs	  
are	  different	   (Elsasser,	   1981).	  How	  different?	   In	  particular,	   their	   bodies	   are	   constantly	   exchanging	   their	   constituent	  material	  
elements.	  The	  individual	  identity	  of	  each	  carbon	  atom	  entering	  their	  bodies	  is	  traceable	  only	  over	  half	  a	  year	  at	  most.	  When	  we	  
say	  that	  the	  major	  ingredients	  of	  dogs	  bodies	  are	  carbon	  atoms,	  what	  we	  refer	  to	  by	  the	  tag	  “carbon	  atoms”	  are	  not	  the	  carbon	  
atoms	  to	  be	  distinguished	  individually,	  but	  the	  class	  property	  of	  the	  carbon	  atoms	  that	  can	  be	  maintained	  in	  their	  bodies	  even	  if	  
each	   one	   of	   them	   is	   replaced	   by	   another	   one	   of	   the	   same	   kind	   (as	   implied	   in	   physics).	   Metabolism	   in	   biology	   makes	   any	  
organism	  as	  a	  material	  manifestation	  of	  the	  class	  identity	  when	  viewed	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  participating	  atoms.	  Each	  
atom	   in	   the	   material	   world	   has	   both	   the	   individual	   and	   the	   class	   identity.	   The	   question	   is	   about	   how	   can	   we	   distinguish	  






Plato:	   From	   a	   logician's	   perspective,	   Everett's	   "interpretation"	   is	   the	   literal	   (technically,	   the	   free	   or	  
Herbrand	  model)	  of	  quantum	  mechanics	  without	  collapse	  (Everett,	  1957a/b,	  1973).	  Everett	  only	  applies	  
the	  wave	  equation	  to	  the	  couple	  made	  of	  the	  physicists	  and	  the	  observed	  particle.	  The	  work	  of	  Marchal	  
(2001;	   2004;	   2005)	   is	   very	   similar,	   in	   the	   context	   of	   digital	   mechanics.	   Starting	   from	   a	   well	   defined	  
distinction	  between	  first	  person	  and	  third	  person	  in	  the	  mechanist	  frame,	  Marchal	  discovers	  that	  physics	  
becomes	   reduced	   to	   an	   internal	  many	   worlds,	   or	   probably	   better	   "many	   dreams"	   statistics	   on	   semi-­‐
decidable	   arithmetical	   relations	   (computations),	   where	   a	   dream	   is	   defined	   by	   a	   computation	   seen	   in	  
some	  precisely	  defined	  first	  person	  perspective.	  These	  works	  accomplish	  a	  reduction	  of	  physics	   to	  the	  
biology	  (or	  psychology,	  or	  theology33)	  of	  numbers	  (or	  digital	  machines).	  	  
	  
It	   shows	   that	   Everett's	   way	   of	   embedding	   the	   subject	   (physicists)	   in	   the	   object	   (the	   quantum	  wave)	  
necessarily	  has	  to	  be	  extended	  into	  an	  embedding	  of	  the	  subject	  (mathematician,	  biologist,	  theologian)	  
into	   arithmetic,	   and	   that	   this	   leads	   directly	   to	   an	   arithmetical	   quantum	   logic	   justifying	  why,	   from	   the	  
points	   of	   view	   of	   'number',	   physics	   seems	   linear,	   symmetrical	   and	   having	  many	   branches	   interfering	  
statistically.	   It	   is	   the	   only	   precise	   theory,	  which	   provides	   a	   testable	   explanation	   of	  where	   the	   laws	   of	  
physics	  come	  from,	  and	  which	  exploits	  the	  incompleteness	  phenomenon	  to	  distinguish	  a	  mathematically	  
precise	   theory	  of	  quanta	   from	  a	  more	  general	   theory	  of	  qualia.	   The	  quanta	  appear	   to	  be	   first	  person	  
plural	   sharable	  qualia.	  Marchal	   argues	   that	   the	   gap	  between	  proof	   and	   truth	   that	  machines	   can	   infer	  
when	   introspecting	   themselves	   (a	   possibility	   already	   seen	   by	   Gödel),	   justifies	   the	   use	   of	   the	   term	  
"number's	   theology"	   instead	  of	  biology	  or	  psychology.	   It	   shows	  also	   that	  Rössler's	  endophysics	   (1987;	  
1990;	  1998)	  is	  naturally	  extended	  into	  an	  endoarithmetic	  once	  we	  assume	  digital	  mechanism.	  	  
	  
A	  key	  question	  to	  answer	  on	  the	  way	  is:	  how	  could	  we	  save	  the	  best	  of	  the	  Platonic	  world	  in	  the	  wild	  if	  
the	  phenomenon	  called	  time	  is	  not	  an	  illusion?	  
	  
Kant:	  Kant	  (2003)	  based	  his	  synthesis	  on	  the	  distinction	  and	  opposition	  of	  the	  understanding,	  structured	  
by	   categories	   and	   the	   sensibilities	   reflecting	   external	   structural	   characteristics	   of	   reality.	   The	   former	  
basically	  defined	   the	   idea	  of	  an	  object	   (thing)	   in	  general;	   the	   latter	   identified	   its	   instances.	  They	  were	  
related	  by	  means	  of	  schemata	  such	  as	  time	  or	  space	  without	  which	  there	  could	  be	  no	  explanation	  about	  
how	  categories	  can	  function	  to	  organize	  sensibilities.	   It	   is	  clear	   that	  Kant's	   idea	  of	  schemata,	  although	  
extremely	  obscure,	  served	  as	  the	  uniting	  element	  of	  his	  philosophy	  of	  knowing.	  The	  choice	  of	  time	  and	  
space	  as	  schemata	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  mechanistic	  view	  of	  the	  reality	  influenced	  by	  
the	  success	  of	  Newtonian	  paradigm.	  It	  implies	  that	  objects	  are	  assembled	  by	  schemata	  into	  an	  organized	  
whole,	  which	  can	  be	  studied	  in	  a	  mechanistic	  way.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Marchal	   defines	   the	   theology	   of	   a	  machine	   by	   the	   arithmetical	   truth	  about	   it,	   or	   involving	   it	   (in	   third	   and/or	   first	   person	  
views)	  minus	  what	   the	  machine	   can	   prove	   about	   itself.	   He	   sums	   it	   up	   often	   by	   saying	   that	   theology	   is	   Tarski's	   truth	  minus	  
Gödel's	  provability.	  This	  gives	  a	  "toy"	  theology	  of	  the	  ideally	  self-­‐referentially	  correct	  machine.	  It	  provides	  a	  theology	  close	  to	  
early	  Platonist	   theologies,	  which	   include	  physics	   as	   a	   sub-­‐branch.	   Indeed,	  he	  proposed	  a	   complete	  and	   testable	  arithmetical	  






Our	  task	  is	  to	  review	  both	  the	  categories	  of	  understanding	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  schemata,	  to	  prevent	  the	  bias	  
of	  the	  mechanistic	  view	  of	  the	  world.	  To	  some	  extent	  the	  initial	  steps	  in	  this	  direction	  have	  been	  taken	  
by	  Humberto	  Maturana	  and	  Francisco	  Varela	  (1980),	  who	  focused	  their	  study	  of	  the	  foundations	  for	  the	  
comprehension	  of	   living	  systems	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  concepts	  of	  structure	  and	  function,	  with	  
the	   autopoietic	   process	   as	   a	   uniting	   element.	   However,	   this	   framework	   is	   too	   narrow	   to	   provide	   a	  
comprehensive	  vision	  of	  reality.	  Also,	  their	  explanation	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  autopoietic	  machine	  includes	  
references	   to	   the	   spatial	   separation	   from	   the	   world	   outside	   and	   to	   the	   temporal	   aspects	   of	  
perpetuation.	   Therefore,	   although	   autopoiesis	   remains	   an	   important	   concept	   characterizing	   living	  
systems,	  it	  lacks	  generality	  and	  independence	  from	  more	  fundamental	  referents,	  which	  are	  necessary	  to	  
initiate	  building	  of	  a	  new	  synthesis.	  For	  instance,	  the	  transition	  from	  the	  traditional	  focus	  on	  substantial	  
aspects	  to	  organizational	  (relational)	  ones	  is,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  living	  systems	  necessary,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  obvious	  
and	  very	  doubtful	  that	  the	  category	  of	  substance	  can	  be	  left	  without	  any	  counterpart.	  
	  
The	  work	  on	  such	  tasks	  should	  proceed	  from	  beginnings	  in	  Aristotelian	  categories	  through	  Kant's	  more	  
elaborate,	  but	  much	  less	  clear	  system	  of	  categories,	  sensibilities	  and	  schemata,	  to	  a	  system	  all	  of	  whose	  
elements	   are	   clearly	   justified.	   In	   addition,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   analyze	   the	   mutual	   relations	   of	   these	  
elements,	  in	  particular	  relationships	  between	  the	  categories,	  or	  whatever	  would	  take	  their	  place.	  If	  we	  
want	  to	  retain	  the	  framework	  of	  Kant's	  synthesis,	  one	  key	  question	  we	  have	  to	  answer	  on	  the	  way	   is:	  
how	  could	  we	  naturalize	  the	  Kantian	  schemata	  for	  space	  and	  time	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  latest	  version(s)	  of	  
quantum	   mechanics	   at	   the	   turn	   of	   the	   21st	   century?	   In	   other	   words,	   do	   we	   need	   to	   revise	   Kant’s	  
synthesis?	  
	  
Conclusion:	  Everett's	  interpretation	  is	  not	  the	  only	  choice	  among	  all	  other	  alternative	  theories	  of	  QM.	  
In	  particular,	  it	  is	  based	  on	  concepts	  of	  the	  old,	  original	  wave	  function	  formalism	  which	  does	  not	  require	  
mathematical	   elaboration	   and	   remains	   very	   useful	   in	   practical	   applications,	   but,	   because	   of	   the	  
involvement	  of	  accidental,	  only	  historically	   justified	  elements	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  generality	   is	  of	   less	  value	  
for	  understanding	  QM34.	  However,	   theories	  such	  as	  Everett's	  also	  have	  some	  merits:	   in	  provoking	   the	  
established	  methodology	  of	  thinking,	  in	  the	  virtue	  of	  Aristotle's	  potentiality	  principle,	  in	  the	  conception	  
of	   gedanken-­‐experiments	   and	   in	   the	   scientific	   discussions	   that	   precede	   adequate	   choice	   and	   (if	  
necessary)	   development	   of	   the	   mathematical	   apparatus.	   This	   is	   what	   really	   counts,	   but	   is	   usually	  
neglected,	  when	   planning	   and	   doing	   science.	  Most	   of	   the	   time	   is	   used	   for	   thinking,	  which	   cannot	   be	  
measured	   in	  physical,	   let	   alone,	  monetary	   units. Therefore,	   the	   Integral	  Biomathics	   approach	  aims	   to	  
minimize	   presuppositions	   and	   consider	   all	   possible	   interpretations	   of	   physical	   theories	   for	   assessing	  
their	  value	  in	  explaining	  life.	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  very	  different	  approaches	  as	  those	  of	  Everett's,	  
Marchal's	  and	  Schroeder's	   lead	  to	  some	  similar	  conclusions	  by	   involving	   the	  observer	   in	   the	  equation.	  
This	  correlation	  must	  mean	  something.	  To	  answer	  what	  we	  need	  to	  do	  more	  research.	  
	  
Nevertheless,	   theoretical	   advances	   in	  QT	   and	   its	   impact	   on	  biology	   are	  one	   issue,	   and	   their	   empirical	  
evidence	  is	  a	  different	  one.	  	  Theoretically,	  QM	  effects	  might	  affect	  a	  macromolecule35,	  but	  such	  events	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 In	  particular,	  this	  formalism	  cannot	  accommodate	  superselection	  rules,	  which	  show	  that	  actual	  physical	  systems	  considered	  
as	  quantum	  ones	  are	  partially	  quantum	  and	  partially	  classical. 





would	  be	   individual.	   The	  question	   is:	  how	  do	   they	   accumulate	   in	  order	   to	  have	  an	  effect	  on	   the	   cell?	  
There	  are	  differing	  opinions:	  	  
"Neurobiologists	  and	  most	  physicists	  believe	  that	  on	  the	  cellular	  level,	  the	  interaction	  of	  neurons	  
is	  governed	  by	  classical	  physics.	  A	  small	  minority,	  however,	  maintains	  that	  quantum	  mechanics	  is	  
important	   for	   understanding	   higher	   brain	   functions,	   e.g.	   for	   the	   generation	   of	   voluntary	  
movements	   (free	   will),	   for	   high-­‐level	   perception	   and	   for	   consciousness.	   Arguments	   from	  
biophysics	  and	  computational	  neuroscience	  make	  this	  unlikely."	  (Koch	  &	  Hepp,	  2007)	  	  
	  
The	  quest	  continues,	  e.g.	  (Georgiev,	  2011).	  	  
 
7.6	  A	  Unifying	  Formal	  Framework	  
	  
In	  biology,	  classical	  models	  (mostly	  based	  on	  non-­‐linear	  differential	  equations,	  dynamic	  systems,	  graph	  
theory,	   stochastic	  processes	  or	   information	   theory)	  are	  well	  adapted	  to	  study	   local	  problems,	  but	   it	   is	  
impossible	  to	  extrapolate	  global	  properties	  of	  a	  system	  from	  its	  local	  features.	  For	  example,	  in	  a	  cellular	  
system,	  the	  molecules	  that	  make	  up	  the	  cells	  follow	  different	  laws	  from	  those	  at	  the	  level	  of	  cells,	  even	  
though	  both	  molecules	  and	  cells	  are	  part	  of	  the	  same	  whole.	  Moreover,	  each	  part	  operates	  on	  its	  own	  
time	  scale,	  and	  these	  temporal	  variations	  play	  an	  essential	  part	  in	  the	  evolution	  of	  a	  system.	  	  So	  we	  need	  
to	  develop	  another	  frame	  in	  which	  both	  local	  and	  global	  problems	  can	  be	  analyzed.	  Category	  Theory	  is	  a	  
good	   candidate	   for	   providing	   the	   unifying	   formal	   framework	   for	   Integral	   Biomathics,	   in	   particular	   to	  
propose	  solutions	  to	  some	  of	  the	  problems	  indicated	  in	  the	  preceding	  sections.	  
	  
7.6.1	  Why	  Categories?	  
	  
Category	  Theory	  (CT)	  is	  strongly	  related	  to	  graph	  theory.	  A	  category	  is	  a	  (directed	  hyper)	  graph36	  plus	  an	  
internal	  composition	  of	  directed	  arcs.	  Conversely,	  a	  graph	  generates	  the	  category	  of	  its	  paths,	  obtained	  
just	   by	   adding	   its	   paths	   as	   new	   edges	   (with	   convolution	   as	   composition).	   Eilenberg	   and	   MacLane	  
introduced	   Category	   Theory	   in	   the	   early	   1940’s;	   it	   has	   a	   unique	   status,	   at	   the	   border	   between	  
mathematics,	   logic,	   and	   meta-­‐mathematics.	   It	   was	   introduced	   to	   relate	   algebraic	   and	   topological	  
constructs,	  and	  later	  its	  foundational	  role	  in	  mathematics	  and	  logic	  was	  emphasized	  by	  several	  authors,	  
for	   example,	   in	   the	   theory	   of	   topos	   developed	   by	   Lawvere	   and	   Tierney,	   and	   in	   the	   sketch	   theory	  
developed	   by	   Ehresmann.	   In	   particular	   it	   provides	   a	   single	   setting	   unifying	   many	   domains	   of	  
mathematics	  and	  makes	  a	  general	  concept	  of	  structure	  possible.	  Categorical	  logic	  is	  now	  a	  well-­‐defined	  
field	   based	   on	   type	   theory	   for	   intuitionistic	   logics,	   with	   applications	   in	   functional	   programming	   and	  
domain	   theory,	  where	  a	  Cartesian	  closed	  category	   is	   taken	  as	  a	  non-­‐syntactic	  description	  of	  a	   lambda	  
calculus	  (Church,	  1940;	  Lambek,	  1986).	  	  
	  
Category	  Theory,	   seen	  as	  an	  analysis	  of	   the	  main	  operations	  of	   the	  "working	  mathematician",	   reflects	  
some	  of	  the	  prototypical	  operations	  that	  man	  does	  for	  making	  sense	  of	  his	  world.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  	  Here	  we	   restrict	  ourselves	   to	   'small'	   categories	  whose	  objects	   form	  a	   set.	   In	  general,	   'large'	   categories	  are	  also	  accepted.	  






Among	  these	  operations	  are	  formation,	  dissolution,	  comparison,	  and	  combination	  of	  relations	  between	  
objects	   (morphisms	   and	   their	   composition	   in	   a	   category);	   synthesis	   of	   complex	   objects	   from	   more	  
elementary	   ones	   ("colimit"	   operation);	   analysis	   (decomposition	   of	   complex	   objects);	   optimization	  
processes	   (universal	   constructions);	   formation	   of	   hierarchies	   of	   objects	   ("complexification");	  
classification	  of	  objects	  into	  invariance	  classes	  (formation	  of	  concepts	  as	  projective	  limits).	  	  
	  
As	   these	  operations	  are	  at	   the	  basis	  of	  science,	   it	  explains	   the	   interest	  of	  applying	  Category	  Theory	   in	  
other	   scientific	   domains.	   For	   instance,	   categories	   propose	   new	   perspectives	   on	   the	   foundations	   of	  
physics	   (e.g.,	   using	   higher	   order	   categories	   and	   "higher	   symmetries")	   for	   studying	   quantum	   field	  
theories,	   quantum	   gravitation,	   string	   and	   D-­‐branes	   theory	   (cf.	   Baez,	   Coecke,	   etc.).	   In	   the	   late	   fifties,	  
Robert	  Rosen	  introduced	  categories	  to	  develop	  a	  relational	  biology.	  	  
	  
A	  'dynamic'	  Category	  Theory	  (incorporating	  time	  and	  durations)	  is	  at	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  Memory	  Evolutive	  
Systems	  (Ehresmann	  &	  Vanbremeersch,	  1987,	  2007),	  which	  give	  a	  frame	  for	  hierarchical	  natural	  systems	  
with	   a	  multi-­‐agent,	  multi-­‐temporal	   self-­‐organization,	   such	   as	   biological	   systems,	   cognitive	   systems	   or	  
social	   systems.	   MES	   simultaneously	   cover	   the	   local,	   global,	   evolutionary	   and	   temporal	   aspects,	   in	  
particular	   analyzing	   how	   the	   interplay	   among	   the	   possibly	   conflicting	   local	   logics	   of	   the	   co-­‐regulator	  
agents	  can	  lead	  to	  a	  'less	  disruptive'	  global	  logic	  merging	  most	  of	  them	  into	  a	  higher	  synthesis.	  Among	  
the	  categorical	  tools	  used	  in	  MES	  figure	  the	  (co)limit	  operation	  to	  model	  the	  hierarchy.	  	  
	  
Goguen,	   a	  well-­‐known	   computer	   scientist	   (who	   died	   in	   2006),	   one	   of	   the	   first	   to	   use	   categories,	   had	  
proposed	   to	  use	   this	  operation	  already	   to	   this	  end	   in	  1970	   (Goguen	  1970).	  However	  even	   in	  his	   later	  
works	  (e.g.,	  Goguen,	  1992),	  he	  does	  not	  contemplate	  the	  main	  problems	  studied	  in	  MES.	  For	  instance	  in	  
their	   first	   1987	   paper	   on	   hierarchical	   evolutive	   systems,	   Andrée	   Ehresmann	   &	   J.-­‐P.	   Vanbremeersch	  
already	  apply	   colimits	   in	  a	  more	  elaborate	  manner	   to	  develop	  a	   theory	  of	  emergence	  and	  complexity	  
and	  to	  construct	  the	  "complexification	  process"	  (which	  relies	  on	  previous	  works	  of	  Andrée	  and	  Charles	  
Ehresmann	  (A.	  Bastiani-­‐Ehresmann	  &	  C.	  Ehresmann,	  1970-­‐1972).	  And	  there	  is	  nothing	  in	  Goguen's	  work	  
(e.g.	  Goguen,	  1992,	  based	  on	  sheaf	   theory)	   that	   relates	   to	   the	  'dynamic'	  aspect	  of	  MES	  with	   its	  multi-­‐
temporal	  self-­‐organization	  as	  developed	  in	  (Ehresmann	  &	  Vanbremeersch,	  1990,	  2007).	  	  
 
7.6.2	  The	  Memory	  Evolutive	  Systems	  (MES)	  
 
The	   Memory	   Evolutive	   Systems	   (MES)	   provide	   a	   mathematical	   model	   for	   autonomous	   evolutionary	  
systems	  of	  higher	  complexity,	  such	  as	  biological,	  neuro-­‐cognitive	  or	  social	  systems.	  Such	  systems	  have	  a	  
tangled	  hierarchy	  of	  interconnected	  components	  varying	  over	  time;	  their	  self-­‐organization	  is	  directed	  by	  
a	  net	  of	  mutually	  entailed	  functional	  regulatory	  subsystems,	  the	  "Co-­‐Regulators"	  (CRs),	  each	  operating	  
with	   its	   local	   logic	   at	   its	   own	   complexity	   level,	  with	   a	   specific	   timescale	   and	  a	  differential	   access	   to	   a	  







The	   model	   developed	   by	   A.	   Ehresmann	   and	   J.-­‐P.	   Vanbremeersch	   since	   1987,	   (Ehresmann	   &	  
Vanbremeersch,	  2007;	   for	  a	  summary,	  cf.	   (Ehresmann	  and	  Simeonov,	  2012))	   is	  based	  on	  a	   'dynamical'	  
theory	  of	  categories	  which	  provides	  a	  frame	  for	  studying	  the	  following	  problems:	  	  
	  
(i) The	  Binding	  Problem:	  how	  do	  simple	  objects	  bind	  together	  to	  form	  a	  complex	  object	  forming	  "a	  
whole	  that	  is	  greater	  than	  the	  sum	  of	  its	  parts"?	  (The	  "whole"	  C	  is	  represented	  by	  the	  'colimit'	  
(Kan,	  1958)	  of	   the	  pattern	  P	   formed	  by	  the	   interconnected	  simple	  "parts",	  explaining	  how	  the	  
class	   identity	  (or	  complex	   identity	  of	  C)	  can	  be	  preserved	  while	  the	  "individual	   identity"	  of	  the	  
components	   of	   P	   varies?	   And	  what	   are	   the	   simple	   and	   complex	   interactions	   arising	   between	  
complex	  objects?	  The	  simple	   links	   just	  bind	  clusters	  of	   links	  between	   lower	   level	  components.	  
However	  it	  is	  proven	  that	  "complex	  links"	  can	  emerge	  when	  the	  system	  satisfies	  the	  "Multiplicity	  
Principle"	   (MP),	   a	   kind	   of	   "degeneracy"	   (in	   Edelman's	   sense,	   1987),	   ensuring	   the	   existence	   of	  
'multiform'	   objects	   admitting	   functionally	   equivalent,	   but	   non-­‐connected,	   lower	   order	  
realizations.	  These	  complex	  links	  compose	  simple	  links	  binding	  non-­‐adjacent	  clusters,	  and	  they	  
reflect	  global	  properties	  of	  the	  lower	  levels	  not	  observable	  locally	  at	  these	  lower	  levels.	  	  
	  
(ii) The	   Emergence	   Problem:	   how	   to	   measure	   the	   'real'	   complexity	   order	   of	   an	   object	   and	   to	  
characterize	   the	   property	   allowing	   for	   the	   formation	   of	   objects	   and	   processes	   of	   increasing	  
complexity	   orders	   through	   successive	   "complexification	   processes"	   over	   time?	   The	  
complexification	   process	   explains	   how	   new	   categories	   can	   'emerge'	   and	   gives	   an	   explicit	  
description	  of	  them.	  A	  major	  result	  proves	  that	  MP	  is	  the	  necessary	  condition	  for	  the	  emergence	  	  
of	  objects	  and	  processes	  of	  increasing	  complexity	  order	  through	  iterated	  complexifications;	  for	  
instance	  the	  emergence	  of	  complex	  organisms,	  or	  of	  higher	  cognitive	  processes	  (as	  explained	  in	  
MENS,	   cf.	   Section	   8.1.3).	   And	   MP	   clarifies	   the	   difference	   between	   "mechanisms"	   and	  
"organisms"	  (in	  Rosen's	  terminology).	  
	  
(iii) Multi-­‐scale	   self-­‐organization:	   how	   is	   the	   dynamic	   of	   the	   system	   generated	   internally,	   through	  
the	   competition/cooperation	   between	   its	   net	   of	   coregulators,	   each	   operating	   as	   a	   hybrid	  
system,	  at	   its	  own	  rhythm	  and	  with	   its	  own	   logic?	  Each	  coregulator	  selects	  a	  procedure	  on	   its	  
"landscape",	  but	  their	  various	  procedures	  may	  conflict,	  requiring	  a	  global	  equilibration	  process,	  
the	   interplay	   among	   coregulators,	   a	   kind	   of	   selection	   process	   among	   them,	   to	   which	   the	  
Multiplicity	   Principle	   provides	   more	   flexibility.	   This	   process	   must	   respect	   the	   temporal	  
constraints	   expressed	   by	   the	   "synchronicity	   laws".	   It	   leads	   to	   the	   global	   logic	   which	   will	   be	  
implemented,	  possibly	  causing	  loops	  of	  dysfunction/repairs	  between	  the	  coregulators.	  
	  
The	  MES	  model	  leads	  to	  several	  applications,	  for	  instance:	  	  
	  
(a)	  Efficient	  methods	  for	  ubiquitous	  complex	  events	  processing,	  in	  particular	  leading	  to	  a	  Theory	  
of	  aging	  for	  an	  organism	  (cf.	  Section	  8.4).	  	  
	  
(b)	  Model	  MENS	  for	  a	  neuro-­‐cognitive	  system	  (cf.	  Section	  8.3).	  It	  is	  a	  MES	  obtained	  by	  successive	  






MES	   allow	   incorporating	   typical	   biological	   properties,	   and	   also	   physical	   ones,	   for	   the	   first	   time	   in	   a	  
formal	  mathematical	  framework.	  However	  they	  do	  not	  tell	  the	  whole	  story	  of	  living	  systems.	  	  
	  
7.6.3	  Open	  Problems	  	  
	  
Up	  to	  now,	  the	  MES	  theory	  comprises	  the	  following	  characteristics:	  
	  
• Advantages:	   The	   MES	   theory	   offers	   a	   model,	   which	   simultaneously	   takes	   account	   of	   the	  
hierarchy,	   complexity	   and	   dynamic	   multi-­‐agent	   multi-­‐temporal	   self-­‐organization	   (beyond	  
autopoiesis).	   Its	  main	  result	   is	  the	  singling	  out	  of	  the	  Multiplicity	  Principle	  (MP)	  at	  the	  basis	  of	  
emergence	  of	  higher	  structures	  and	  processes,	  providing	  the	  only	  explanation	  of	  emergence	  we	  
know	  at	  this	  moment.	  
	  
• Weaknesses:	  Theoretically,	  MES	  cannot	  solve	  the	  difficult	  problem	  of	  interplay	  among	  CRs;	  we	  
point	   to	   the	   temporal	   constraints	   given	   by	   the	   synchronicity	   laws,	   but	   there	   are	  many	   other	  
constraints,	  which	   should	  be	   taken	   into	   account.	  Besides,	  we	  need	   to	   answer	   the	  question	  of	  
how	   to	   deduce	   a	   global	   logic	   from	   more	   or	   less	   conflicting	   local	   logics,	   each	   with	   multiple	  
instantiations.	  Practically,	  the	  above	  issues	  are	  not	  easily	  amenable	  to	  computations	  of	  any	  kind	  
to	  this	  moment.	  A	  possible	  approach	  for	  a	  more	  dynamic	  computing/communications	  approach	  
to	  these	  problems	  could	  be	  through	  the	  Wandering	  Logic	  Intelligence	  (Simeonov,	  2002a/c).	  This	  
is	  what	  Ehresmann	  and	  Simeonov	  propose	  in	  (Ehresmann	  &	  Simeonov,	  2012).	  	  	  
	  
Another	  problem	  is	  to	  take	  account	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  living	  systems	  exhibit	  supplementary	  structures.	  To	  
account	  for	  them,	  (the	  configuration	  categories	  of)	  a	  MES	  can	  be	  "enriched"	  with	  these	  structures.	  It	  is	  
easy	   with	   topologies	   or	   higher	   categories.	   It	   is	   more	   difficult	   to	   introduce	   the	   kind	   of	   randomness	  
natural	   phenomena	   exhibit	   (for	   instance	   the	   firing	   of	   a	   neuron	   when	   the	   depolarisation	   is	   above	  
threshold	  generally	  occurs	  only	  with	   some	  probability).	  An	   important	   step	   in	   this	   respect	  would	  be	   to	  
introduce	  a	  notion	  of	  "stochastic"	  category	  in	  which	  the	  composite	  only	  exists	  with	  some	  probability.	  
 
7.7	  Conclusions	  and	  Outlook	  
	  
The	  new	  paradigm	  of	   Integral	   Biomathics	   distinguishes	  physical	   structures	   from	   functional	   structures,	  
the	  former	  being	  defined	  in	  physical	  terms	  while	  the	  latter	  are	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  behaviour.	   	  In	  
physics	   there	   is	   little	  difference	  between	   the	   two	   in	   that	   structure	  or	  constitution	   tends	   to	  determine	  
behaviour	  while	   given	   some	   observed	   behaviour	   one	   is	   often	   able	   to	   determine	   the	   structure	   that	   is	  
responsible.	   	  In	  biology,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  there	  may	  be	  no	  specific	  structure	  associated	  with	  a	  given	  
function;	  instead	  there	  are	  many	  ways	  to	  achieve	  a	  given	  goal:	  the	  functionality	  acts	  a	  filter	  determining	  
which	  structures	  are	  possible.	  
	  
Functionality	   is	   not	   entirely	   straightforward	   either,	   as	   it	   is	   typically	   achieved	   through	   a	   number	   of	  
components	   working	   together.	   Thus,	   an	   important	   aspect	   of	   functionality	   consists	   in	   components	  





involves	  systems	  learning	  to	  recognize	  signs	  and	  responding	  appropriately.	   In	  other	  cases	  a	  function	   is	  
developed	   by	   a	   less	   constrained	   process,	  which	   can	   be	   characterized	   as	   play.	   	  These	   processes	   all	   go	  
towards	  making	  a	  biosystem	  behave	  as	  a	  unitary	  whole,	  with	  a	  particular	  perspective	  of	  its	  own.	  	  	  
	  
This	   tendency	   to	   create	   “wholes”	   extends	   to	   the	   environment	   of	   a	   biosystem,	   as	   each	  particular	   unit	  
finds	  niches	   in	  which	  it	  can	  function	  effectively.	   	  In	  an	  even	  subtler	  mode,	  signs	  may	  find	  niches	  where	  
they	  are	  effective,	  as	  in	  our	  use	  of	  language.	  
	  
Another	   unique	   aspect	   of	   biological	   systems	   is	   that	   as	   they	   evolve,	   they	   create	   new	   signs	   and	   new	  
niches.	   Niche	   creation	   is	   a	   relatively	   new	   and	   rapidly	   growing	   field	   of	   study,	   mainly	   in	   ecology	  
(Ulanowicz,	  1986;	  1997),	  but	   it	   is	  a	  concept	  that	  applies	  to	  all	   levels	  of	  organization.	  	  One	  of	   the	  most	  
intriguing	  aspects	  of	  niche	  creation	  is	  that	  it	  is	  often	  the	  excreta	  of	  one	  organism	  that	  creates	  the	  niche	  
for	   another	   (classic	   examples	   being	   oxygen,	   which	   poisons	   anaerobes	   but	   created	   a	   new	   niche	   for	  
aerobic	  organisms,	  and	  dung	  and	  the	  evolution	  of	  dung	  beetles).	  	  
	  
Furthermore,	  the	  concepts	  of	  selective	  retention	  of	  some	  components	  and	  the	  selective	  elimination	  of	  
others	  also	  seem	  to	  be	  unique	  to	  biology.	  A	  further	  twist	  is	  provided	  by	  the	  idea	  of	  complementarity	  (s.	  
section	  5.1).	  Complementarity	  relates	  to	  the	  ambiguity	  of	  reality	  in	  our	  perception	  of	  it.	  The	  fact	  that	  we	  
may	   view,	   for	   example	   a	   situation	   or	   thing	   as	   one	   entity	   or	   alternatively	   as	   another	   entity,	   or	   even	  
choose	  between	  the	  two	  to	  fit	  our	  purposes,	  reveals	  Nature,	  as	  it	  were,	  offering	  us	  options.	  
	  
The	   usual	   ways	   of	   characterizing	   Nature	   loses	   these	   subtleties,	   treating	   Nature	   in	   objective	   terms,	  
assuming	  we	   can	  master	   it	   cognitively	   and	   say	   definitely	  what	   is	   there.	   	  With	   the	   concepts	   discussed	  
above	   we	   can	   start	   to	   consider	   the	   question	   'what	   is	   really	   going	   on',	   in	   the	   new	   light	   of	   Integral	  
Biomathics.	  
	  
8.	  Initial	  GTLS	  Application	  Domains	  	  
	  
This	  section	  describes	  the	  efforts	  to	  apply	  this	  general	  theory	   in	  many	  domains,	  with	  special	  emphasis	  
on	   cross-­‐disciplinary	   problems	   and	   multiple	   domains	   spanning	   both	   “hard”	   and	   “soft”	   sciences.	   The	  
result	  will	  be	  a	  coherent	  collection	  of	  computationally	  hostable	  analytical	  techniques.	  
The	  following	  sections	  present	  a	  non-­‐exclusive	  list	  of	  applications	  in	  Brain/Mind	  Science	  using	  Category	  
Theory	  as	  major	  tool.	  
	  
8.1	  Fusing	  the	  Different	  Levels	  of	  Brain/Mind	  Modeling	  	  
	  
At	   the	   synaptic	   and	   neuronal	   level,	   since	   Hodgkin-­‐Huxley’s	   seminal	   work	   in	   the	   early	   50’s,	   we	   have	  
accurate	   biophysical	   models	   of	   single	   neuronal	   dynamics.	   Sophisticated	   computational	   models	   have	  
been	  produced	  since	   then,	  but	  neuroscience	   itself	  has	   remained	   fragmented	  at	   the	  different	   levels	  of	  





of	   neurons,	   and	   finally	   the	  macroscopic	   level	   of	   whole	   brain	   areas	   in	   which	   cognitive	   function	   arise.	  
Thus,	  we	  have	  a	  whole	  host	  of	  mathematical	  structures	  and	  frameworks	  to	  fuse	  together.	  Each	  one	  of	  
them	   has	   to	   be	   evaluated	   regarding	   its	   effectiveness	   in	   order	   to	   decide	   how	   it	   could	   be	   developed	  
further	   into	   a	   larger	   framework	   for	   which	   we	   are	   searching.	   The	   use	   of	  mathematical	   tools,	   such	   as	  
Category	  Theory	  combined	  with	  stochastic	  continuum	  neural	  field	  theory	  and	  related	  dynamical	  systems	  
analyses,	  will	   give	  a	   common	  underlying	   framework	   to	  obtain	  variables	   relating	   the	  different	   levels	  of	  
description	  (micro,	  meso,	  macro)	  for	  studying	  these	  mechanisms,	  and	  for	  explaining	  how	  they	  may	  lead	  
to	   the	  emergence	  of	  higher	   cognitive	  processes.	  Computational	  models	  of	   the	  hippocampus	   (Burgess,	  
1994;	  Arleo,	  2000)	  state	  that	  the	  sum	  of	  a	  set	  of	  elements	  (grid	  cells)	  directly	  produces	  another	  element,	  
a	   place	   cell.	   In	   doing	   so,	   these	   models	   take	   for	   granted	   that	   the	   properties	   of	   the	   sum	   are	   directly	  
reducible	   to	   those	   of	   its	   components.	   This	   strict	   form	   of	   reductionism	   is	   at	   odds	   with	   the	   nature	   of	  
complex	  systems.	  Gomez-­‐Ramirez	  (2010)	  has	  used	  Category	  Theory	  for	  modeling	  the	  formation	  of	  place	  
cells	   from	  grid	   cells	   in	   the	  hippocampus	   in	   a	   non-­‐reductionist	  way.	   The	   cooperation	  of	   the	   grid	   fields	  
gives	  rise	  to	  a	  colimit,	  which	  is	  a	  place	  field.	  	  
	  
8.2	  Scale-­‐free	  Dynamics	  
	  
An	   object	   that	   presents	   invariance	   over	   changes	   of	   scale	   of	   observation	   is	   scale	   invariant.	   This	   is	   a	  
symmetric	  property	  of	  paramount	  importance	  in	  mathematics	  and	  natural	  science.	  Simply	  stated,	  scale	  
invariance	  means	  that	  the	  object	  reproduces	  itself	  on	  different	  time	  or	  spatial	  scales37.	  	  For	  example,	  it	  
presents	  self-­‐similarity	  in	  a	  geometrical	  context.	  Scale	  free	  dynamics	  refers	  here	  to	  the	  invariance	  of	  the	  
equations	  that	  describe	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  system.	  Thus,	  given	  an	  observable	  O	  i.e.	  an	  equation,	  which	  
depends	   on	   the	   parameter	   x,	   we	   say	   that	   is	   scale	   invariant	   under	   the	   change	   of	   x	   by	  αx,	   if	   exists	   a	  
number,	  φ(α),	  such	  that	  O(x)	  =	  φ(O(αx))	  .	  For	  a	  more	  in	  depth	  characterization	  of	  scale	  invariance,	  and	  
other	   related	  phenomena	   like	   self-­‐organized	   criticality	   or	   fractality,	   see	   for	   example	   	   (Sornette,	   2000;	  
Embrechts	  2002).	  
	  
Studies	  on	  scale	   invariance	   in	  the	  brain	  are	  being	  spurred	  thanks	  to	  the	  progressive	   increase	   in	  spatial	  
and	  temporal	  resolution	  of	  recording	  techniques.	  It	  has	  been	  recently	  demonstrated	  (Expert	  et	  al.,	  2010)	  
that	  even	  fMRI	  data	  when	  appropriately	  analyzed,	  exhibits	  self-­‐similarity	  and	  hierarchical	  structure	  at	  all	  
length	   scales.	   Indeed,	   the	   apparent	   heterogeneity	   of	   various	   parts	   of	   the	   brain	   hides	   some	   general	  
mechanisms	  at	  the	  basis	  of	  its	  functioning.	  	  In	  particular,	  it	  is	  well	  known	  that	  mental	  operations	  depend	  
on	   the	  activation	  of	   synchronous	  neuronal	  groups,	  different	  such	  neural	  groups	  having	   the	  same	  role.	  
We	   explore	   the	   concept	   of	  meaningful	   patterns,	   which	   is	   similar	   to	   the	   term	   “cognit”	   coined	   by	   the	  
neurobiologist	  J.	  Fuster	  (Fuster,	  2005)	  and	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  “neurocognitive	  networks”	  conceived	  by	  
S.	  Bressler	  (Bressler,	  2007).	  The	  neural	  populations	  at	  the	  mesoscopic	  level	  in	  the	  olfactory	  bulb	  studied	  
by	  W.	  Freeman	  (Freeman,	  2000)	  are	  also	  similar	  to	  our	  meaningful	  patterns.	  
	  
However,	  the	  identification	  of	  meaningful	  networks	  or	  patterns	  that	  express	  those	  cognitive	  functions,	  
which	   are	   what	   this	   theory	   promises,	   is,	   as	   is	   recognized	   by	   its	   own	   proponents,	   simply	   daunting.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  In	  a	   topological	  context,	   it	   is	   interesting	  to	  note	  that	  a	  scale-­‐free	  network	   is	  one	  that	  does	  not	  have	  a	  specific	  





Indeed,	  when	   dealing	  with	   broadly	   distributed	   connections	   of	   a	   large	   number	   of	   components,	   highly	  
coupled	  with	  non	  linear	  dynamics,	  the	  resulting	  behaviour	  of	  the	  neurocognitive	  networks	  are,	  in	  many	  
cases,	   impossible	   to	   control	   and	   predict.	   The	   problem	   is	   as	   follows:	   assuming	   that	   we	   know	   how	   to	  
describe	  the	  dynamics	  that	  neurons	  would	  exhibit	   in	   isolation,	  and	  assuming	  that	  the	  dynamics	  of	   the	  
temporal	  patterns	  of	   those	   isolated	  neurons	  have	  a	  well-­‐known	   long-­‐term	  behaviour,	   like	   for	  example	  
stable	  fixed	  points	  or	  chaotic	  attractors;	  if	  we	  couple	  those	  systems	  together	  the	  global	  behaviour	  is	  still	  
missing.	  	  
	  
This	   is	   the	   essence	   of	   Complexity	   Science:	   understand	   the	   global	   dynamics	   of	   complex	   systems,	  
consisting	  of	  a	  number	  of	  elements,	  strongly	  coupled	  and	  with	  highly	  non-­‐linear	  dynamics.	  We	  believe	  
that	   i)	   by	   acknowledging	   scale	   free	   dynamics	   hypothesis,	   and	   ii)	   by	   using	  mathematics	   like	   Category	  
Theory	   combined	  with	   other	  methodologies	   of	   complexity	   sciences	   such	   as	   Network	   Theory,	   a	  more	  
effective	  and	  fruitful	  approach	  in	  the	  unveiling	  of	  meaningful	  patterns	  in	  the	  brain	  will	  be	  possible.	  
	  
Scale-­‐free	   dynamics	   of	   neocortex	   are	   characterized	   by	   hierarchical	   self-­‐similarities	   of	   patterns	   of	  
synaptic	   connectivity	   and	   spatiotemporal	   neural	   activity	   (Freeman,	   2007).	  We	   are	   going	   to	   develop	   a	  
novel	   framework	   to	   investigate	   the	   structure	   of	   complex	   brain	   networks,	   based	   on	   Category	   Theory,	  
combined	  with	  statistical	  mechanics	  to	  model	  high-­‐dimensional	  complex	  data.	  
	  
8.3	  The	  Model	  MENS	  	  
	  
MENS	  (Ehresmann	  &	  Vanbremeersch,	  1990,	  2007,	  2009)	   is	  an	  application	  of	  MES	  (cf.	  Section	  7.6)	  to	  a	  
neuro-­‐cognitive	  system.	  This	  hierarchical	  model	  has	  the	  neural	  system	  at	   its	  base	  with	  its	  neurons	  and	  
synaptic	   paths	   between	   them.	   The	   components	   of	   higher	   levels,	   called	   category-­‐neurons,	   represent	  
increasingly	   complex	  mental	   objects	  or	  processes	  obtained	  as	   the	   colimit	   of	   each	   synchronous	  neural	  
(hyper-­‐)assembly	   which	   they	   activate.	   Such	   category-­‐neurons	   are	   obtained	   from	   the	   neural	   level	   by	  
iterated	   complexification	   processes,	   and	   they	   have	   multiple	   physical	   realizabilities	   into	   neural	  
'pyramids'.	  The	  model	  accounts	  for	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  flexible	  internal	  model	  of	  the	  Self,	  the	  Archetypal	  
Core,	  and	  explains	  how	  it	  is	  at	  the	  root	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  higher	  mental	  or	  cognitive	  processes,	  up	  to	  
consciousness	  (Ehresmann	  &	  Vanbremeersch,	  2002,	  2009).	  For	  a	  more	  precise	  discussion,	  please	  refer	  
to	  (Ehresmann,	  2012).	  
	  
8.4	  Application	  to	  Complex	  Event	  Processing.	  A	  Theory	  of	  Aging	  
	  
Organisms	  such	  as	  living	  systems	  have	  a	  multi-­‐agent	  multi-­‐temporal	  self-­‐organization.	  In	  MES	  the	  agents	  
are	   the	   coregulators	   (CRs).	   Each	   CR	   operates	   locally	   stepwise	   with	   its	   own	   rhythm,	   logic	   and	   partial	  
information.	  However,	  their	  commands	  to	  effectors	  must	  be	  coordinated	  through	  'interplay'	  among	  CRs,	  
which,	   as	   said	   in	   Section	   7.6.2,	   causes	   dysfunctions	   (fracture,	   dyschrony	   or	   even	   the	   need	   for	   re-­‐
synchronisation)	  to	  the	  CRs	  whose	  commands	  cannot	  be	  realized.	  In	  particular	  the	  temporal	  constrains	  
of	   each	   CR	  must	   be	   respected,	   and	   hence	   the	   synchronicity	   laws	   relating	   the	   period	   of	   a	   CR	   to	   the	  
stability	  span	  of	  the	  intervening	  components	  and	  the	  transmission	  delays	  between	  them;	  these	  laws	  are	  






Failure	  to	  respect	  these	  laws	  may	  lead	  to	  loops	  	  
	  
fracture	  à	  	  	  repair	  à	  fracture…	  
	  
between	  CRs	  of	  different	  levels,	  possibly	  leading	  to	  a	  re-­‐synchronisation	  of	  some	  CRs.	  	  
	  
One	   application	   is	   an	   Aging	   Theory	   for	   an	   organism,	   through	   a	   cascade	   of	   re-­‐synchronisations	   for	  
physiological	  co-­‐regulators	  of	  increasing	  levels	  (Ehresmann	  &	  Vanbremeersch,	  1993).	  This	  theory	  agrees	  
and	  unifies	  most	  known	  physiological	  theories.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Zlotin's	  work	  (Zlotin,	  1972)	  forms	  the	  
physical	  basis	  of	  a	  theory	  of	  aging,	  which	  applies	  to	  all	  dissipative	  systems	  (Salthe,	  1993).	  	  
	  
Other	   applications	   of	   this	   process	   have	   been	   developed	   for	   complex	   event	   processing	   for	   various	  
organisms	   (Ehresmann	   &	   Vanbremeersch,	   2011),	   leading	   to	   a	   methodology	   for	   anticipation	   using	  
complex	  switches	  between	  different	  realizations	  of	  multiform	  objects	  to	  generate	  complex	  scenarios.	  
	  
9.	  The	  GTLS	  Test	  Cases	  	  
	  
This	   section	   describes	   the	   theory’s	   test	   cases.	   These	   are	   designed	   to	   demonstrate,	   prove	   and	  
communicate	   the	   results.	   The	   problem	   is	   one	   that	   spans	   physics,	   chemistry,	   biology,	   societies	   and	  
societal	  dynamics.	   It	   requires	   integrated	  measurable	   results	  at	  many	   levels,	  and	   it	   is	   in	  a	  general	  area	  
known	  to	  present	  “grand	  challenges”	  to	  existing	  methods.	  	  
A	   key	   aspect	   of	   understanding	   the	   brain	   and	   other	   complex	   systems	   is	   to	   appreciate	   the	   logic	   in	  
relatively	   small	   and	   simple	   sets	   of	   information.	   The	   goal	   should	   not	   be	   complexity	   per	   se,	   but	   design	  
systems	   that	   provide	   complex	   functions,	   without	   structural	   complexity.	   Thus	   the	   goal	   is	   to	   eliminate	  
complexity	  from	  the	  design	  side.	  If	  we	  can	  do	  that	  we	  can	  understand	  complexity	  in	  biological	  systems.	  
This	  can	  only	  be	  done	  by	  grasping	  the	  underlying	  principles,	  such	  us	  robustness,	  stability	  etc.	  We	  need	  to	  
go	  small	  for	  doing	  that,	  e.g.	  to	  start	  with	  small	  complex	  systems	  like	  the	  e.	  coli.	  
	  
In	  the	  following	  we	  propose	  three	  projects	  as	  test	  cases.	  
	  
9.1	  WLIMES	  	  	  
Living	  systems	  are	  systems	  with	  a	   tangled	  hierarchy	  of	   interconnected	  components	  varying	  over	   time,	  
with	   a	  multi-­‐scale	   self-­‐organization.	   As	   explained	   in	   section	   7.6,	   the	  Memory	   Evolutive	   Systems,	  MES	  
(Ehresmann,	   A.	   C.,	   Vanbremeersch,	   2007)	   provide	   a	  mathematical	  model	   based	   on	   a	   'dynamic'	   category	  









The	   Wandering	   Logic	   Intelligence,	   WLI	   (Simeonov,	   1999-­‐2002a/c),	   is	   an	   open,	   hierarchical	   and	  
dynamically	  structured	  model	  for	  communication	  systems.	  It	  enables	  the	  design	  of	  a	  special	  class	  of	  ad-­‐
hoc	  mobile	  active	  networks,	  Wandering	  Networks	  (WN),	  defined	  by	  the	  following	  characteristics:	  	  
 
•	  flexible,	  multi-­‐modal	  specialization	  of	  network	  nodes	  as	  virtual	  subnetworks;	  	  
•	  mobility	  and	  virtualization	  of	  the	  net	  functions	  as	  hardware	  und	  software;	  	  
•	  self-­‐organization	  as	  multi-­‐feedback-­‐based	  topology-­‐on-­‐demand.	  	  
	  
Network	   elements	   can	   contain	   several	   exchangeable	   modules	   capable	   of	   executing	   diverse	   network	  
functions	   in	  parallel.	   They	  can	  be	   invoked,	   transported	   to	  or	  generated	   in	   the	  nodes	  upon	  delivery	  of	  
mobile	  code	  about	   the	  node’s	  behaviour.	  For	   this	  purpose,	  both	   the	  processing	  nodes	   (ships/netbots)	  
and	   the	   information	   packets	   (shuttles)	   are	   active	   (i.e.	   executable),	   exchangeable,	   re-­‐configurable	   and	  
programmable.	   The	   WN	   elements	   are	   of	   temporal	   character;	   they	   can	   be	   created,	   configured	   and	  
removed.	  Functions	  can	  change	  their	  hosts,	  wander	  and	  settle	  down	  in	  other	  hosts.	  
	  
WLI	   is	  a	  technical	  concept	  taken	  from	  the	  domain	  of	  biology,	   i.e.	  a	  "bio-­‐inspired"	  mechanism	  with	  the	  
goal	  of	  solving	  problems	  of	  growing	  complexity	   in	  communication	  networks.	   It	  combines	   the	   issues	  of	  
information	   processing,	   exchange,	   storage	   and	   virtualization	   into	   a	   robust	   operational	   engineering	  
framework.	   The	   solutions	   are	   distributed	   "human-­‐designed"	   self-­‐organization	   algorithms	   such	   as	  
WARAAN	  (Simeonov,	  2002b)	  and	  HiPeer	  (Wepiwé	  &	  Simeonov,	  2006)	  implemented	  as	  conventional	  Turing	  
Machine	   computation.	   They	   are	   artificial	   constructs	   and	   run	   essentially	   as	   any	   other	   communication	  
protocol	   or	   resource	   discovery	   scheme.	   The	   only	   distinction	   is	   their	   inherent	   growing	   behavioural	  
complexity	  achieved	  by	  "memorizing"	  and	  distributing	  navigation	  and	  structural	   information	  about	  the	  
evolving	  environment	  “locally”	  in	  the	  genetic	  code	  of	  the	  shuttles	  when	  traversing	  the	  netbots.	  	  
	  
Now,	  WLI	  as	  an	  extracted-­‐from-­‐Nature	  model	   can	  be	  applied	  back	   to	  biological	   systems	   in	  a	   series	  of	  
iterations	  to	  ensure	  its	  verification.	  The	  most	  characteristic	  concept	  is	  the	  one	  of	  fractal	  virtualization	  of	  
resources	   and	   its	   continuous	  multiplication	   in	   terms	   of	   “software	   chunks”	   over	   time,	  which	   does	   not	  
really	  have	  analogs	  in	  biology	  and	  physiology.	  	  
	  
Therefore,	  one	  of	   the	   intended	  projects	   is	   to	   combine	   the	   two	  approaches	  WLI	  and	  MES	   into	  a	  novel	  
theoretical	  model	  framework,	  WLIMES,	  the	  Wandering	  LIMES,	  the	  suitability	  of	  which	  has	  to	  be	  verified	  
against	   real	   world	   biological	   systems.	   In	   particular	   this	   frame	   could	   approach	   the	   computational	  
problems	  raised	  by	  MES.	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  the	  CRs	  of	  MES	  and	  the	  netbots	  of	  WLI	  play	  similar	  roles.	  What	  
of	  the	  shuttles?	   In	  MES	  a	   link	   is	   'active'	  at	  t	   if	  some	  information	  passes	  through	   it.	  This	   information	  of	  
various	   kinds	   (physical,	   chemical,	   code,	   etc.)	   could	   be	   carried	   by	   shuttles,	   which	   activate	   several	  
consecutive	  links	  on	  their	  way.	  	  
	  
One	  of	  the	  main	  problems	  for	  making	  MES	  amenable	  to	  computation	  is	  the	  'interplay'	  among	  the	  CRs.	  
Indeed	  the	  commands	  sent	  to	  effectors	  by	  the	  various	  CRs	  at	  a	  given	  time	  can	  be	  conflicting.	  In	  terms	  of	  
WLI	  it	  means	  that	  there	  are	  competitive	  shuttles.	  Can	  WLI	  methods	  be	  extended	  to	  solve	  this	  problem?	  









The	  importance	  of	  scale	  to	  biological	  systems	  makes	  it	  imperative	  that	  one	  of	  our	  test	  cases	  should	  face	  
this	  issue	  head	  on.	  Our	  second	  project	  addresses	  the	  properties	  and	  operation	  of	  a	  multiscale	  complex	  
computational	  hierarchy,	  as	  briefly	  described	  earlier.	  
	  
Following	  the	  description	  of	  Section	  5.2	  of	  this	  document	  (‘Scale	  and	  Hyperscale’)	  such	  a	  computational	  
hierarchy	  will	  consist	  of	  alternating	  levels	  of	  logical	  ‘normality’	  and	  logical	  ‘complexity’.	  The	  former	  will	  
be	  provided	  by	   InfoMax,	   a	   currently	   successful	   cortical	  processing	  model,	   (Cottam	  et	  al.,	   2000),	  while	  
the	   latter	  will	   be	  modeled	   using	   Schroeder’s	   (2009)	   informational	   integration	   ‘quantum	   logic	  without	  
quantum	  systems’.	   In	  many	  ways	   this	  project	   is	  parallel	   to	  WLIMES,	  but	   its	   grounding	  philosophy	  and	  
integrated	  mechanisms	  are	  very	  different.	  This	  follows	  from	  the	  Integral	  Biomathics	  approach	  of	  testing	  
different	  approaches	  to	  the	  same	  target	  –	  that	  of	  modeling	  biosystems.	  
	  
Hyper-­‐B	   will	   start	   by	   establishing	   a	   single	   computational	   scaling	   model	   –	   where	   data	   at	   one	   level	  
becomes	  contextualized	  to	  information	  at	  another.	  The	  following	  phase	  will	  be	  to	  couple	  more	  than	  one	  
of	  these	  computational	  schemes	  together	  to	  represent	  the	  multiscale	  nature	  of	  biology.	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  
information	  created	  at	  one	  level	  becomes	  the	  data	  for	  the	  next,	  as	  the	  context	   itself	  will	  be	  scaled.	  As	  
indicated	   in	   Section	  5.2,	   inter-­‐level	   transit	   appears	   to	   resemble	  quantum	  error-­‐correction	   techniques,	  
and	   this	   will	   be	   simulated	   by	   the	   collection	   of	   contextual	   ecosystemic	   information	   at	   one	   level	   to	  
facilitate	  transit	  to	  a	  higher	  one.	  
	  
This	   kind	   of	   scheme	   is	   neither	   bottom-­‐up,	   nor	   top-­‐down	   in	   character:	   propagation	   in	   both	   of	   these	  
directions	  is	  necessary	  to	  instill	  the	  required	  cross-­‐scalar	  correlations,	  which	  will	  lead	  to	  the	  generation	  
of	  a	  global	  systemic	  identity.	  
	  
We	   envisage	   two	   different	   ways	   in	   which	   the	   resulting	   computational	   assembly	   will	   be	   accessed	   by	  
considering	  applications.	  The	  first	  corresponds	  to	  a	  scheme,	  which	  was	  put	  forward	  in	  1991	  (Cottam	  et	  
al.)	   to	  provide	  computational	   responses	   to	   threats	  within	  a	   limited	   time-­‐window.	  This	  kind	  of	  survival	  
computation	   envisages	   access	   to	   a	   hierarchical	   assembly	   by	   propagating	   a	   (threatening)	   stimulus	  
internally	  from	  the	  highest	  hierarchical	   level	  towards	  the	  lowest.	  Each	  successive	  level	  takes	  more	  and	  
more	   processing	   time,	   but	   results	   in	   progressively	   greater	   accuracy	   of	   response.	   Waiting	   as	   long	   as	  
possible	  during	  the	  available	  window	  of	  time	  then	  yields	  the	  ‘best’	  response	  possible.	  	  
	  
The	   second	   way	   in	   which	   we	   envisage	   access	   is	   through	   a	   separately	   computed	   hyperscale	  
representation	  of	  the	  multiple	  scales.	  This	  hyperscale	  representation	  will	  be	  created	  in	  a	  manner	  similar	  
to	  that	  integrated	  the	  multiple	  scales	  themselves	  –	  by	  a	  combination	  of	  quantum	  logic	  without	  quantum	  
systems	   and	   InfoMax.	   In	   this	   case,	   all	   of	   the	   scales	  will	   be	   simultaneously	   accessible,	   but	   only	  with	   a	  
reduced	  precision	  (as	  the	  scales	  themselves	  are	  partially	  enclosed	  when	  viewed	  from	  outside).	  The	  net	  
result	  here	  will	  be	  a	  systemic	  identity	  which	  takes	  account	  of	  the	  degrees	  to	  which	  individual	  scales	  are	  
enclosed	   (and	   therefore	   partially	   inaccessible),	   and	   which	   delivers	   a	   systemic	   image	   which	   is	   biased	  








A	  third	  test	  case	  could	  be	  the	  realization	  of	  a	  computational	  framework	  dedicated	  to	  the	  generation	  of	  
multi-­‐scale	   models	   of	   living	   tissues	   and	   organs.	   The	   framework	   would	   be	   founded	   upon	   the	   self-­‐
organizing	  principles	  of	  morphogenesis.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  spectacular	  and	  fascinating	  manifestations	  of	  
self-­‐organization	   in	   living	   systems	   is	   embryogenesis	   and	   the	   morphogenesis	   of	   organs	   during	   the	  
developmental	   phase	   of	   the	   embryo.	   It	   is	   during	   this	   phase	   that	   the	   exceedingly	   complex	   and	  
interwoven	   structures	   of	   tissues	   and	   organs	   are	   grown	   out	   of	   a	   “disordered”	   mesenchyme.	   Only	  
morphogenetic-­‐based	  methods	  will	   be	   able	   to	   produce	   realistic	  multi-­‐scale	   3D	  models	   of	   tissues	   and	  
cells.	   Manual	   modeling	   can	   only	   produce	   a	   stereotyped	   organization	   by	   concatenating	   parametric	  
“template”	   elements.	   Today’s	  modern	   imaging	   systems	   (RMI,	   scanners)	   can	   provide	   gross	   anatomical	  
features	   but	   are	   a	   far	   cry	   from	   “showing”	   the	   intricate	   capillary	   and	   lymphatic	   networks	   and	   nerve	  
structures	  around,	  say,	  a	  small	  group	  of	  cells.	  Yet,	   if	  building	  models	  of	   living	  tissues	  and	  organs	   is	  the	  
goal,	  we	   need	   to	  model	   all	   the	   dynamics	   that	   occurs	   around	   and	  within	   its	  most	   important	   unit:	   the	  
single	   living	  cell.	  The	  structures	   involved	  are	   individually	  complex,	   interwoven,	  and	  anisotropic	   in	  their	  
physico-­‐chemical	  properties.	  The	  challenge	  then	  is	  to	  devise	  self-­‐constructing	  models	  that	  can	  simulate	  
the	  self-­‐organizing	  processes	  that	  underlie	  embryogenesis,	  growth	  and	  adult-­‐life	  adaptation.	  	  
	  
Living	  tissues	  are	  highly	  complex	  and	  intertwined.	  They	  perform	  functions	  like	  mass	  transport.	  And	  any	  
attempt	   to	  model	   such	   functions	   requires	   shape	   information	   at	   all	   levels	   of	   detail	   before	   setting	   the	  
boundary	  conditions	  across	  each	  interface	  (e.g.	  flux,	  partial-­‐flux	  or	  no-­‐flux	  across	  boundaries	  for	  a	  given	  
chemical	   species).	  Thus	  an	   important	  part	  of	  modeling	   life-­‐like	   tissues	   lies	   in	  producing	   realistic	  multi-­‐
scale	  3D	  morphologies,	  boundary	  conditions	  and	  incorporating	  the	  anisotropic	  properties	  of	  the	  system	  
under	  study.	  This	  is	  particularly	  true	  when	  modeling	  living	  organisms.	  Understanding	  the	  morphogenesis	  
of	  tissues	  and	  organs	  from	  a	  single	  cell	  will	  open	  the	  window	  to	  Nature’s	  secret	  of	  generating	  forms	  of	  
tremendous	  complexity	  from	  the	  initial	  egg	  structure.	  Despite	  this	  complexity,	  fundamental	  research	  in	  
developmental	   biology	   seem	   to	   confirm	   that	  morphogenesis	   results	   from	   coordinated	   cell	   behaviour	  
such	  as	   signaling	  motion	  and	  aggregation,	  division,	  differentiation	  and	  apoptosis	   (Dressler,	  2006).	   The	  
process	  is	  initiated	  by	  inductor	  cells	  and	  coordination	  is	  mediated	  by	  short-­‐range	  direct	  cell-­‐cell	  and	  cell-­‐
extra-­‐cellular	  matrix	   interactions	   as	  well	   as	  medium	   to	   long-­‐range	   interactions	  mediated	   by	   chemical	  
and	   electrical	   morphogenetic	   fields.	   It	   is	   the	   spatiotemporal	   organization	   of	   these	   interactions	   that	  
determine	  the	  final	  structure.	  	  
	  
This	   test	   case	   addresses	  many	   issues	   of	   the	   INBIOSA	   research	   program.	   Indeed,	   the	   following	   points	  
could	  be	  studied:	  
• 	  multi-­‐scale	  structural	  generation;	  
• 	  multi-­‐modal,	  short,	  medium	  and	  long	  range	  interactions;	  
• 	  simultaneous	   co-­‐dependencies	   between	   these	   interactions	   and	   the	   global	   form/geometry	   of	   the	  
structure	  being	  generated;	  
• combination	  of	  discrete	  structures	   (e.g.	  cells)	  with	  “continuous”	  quantities	  such	  as	  morphogenetic	  






In	   addition,	   descriptive	   knowledge	   (predicates)	   could	   also	   be	   included	   in	   the	   framework	   in	   order	   to	  
inform	  the	  latter	  about	  the	  agents	  and	  entities	  involved	  in	  morphogenesis.	  This	  would	  open	  the	  door	  to	  
other	  INBIOSA	  issues,	  such	  as:	  
• addressing	  entailment	  and	  relational	  biology	  
• incorporating	  Category	  Theory	  /	  MES	  
• developing	  introspectively	  articulated	  systems.	  
	  
10.	  Call	  to	  Action	  
	  
In	  the	  following	  sections	  we	  summarize	  the	  major	  conclusions	  of	  this	  report.	  
	  
10.1	  The	  Case	  for	  Transformative	  Research	  in	  Biology	  
	  
This	  section	  summarizes	  the	  argument	  in	  this	  paper	  seeking	  FET	  support	  for	  a	  continuance	  into	  Phase	  2	  
of	  the	  transformative,	  i.e.	  high	  risk,	  high	  payoff	  research	  proposed	  by	  the	  INBIOSA	  group	  of	  researchers.	  
The	   proposals	   are	   organized	   around	   the	   broader	   theme	   of	   the	   sciences	   of	   complexity	   rather	   being	  
narrowly	   focused	  on	  biology	  as	  a	  complex	  science	  per	  se.	  However	   there	   is	  a	  central	   focus	  on	  biology	  
because	   of	   the	   many	   advances	   contributing	   to	   the	   new	   sciences	   of	   complexity	   achieved	   from	   the	  
massive	   societal	   investment	   in	   health	   and	   related	   sciences	   research	   over	   the	   past	   50	   years.	   Our	  
proposals	   are	   organized	   around	   two	   fundamental	   themes	   that	   we	   believe	   are	   essential	   to	   the	  
transformation	  of	  modern	  science:	  
• the	  need	   for	   convergent	   theoretical	   syntheses	  which	  will	   crystallize	   the	   theoretical	   challenges	  
and	  	  
• the	   need	   for	   innovative	  mathematical	   concepts	   to	   effectively	   articulate	   these	   new	   syntheses	  
into	  a	  verifiable	  theoretical	  foundation	  for	  practical	  applications.	  	  
	  
Lastly,	  we	  provide	  proposals	  for	  institutionalizing	  these	  transformations	  into	  future	  FET	  funded	  research.	  	  
	  
We	  believe	  that	  our	  research	  proposals	  meet	  the	  criteria	  for	  qualification	  as	  scientific	  grand	  challenges	  
and	  are	  worthy	  of	  further	  investment	  as	  the	  spearhead	  of	  a	  new	  renaissance	  in	  science.	  The	  proposals	  
are	  critically	  relevant	  to	  scientific	  progress	  because	  they	  address	  the	  issue	  of	  systems	  (real	  and	  artificial)	  
of	   increasing	  complexity;	  they	  are	  paradigmatically	  radical	  because	  they	  call	  for	  convergent	  theoretical	  
synthesis	   of	   a	  magnitude	  not	   seen	   in	  biology	   since	  Darwin;	   and	   they	  will	   have	  a	   radical	   impact	  on	  all	  
sciences	   of	   complexity	   because	   they	   will	   offer	   new	   metaphors	   and	   mathematical	   innovation.	   	   We	  
recognize	  that	  such	  language	  may	  appear	  to	  be	  overly	  and	  insupportably	  ambitious.	  Indeed,	  we	  do	  not	  
know	   if	   among	   the	   world	   scientific	   community,	   there	   exists	   the	   genius	   to	   address	   the	   problem	  






What	   we	   do	   know	   is	   that	   is	   has	   happened	   before	   –	   a	   methodological	   revolution	   in	   the	   physical	  
sciences:	  the	  transformation	  of	  physics	  into	  a	  dual	  discipline	  of	  experimental	  and	  theoretical	  physics	  –	  
that	  brought	  forth	  the	  modern	  world.	  	  
	  
That	   revolution	   was	   founded	   on	   the	   discovery	   that	   the	   apparent	   complexity	   of	   the	   world	   could	   be	  
addressed	   by	   rigorous	   experimental	   methods	   and	   the	   development	   of	   mathematical	   languages	   and	  
grammars	  that	  stunned	  our	  own	  beliefs	  in	  the	  power	  of	  human	  thought	  (Wigner,	  1960).	  	  
	  
But	   now	  we	   face	   a	   new	   intellectual	   challenge,	   not	   of	   apparent	   complexity	   but	   of	  genuine	   irreducible	  
complexity	   in	   our	   quest	   for	   a	   more	   fundamental	   understanding	   of	   living	   entities	   and	   the	   complex	  
institutions	  and	  technologies	  enabled	  by	  our	  scientific	  culture.	  The	  rigor	  and	  fundamental	  paradigms	  of	  
physics	  advanced	  all	  sciences	  across	  a	  very	  wide	  field	  of	  knowledge	  bringing	  new	  observational	  tools	  and	  
computational	  capabilities	  to	  bear	  on	  the	  new	  quest.	  That	  quest	  is	  beleaguered	  by	  the	  intransigence	  of	  
living	  systems	  to	  submit	  to	  the	  assumptions	  of	  simplification	  and	  computation	  of	  the	  physical	  sciences.	  
The	  dynamic	  complexity	  of	  all	  living	  entities	  appears	  to	  be	  irreducible	  and	  totally	  confounding.	  
	  
Our	  ability	  to	  describe	  the	  biological	  world	  in	  all	  its	  manifestations	  has	  reached	  the	  point	  where	  we	  can	  
track	   neurons	   and	   chemical	   transactions	   in	   the	   brain	   simultaneously;	   at	   the	   higher	   levels	   of	   the	  
organization	   of	   life	   we	   have	   terabytes	   of	   data	   describing	   our	   social,	   ecological,	   technological	   and	  
economic	   systems.	  We	   have	   reached	   this	   condition	   of	   information	   overload	   in	   the	   sciences	   of	   living	  
systems	   because	   our	   theoretical	   understanding	   greatly	   lags	   our	   observational	   capabilities.	   We	   are	  
confounded	  with	  an	  excess	  of	  incommensurable	  observation	  and	  theory	  in	  much	  the	  same	  way	  that	  the	  
astronomers	   of	   old	   were	   confounded	   with	   what	   appeared	   to	   be	   irresolvable	   inconsistencies	   in	   their	  
observations	   of	   the	   stars	   and	   Ptolemaic	   theory	   until	   the	   Copernican	   Revolution.	   Because	   biology	   has	  
proliferated	  too	   many	   theories	   and	   paradigms,	   all	   too	   narrowly	   focused,	   there	   is	  the	   need	   for	  
convergent	   theoretical	   synthesis	   ultimately	   synthesizing	   a	   simpler	   theory	   (canon	   of	   parsimony)	   that	  
encompasses	   the	   subordinate	   ones.	   The	   implicit	   response	   of	   mainstream	   science	   is	   to	   wait	   for	   the	  
Copernicus	  of	  the	  modern	  era	  and	  for	  the	  generations	  of	  genius	  that	  will	  inevitably	  follow	  him.	  But	  we	  
have	  reasons	  not	  to	  wait.	  
	  
10.2	  The	  Threat	  to	  the	  Certainities	  of	  Continuing	  Progress	  	  
	  
The	  first	  reason	  why	  we	  cannot	  wait	  and	  why	  we	  must	  attempt	  to	  accelerate	  the	  progress	  of	  science	  is	  
that	   the	   growing	   complexity	   of	   the	   modern	   world	   –	   the	   product	   of	   first	   scientific	   revolution	   –	   is	  
becoming	   increasingly	   evident	   to	   all.	   We	   are	   many	   now.	   We	   are	   massive	   consumers	   of	   the	   earth’s	  
energy	  resources.	  Our	  information	  technologies	  support	  industries,	  economies,	  education	  and	  financial	  
systems	  from	  the	  global	  to	  the	  individual	  level.	  Our	  medical	  and	  biochemical	  technologies	  enable	  bodily	  
interventions	   of	   unparalleled	   complexities	   in	   an	   ever	   more	   costly	   effort	   to	   manage	   the	   diseases	   of	  
modernity.	  Our	   industrial	   technologies	  demand	  equally	   intensive	   and	   complex	   interventions	   in	   all	   the	  
natural	  ecologies	  that	  support	   life	  on	  this	  Earth.	  But	  all	   is	  not	  well.	  Despite	  the	  undeniable	  progress	   in	  
human	   welfare	   the	   complexities	   of	   modernity	   are	   growing	   and	   threatening	   the	   certainties	   of	   our	  






What	   makes	   these	   threats	   extremely	   problematic	   is	   that	   we	   have	   a	   world	   universally	   entrained	   in	  
complex	  systems	  and	  interventions	  where	  we	  know	  scarcely	  anything	  of	  their	  potential	  interaction	  and	  
failure	   rates	   and	   forms38 .	   The	   risk	   is	   therefore	   of	   catastrophic	   failure	   because	   of	   this	   universal	  
deployment	  and	  extreme	  dependence.	   In	   some	  areas,	   such	  as	  national	   security,	  where	  our	   security	   is	  
based	  on	  engineered	  systems	  of	  complexity,	  we	  take	  steps	  to	  limit	  catastrophic	  failure	  by	  pursuing	  the	  
development	  of	  systems	  of	  even	  higher	  complexity	  (e.g.	  countermeasures	  utilizing	  quantum	  computing	  
as	  the	  shield	  against	  computer	  hacking	  or	  subversion).	  	  
	  
However	  the	  availability	  of	  opportunities	  in	  most	  areas	  of	  natural	  complexity	  is	  very	  limited	  because	  we	  
do	  not	  understand	  how	  Nature	  develops	  complexity	  in	  the	  first	  instance.	  
	  
10.3	  The	  Intellectual	  Challenge	  of	  the	  Complexity	  Complexity	  	  
	  
There	   is	   a	   second	   reason	   not	   to	   wait.	   Frustration	   with	   the	   inadequacy	   of	   conventional	   scientific	  
approaches	   in	   addressing	   societally	   supported	   research	   objectives	   and	   the	   unquenchable	   thirst	   for	  
understanding	   that	   drives	   human	   existence	   invites	   intellectual	   risk-­‐taking.	   Some	   of	   that	   risk-­‐taking	   is	  
paying	  off.	  We	  are	  painstakingly	  learning	  how	  to	  conduct	  the	  many	  sciences	  of	  complexity39.	  For	  science	  
itself	   is	   a	   complex	   system	   of	   human	   creation40.	   We	   now	   understand	   science	   as	   a	   highly	   complex	  
hierarchical	   system	   of	   thought,	   a	   noetic	   system	   in	   itself,	   whose	   careful	   reasoning	   and	   open-­‐ended	  
insight	  processes	  are	  irrepressibly	  capable	  of	  generating	  novel	  theories.	  	  We	  can	  have	  a	  new	  confidence	  
in	   embarking	   on	   a	   journey	   of	   intentionally	   challenging	   ourselves	   to	   explore	   the	   complexity	   of	   living	  
entities	  because	  we	  have	  begun	  to	  learn	  from	  the	  history	  of	  science	  how	  to	  advance	  science	  itself.	  The	  
lessons	  are	  twofold:	  first,	  there	  is	  a	  need	  for	  theoretical	  convergence	  of	  the	  many	  working	  theories	  and	  
hypotheses	  that	  arise	  across	  the	  many	  narrow	  subdomains	  of	  complex	  fields;	  secondly	  that	  it	  is	  essential	  
to	   develop	  mathematical	   formalisms	   derived	   specifically	   from	   and	   for	   the	   fields	   in	   which	   complexity	  
reigns.	  If	  we	  adopt	  these	  overarching	  principles	  of	  scientific	  innovation	  we	  will	  have	  new	  tools	  to	  apply	  to	  
the	  methodological	  challenges	  in	  biology	  and	  complex	  systems	  generally.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  Notably,	  an	  earlier	  EC	  expert	  consultation	  has	  reported:	  “…	  that	   the	  number	  of	  digital	  systems	  and	  artifacts	   is	   increasingly	  
exponentially,	  such	  that	  we	  are	  approaching	  a	  point	  where	  digital	  entities	  have	  ceased	  to	  be	  just	  technical	  systems	  and	  have	  
become	  part	  of	  the	  socio-­‐technical	  fabric	  of	  society.	  This	  plethora	  of	  semi-­‐autonomous,	  ‘cyberphysical	  systems’	  –	  which	  all	  rely	  
on	   embedded	   ICT	   and	   are	   connected	   to	   the	   information	   ether	   –	  will	   constitute	   a	   new	   kind	  of	   physical	   intelligence…For	   our	  
societies	   to	   function	   effectively,	  we	  have	   to	   learn	   to	   identify	   and	   give	  meaning	   to	   interactions	  within	   these	   highly	   complex,	  
cooperative	   and	   dynamic	   systems.	   This	   poses	   severe	   challenges	   from	   both	   technological	   and	   societal	   perspectives.”	   FET	  
Consultation	  on	  Collective	  Adaptive	  Systems,	  November	  2009.	  
39	  “Semiosis	  and	  self-­‐organization	  are	  co-­‐extensional	  -­‐	  there	  are	  as	  many	  different	  basic	  types	  of	  semiotic	  processes	  as	  there	  
are	  basic	  types	  of	  systemic	  self-­‐organizing	  processes.”	  (Hofkirchner,	  2002)	  
40	  “Human	  language,	  culture,	  science,	  technology,	  systems	  of	  governance	  and	  economies	  are	  all	  examples	  of	  human	  symbolic	  
systems	   that	   propagate	   their	   organization.	   They	   occupy	   a	   special	   place	   in	   the	   biosphere.	   They	   are	   products	   of	   human	  
conceptual	   thought	   and	   represent	   emergent	   phenomena.	   They	   differ	   from	   the	   materially	   based	   information	   in	   biological	  
systems	  in	  that	  they	  are	  abstract	  and	  symbolic	  and	  not	  materially	  instantiated	  as	  such	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  technology.	  In	  the	  
case	   of	   technology	   it	   is	   the	   concepts	   and	   organization	   that	   goes	   into	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   physical	   tools	   that	   propagates.”	  





10.4	  Programmatic	  Advance	  in	  Theoretical	  Research	  	  
	  
While	   history	   is	   replete	   with	   stories	   grand	   and	   (sometimes)	   failed	   of	   intentional	   efforts	   to	   develop	  
technologies	  for	  extremely	  ambitious	  human	  undertakings	  (e.g.,	  the	  Manhattan	  Project,	  the	  Man	  on	  the	  
Moon	   Project,	   the	   (Japanese)	   Fifth	   Generation	   Computing	   Project,	   The	   Human	   Genome	   Project,	   The	  
Blue	  Brain	  Project,	  etc.)	  there	  is	  no	  history	  of	  programmatic	  advance	  in	  theoretical	  science,	  the	  essential	  
foundation	  for	  all	  scientific	  and	  technological	  advance.	   It	  took	  two	  thousand	  years	  for	  the	  world	  to	  be	  
persuaded	  of	   the	   importance	  of	   theory	   to	   the	   establishment	   of	   heliocentrism,	   but	   only	   four	   hundred	  
years	  more	   to	   await	   the	   discovery	   of	   the	   power	   of	   mathematical	   abstraction	   to	   advance	   theoretical	  
science.	   Perhaps	  within	   a	   generation	  we	  will	   extend	   our	   grasp	   of	   the	   dynamics	   of	   living	   systems	   and	  
their	   sister	   technologies.	   Let	   us	   assume	   that	   there	   may	   indeed	   be	   genius	   in	   our	   midst	   with	   the	  
imagination	  required	  to	  unlock	  this	  most	  complex	  of	  mysteries.	  How	  should	  we	  accelerate	  engagement	  
with	  this	  challenge	  among	  our	  best	  and	  brightest?	  
	  
We	  have	  no	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  but	  offer	  three	  considerations:	  	  
	  
1. The	  first	  is	  that	  the	  modern	  world	  is	  unique	  in	  history	  in	  that	  it	   is	  rapidly	  proliferating	  complex	  
technologies	   of	   production	   and	   intervention	  on	   a	   global	   scale	   and	   it	   does	   so	  without	   full	   and	  
responsible	   knowledge	   of	   the	   consequences	   of	   continued	   complexification	   of	   these	  
technologies;	  that	  is	  a	  risk	  no	  one	  has	  measured	  or	  considered;	  the	  need	  to	  understand	  is	  great;	  
never	  has	  the	  project	  of	  scientific	  advance	  worked	  under	  such	  conditions.	  	  
	  
2. The	  second	  consideration	  is	  that	  of	  the	  possibilities	  of	  the	  complexity	  sciences	  enabling	  a	  second	  
revolution	   in	   the	   re-­‐shaping	   of	   the	   world	   towards	   human	   needs,	   security	   and	   sustainability.	  
Advances	   in	   disease	   management,	   ecological	   stabilization,	   resource	   efficiencies,	   and	   social	  
justice	  are	  potential	  outcomes	  of	  greater	  understanding	  of	  basic	  life	  processes	  and	  the	  cultural	  
edifices	  and	  artifacts	  enabled	  by	  cumulative	  human	  creativity	  and	  collaboration.	  
	  
3. The	  third,	  and	  even	  more	  encouraging	  consideration,	  is	  that	  we	  have	  a	  much	  greater	  potential	  in	  
terms	  of	  human	  resources	  and	  its	  new-­‐found	  connectivity	  to	  bring	  to	  bear	  the	  human	  intellect	  
required	  to	  address	  the	  challenge	  –	  if	  we	  want;	  we	  lack	  only	  the	  institutional	  frameworks	  to	  do	  
it.	   The	   challenge	   is	   to	   invent	  and	  create	   the	  necessary	   institutional	   settings	   required	   to	   foster	  
specific	  methodologies	  for	  the	  advance	  of	  critical	  areas	  in	  science.	  	  
	  
INBIOSA	  suggests	  consideration	  of	  a	  conceptual	  model	  for	  such	  an	  institutional	  framework	  based	  on	  the	  
concept	  of	  emergent	  complex	  systems	  itself:	   in	  other	  words	  to	  mimic,	   in	  the	  larger	  world,	  the	  thought	  
processes	  and	   structures	   that	  enable	   the	  emergence	  of	  new	   ideas	   in	   the	  human	  mind.	   The	   list	   in	   the	  
next	   section	   is	   a	   reformulation	   of	   the	   previous	   table	   in	   section	   6.4	   listing	   potential	   fields	   of	   research	  
addressing	  complexity	  issues.	  The	  reformulation	  as	  a	  (tentative)	  hierarchy	  of	  theoretical	  orientation	  is	  a	  
first-­‐cut	   schematic	   for	   implementing	   the	   central	   scientific	   challenge	   of	   performing	   the	   necessary	  
convergent	  synthesis	  of	  theory	  underlying	  the	  complexity	  of	  living	  systems.	  The	  institutional	  challenge	  is	  





In	  other	  words,	  the	  co-­‐ordination	  –	  but	  not	  the	  control	  –	  of	  the	  many	  modules	  of	  thought	  that	  could,	  but	  
are	   not	   being	   brought	   together	   into	   a	   more	   coherent	   model	   of	   life	   itself.	   This	   would	   involve	   co-­‐
coordinating	  efforts	  through	  FET	  for	  academic	  and	  private	  interdisciplinary	  collaborators	  guided	  by	  the	  
principle	   of	   synthesis.	   Implementing	   such	   co-­‐ordination	   is	   the	   institutional	   challenge.	   The	   form	   of	  
structure	  and	  communication	  that	  would	  most	  benefit	  the	  process	  is	  not	  yet	  known.	  What	  is	  known	  is	  
that	   existing	   processes	   of	   collaboration	   and	   disciplinary	   integration	   and	   co-­‐ordination	   do	   not	   support	  
such	  synthesis	  and	  mathematical	  innovation.	  There	  is	  a	  great	  deal	  to	  explore	  ahead	  of	  us.	  	  
	  
Despite	   revealing	   more	   detail,	   natural	   sciences	   have	   not	   provided	   a	   complete	   theory	   of	   reality	   yet.	  
Modern	   culture	   and	   science	   constrain	   us	   (Pickering,	   2011).	   For	   instance,	   mind	   and	   intelligence	   have	  
been	   investigated	   in	   a	   very	   limited	   way	   in	   Artificial	   Intelligence,	   (Ray,	   2011).	   There	   are	   natural	  
phenomena	  such	  as	  sentience	  (Clarck,	  2000)	  and	  emotion	  (Damasio,	  2005)	  that	  do	  not	  have	  measurable	  
characteristics	  (quanta).	  The	  nature	  of	  Nature	  is	  its	  incompleteness,	  (Deacon,	  2011).	  Integral	  Biomathics	  
accepts	  that	  and	  tries	  to	  discover	  the	  missing	  links	  and	  fill	  the	  gaps	  by	  putting/developing	  mathematical	  
theory	  and	  computation	   into/	  out	  of	  biology.	  A	  part	  of	  the	  broad	  perspective	  that	   lies	   in	  the	  future	  of	  
Biocomputing	  and	  Integral	  Biomathics	  is	  shown	  in	  (Seaman	  &	  Rössler,	  2011)	  and	  (Josephson,	  2012).	  	  
	  
10.5	  A	  New	  Framework	  for	  Mathematics	  and	  Computation	  	  
	  
In	  what	  follows,	  we	  present	  a	  (non-­‐exhaustive)	  list	  of	  key	  themes	  for	  research	  in	  Integral	  Biomathics.	  It	  is	  
far	  from	  Hilbert’s	  famous	  list	  of	  challenging	  problems	  in	  mathematics	  (Hilbert,	  1902).	  We	  do	  not	  believe	  
in	  reviving	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  axiomatic	  system	  of	  science.	  We	  consider	  INBIOSA,	  as	  a	  developing	  project,	  a	  
permanent	   “building	   site”	  with	   concepts	   and	   ideas	   in	   permanent	  movement.	   "The	   future	   is	   easier	   to	  
predict	  with	   hindsight".	   	  So,	   this	   list	   should	   be	   considered	   to	   be	   a	   preliminary	   one.	  We	  will	   continue	  
working	  on	  it	  in	  a	  follow-­‐up	  project.	  
	  
The	  following	  two	  activity	  fields	  comprise	  our	  research	  framework.	  
	  
Living	  Systems	  Modeling	  
	  
• Develop	  new	  realistic	  mathematical	  models	  tailored	  for	   living	  systems,	  obtained	  by	  integration	  
and	   development	   of	   different	   domains	   of	   mathematics:	   	  algebraic	   topology	   and	   geometry,	  
cohomological	  algebra,	  functional	  analysis	  and	  differential	  equations,	  differential	  geometry	  and	  
fibred	  spaces,	  statistics	  and	  probability,	  different	  kinds	  of	  logic,	  and	  so	  on.	  
	  
• Develop	   new	   simulation,	   visualization	   and	   creativity	   support	   techniques	   and	   tools	   for	   these	  
novel	  mathematical	  models	  of	  the	  living.	  	  
	  
Steps	  towards	  a	  “New	  Integral	  Science”	  	  
	  
The	   essence	   of	   typical	   questions	   to	   be	   addressed	   is	   how	   to	   take	   account	   of	   the	   (possibly	   fuzzy)	  






• Design	   an	   original	   general	   system	   of	   abstractions	   within	   the	   biological	   domain	   that	   can	   be	  
relationally	  examined.	   It	   should	   support	  multiple	   complementary	  mathematical	  approaches	   to	  
phenomena	  that	  can	  be	  brought	  into	  dialogical	  juxtaposition.	  
	  
• Define	   ways	   of	   identifying	   the	   biological	   properties	   that	   are	   as	   unique	   to	   such	   complex	  
conglomerations	  as	  ‘temperature’	  is	  to	  a	  set	  of	  molecules,	  or	  the	  'flexible	  redundancy'	  property	  
ubiquitous	  in	  biological	  systems,	  called	  degeneracy	  or	  multiplicity.	  What	  we	  seek	  to	  articulate	  is	  
an	  evolutionary	  mathematics	  that	  deals	  with	  the	  emergence	  of	  organization	  from	  non-­‐random	  
selection	  among	  replicating	  variations	  within	  complex	  populations	  of	  processes.	  	  
	  
We	  are	  looking	  here	  not	  only	  for	  space-­‐time	  scale	  invariant	  properties	  of	   living	  organisms,	  but	  also	  for	  
cardinal	  properties	   that	  may	  differ	  across	  the	  space-­‐time	  scales,	  which	  are	  still	   inherently	  “biological”.	  	  
Our	  view	  of	  emergence	  includes	  both	  the	  emergence	  of	  more	  complex	  objects	  as	  aggregates	  of	  patterns	  
of	   interacting	   lower	   level	   objects,	   and	   the	   emergence	   of	   complex	   interactions	   between	   them,	   which	  
emerge	  at	  the	  higher	  level	  from	  the	  global	  structure	  of	  the	  lower	  levels	  but	  cannot	  be	  locally	  observable	  
via	  lower	  level	  components.	  Also	  we	  understand	  emergence	  as	  a	  product	  of	  a	  system	  functioning	  over	  
time	  falling	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  unfolding	  of	  its	  larger	  environment.	  
	  
10.5.1	  Approach:	  Constructivist	  Innovative	  Mathematical	  Cross-­‐Disciplinary	  Models	  	  
	  
The	  main	  activities	  that	  need	  to	  be	  addressed	  here	  are:	  
	  
• Develop	  dynamic	  models	  of	  biochemical	  and	  biophysical	  systems	  accounting	  for	  multiple	  scales	  
and	   time	   frames	   as	   they	   relate	   to	   new	   forms	   of	   dynamic	   modeling	   and	   physical	  
mapping/scanning	  systems.	  Analyze	  how	  scales	  themselves	  can	  be	  of	  emergent	  character.	  	  
	  
• Develop	   convergent	   theoretical	   syntheses	   of	   adequate	   mathematical	   concepts	   and	   methods,	  
bringing	  them	  into	  dynamic	  relation	  with	  each	  other.	  	  Such	  a	  relational	  mathematics	  is	  expected	  
to	  model	  both	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  system	  in	  a	  local	  neighborhood	  with	  its	  specific	  temporality,	  
and	  at	  the	  global	   level	  of	  the	  system	  emerging	  from	  the	  possibly	  conflicting	  relations	  between	  
these	   local	  dynamics,	   through	  a	  kind	  of	  communication	  and	  negotiation	  between	  near	  and	  far	  
neighborhoods.	   
 
• Construct	  models	  of	  "hybrid"	  systems	  presenting	  a	  combination/juxtaposition	  of	  continuous	  as	  
well	  as	  discrete	  time	  changes	  accounting	  for	  their	  relational,	  statistical	  and	  geometrical	  aspects	  
as	  well.	   To	   analyze	   biological	   problems,	   the	  mathematical	   challenge	   is	   how	   to	   combine	   these	  
different	  domains,	  which	  are	  generally	  studied	  separately	  in	  orthodox	  mathematics.	  
	  
As	   Category	   Theory	   unifies	   many	   mathematical	   domains	   and	   is	   also	   at	   the	   frontier	   with	   logic	   and	  
computer	  science,	  it	  should	  be	  used	  in	  models	  formally	  describing	  natural	  phenomena,	  as	  well	  as	  more	  
orthodox	   domains	   such	   as	   partial	   differential	   equations	   and	   chaos	   theory,	   topology	   and	   cohomology,	  





Category	   Theory	   should	   itself	   be	   enriched	   and	  made	  more	   flexible	   by	   addition	   of	  more	   structure,	   for	  
instance	   by	   introducing	   statistical	   categories.	   Categorical	   models	   are	   well	   equipped	   to	   analyze	   the	  
problem	  of	  emergence,	  going	  further	  than	  Rosen's	  notion	  of	  entailment,	  up	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  higher	  
cognitive	   processes,	   perhaps	   allowing	   the	   incorporation	   of	   first	   person	   approaches	   (Topological	  
Psychology).	  They	  can	  also	  provide	  multiple	  perspectives	  related	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  "class	  identity"	  and	  
material	  space/time	  flow.	  	  
	  
The	  working	  “algorithm”	  to	  realize	  this	  approach	  might	  be	  defined	  as	  follows:	  	  
	  
1. Investigate	  phenomena	  in	  living	  systems	  by	  trying	  to	  describe	  them	  using	  the	  above	  (integrated)	  
formal	  toolset	  to	  deliver	  an	  evolving	  model.	  	  
	  
2. At	   the	   point	  where	   the	  model	   does	   not	  match	   the	   experimental	   results,	   develop	   new	   formal	  
means	  to	  reflect	  and	  explain	  these	  peculiarities,	  thus	  advancing	  the	  model	  to	  a	  next	  stage.	  
	  
3. Focus	  on	  both	  objects	  and	  processes	  and	  on	  their	  interactions.	  
	  
This	  method	  should	  not	  be	  understood	  as	  strictly	  formal.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  “match”	  with	  experimental	  
results	  could	  be	  verified	  by	  means	  of	  computer	  programs,	  or	  only	  require	  pencil	  and	  paper.	  On	  the	  other	  
hand,	   there	   are	   also	   negative	   mathematical	   proofs	   (limitation	   results),	   e.g.	   by	   logical	   deduction,	  
predicate	  calculus,	  or	  even	  gedanken-­‐experiments	  involving	  visualization	  tools	  (geometry,	  animation).	  	  
	  
10.5.2	  Focus	  and	  Implementation:	  Integral	  Biomathics	  	  
	  
Integral	   Biomathics	   (Simeonov,	   2010a/b)	   is	   a	   cross-­‐disciplinary	  meta-­‐theory,	   involving	   both	   internalist	  
and	   externalist	   mathematical	   biology	   and	   biological	   mathematics	   based	   on	   advanced	   mathematics	  
formalisms,	   such	   as	   e.g.	   the	   Memory	   Evolutive	   Systems	   (Ehresmann	   &	   Vanbremeersch,	   2007),	   an	  
evolutionary	   dynamic	   category	   theory	   aimed	   at	   integrating	   (halting)	  41	  oracle	  machines	   (Turing,	   1939)	  
and	  other	  related	  mathematical	  and	  computational	  theories	  and	  abstractions,	  as	  well	  as	  heuristics	  and	  a	  
broad	  range	  of	  simulation,	  visualization	  and	  other	  creative	  support	  techniques	  capable	  of	  dealing	  with	  
phenomena	   and	   data	   that	   cannot	   be	   handled	   by	   formalisms	   alone.	   It	   allows	   interrogation	  
marks/interfaces	  between	  its	  constituents	  and	  builds	  bridges	  to	  other	  disciplines.	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  The	  halting	  problem	  is	  indeed	  among	  the	  most	  famous	  ones	  in	  computer	  science.	  The	  question	  here	  is:	  	  should	  we	  restrict	  
ourselves	  to	  halting	  oracles	  only?	  Indeed,	  any	  meta-­‐heuristics	  that	  lies	  outside	  an	  (object-­‐level)	  theory	  is	  an	  oracle	  with	  respect	  
to	   the	   object-­‐level.	   For	   instance,	   an	   agent	   (natural	   or	   artificial)	   that	   decides	   to	   include	   group	   theory	   as	   a	   means	   to	   tackle	  
quantum	   mechanics	   takes	   an	   “oracle”-­‐like	   decision	   with	   respect	   to	   both	   (object-­‐level)	   group	   theory	   and	   QM.	   The	  
questions/goals	  that	  arise	  then	  are:	   (i)	  how	  to	  model	  such	  an	  agent	   for	  biology?;	  and	  (ii)	  can	  we	   later	  devise	  a	  more	  general	  
theory	   that	   would	   substitute	   the	   oracle	   and	   where	   the	   decision	   would	   naturally	   fall	  within	   the	   theory?	   So,	   we	   pursue	   the	  
replacement	  of	  oracles	  in	  general,	  but	  as	  a	  short	  and	  middle	  term	  goal	  we	  have	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  halting	  problem.	  Therefore,	  we	  





The	   operative	   framework	   of	   Integral	   Biomathics	   is	   defined	   as	   a	   multi-­‐perspective	   approach	   to	  
knowledge	   production:	   observation	   of	   new	   phenomena	   /	   incorporation	   of	   new	   forms	   of	   entailment-­‐
generating-­‐technology	   (e.g.	   scanning	   methodologies)	   as	   well	   as	   modeling	   approaches	  à	   articulate	  
convergent	  theoretical	  synthesis	  across	  divergent	  fields	  à	   integrate	  multiple	  mathematical	  formalisms	  
under	   one	   relational	   umbrella	  à	  develop	   integrated	  mathematical	  models	   accounting	   for	  multi-­‐scale	  
structures	  and	  multi-­‐temporal	  dynamics	  à	  study	  the	  dynamic	  relation	  between	  emergent	  phenomena	  
and	   predictive	   phenomena	  à	   justify	   initial	   theoretical	   approaches	   via	   computational	   modeling	  à	  	  
develop	   empirical	   demonstration	   and	   verification	  à	   articulate	   a	   falsifiable	   theoretical	   foundation	   for	  
practical	  applications.	  	  
	  
This	  gives	  us	  a	  panoramic	  view	  of	  the	  system	  with	  all	  its	  structures,	  dynamics	  and	  functionality:	  
	  
• Enable	   the	   use	   of	   information	   from	   different	   areas	   of	   discourse	   to	   examine	   how	   low	   level	  
processes	   “percolate	   up”	   and	   relate	   to	   higher	   levels,	   and	   how	   human	   scale	   behavioural	  
processes	  may	  enable	  first	  and	  third	  person	  comparative	  relations. 	  
• Define	  concrete	  approaches	  to	  discrete	  computational	  methodologies	   (functioning	  at	  different	  
scales)	   to	   capture	   change	   over	   time	   from	   a	   series	   of	   different	   multi-­‐modal	   observational	  
perspectives.	  Define	  systems	  that	  can	  also	  present	  coherent	  integrated	  high-­‐level	  processes	  that	  
relate	   to	   the	   lower	   level	   processes.	   This	   is	   about	   the	   integration	  of	   the	   computational	   aspect	  
and	  its	  material	  underpinning.	  
	  
A	  first	  step	  towards	  realizing	  this	  goal	   is	  a	  follow-­‐up	  project	  of	  the	  INBIOSA	  initiative	  that	  will	  devise	  a	  
research	   framework	   combining	   object-­‐level	   mechanisms	   with	   Turing	   oracles42	  (Chaitin,	   2011).	   This	   is	  
going	   to	   be	   a	   step	   stone	   towards	   a	   “unified	   theory”	   of	   living	   systems,	   both	   “natural”	   and	   “artificial”	  
ones.	  Therefore,	  our	   longer-­‐range	  objective	  will	  be	  to	  step-­‐wise	  replace	  the	  oracles	  by	  a	  more	  general	  
theory	   of	   life.	   The	   question	   is	   how	   to	   proceed	   from	   here?	   Scientific	   approaches	   are	   often	   guided	   by	  
heuristics.	  It	  applies	  to	  any	  organism.	  	  
	  
We	  distinguish	  between	  4	  classes	  of	  heuristics:	  
	  
1. The	  meta-­‐heuristics	  unique	  to	  a	  mathematician	  is	  anthropocentric.	  
2. Heuristics	  in	  foresight	  is	  a	  risk-­‐taking	  endeavor	  (no	  analogue	  in	  the	  Platonic	  world).	  
3. Heuristics	  in	  hindsight	  is	  a	  success	  story.	  	  
4. Evolution	  and	  development	  are	  about	  heuristics	  in	  the	  making.	  
	  
The	  second	  option	  is	  not	  amenable	  to	  formalization.	  The	  fourth	  option	  reflects	  what	  happens	  in	  Nature.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 	  We	   have	   to	   take	   oracles	   into	   account,	   because	   they	   are	   characteristic	   for	   biological	   phenomena.	   For	   instance,	   the	  
evolutionary	   transition	   from	   dinosaurs	   to	   mammals	   can	   be	   modeled	   by	   halting	   oracles,	   although	   they	   do	   not	   entail	   local	  
changes	   in	  the	  probability	  of	  histories.	  A	  reference	  paper	  about	  the	  role	  that	  oracles	  play	   in	  problem	  solving	   in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  





Evolution	  is	  just	  unplanned	  change43.	  Development,	  however,	  from	  the	  computational	  point	  of	  view,	  is	  a	  
'scripted	   change',	   with	   preservation	   of	   the	   results	   of	   the	   changes44.	  While	   evolutionary	   computation	  
(Fogel,	  1966)	  and	  genetic	  algorithms	  (Holland,	  1975)	  are	  well	  known	  in	  AI	  and	  system	  design	  engineering	  
today,	   development	   is	   also	   a	   promising	  model	   for	   computation,	   which	   is	   closer	   to	   the	   third	   class	   of	  
heuristics.	  
	  
What	   remains	   are	   only	   two	   opposite	   options/postulates,	   one	   and	   three,	   to	   choose	   from	   and	   one	  
corollary:	  
1. In	  Nature,	  meta-­‐level	  heuristics	  (i.e.	  mathematical	  heuristics	  of	  the	  first	  class)	  do	  co-­‐exist	  with,	  
and	  are	  distinct	  from,	  mechanisms.	  This	  brings	  the	  following	  questions:	  
• how	  different	  are/what	  distinguishes	  the	  heuristics	  from	  the	  mechanisms?	  
• what	  kind	  of	  (“Maxwell	  daemon”-­‐	  like)	  intelligent	  agents	  are	  carrying-­‐out	  the	  heuristics?	  
2. The	  meta-­‐level	  heuristics	  and	  mechanisms	  are	   in	  fact	  one	  (i.e.	  heuristics	   in	  hindsight	  of	  the	  3rd	  
class).	  Their	  distinction	  is	  circumstantial	  (e.g.	  with	  reference	  to	  a	  given	  problem	  to	  solve	  or	  to	  a	  
given	  perspective).	  Within	  the	  frame	  of	   this	  postulate,	  Nature	  and	   its	  Platonic	  counterpart	  are	  
inherently	   self-­‐referential.	   If	   this	   is	   the	  case	   then,	  objects,	   structures	  and	  operators	   related	   to	  
self-­‐reference	  should	  be	  a	  central	  part	  of	  the	  “unified	  theory”.	  
3. Corollary	  to	  postulate	  (2):	  life	  is	  characterized	  by	  both	  artificial	  and	  natural	  objects.	  
	  
We	  believe	  that	  these	  questions	  and	  the	  attempts	  to	  answer	  them	  are	  the	  core	   issues	  that	  radically	  
distinguish	   the	   INBIOSA	  quest	   from	  Systems	  Biology,	  and	  from	  the	  EC	  FP7	  Flagship	  proposals	  Human	  
Brain	  Project	  (HBP)	  and	  Virtual	  Human	  Project	  (VPH).	  	  	  
Systems	   Biology	   and	   its	   cousin	   Bioinformatics	   are	   centered	   on	   multi-­‐scale	   biological	   processes	   and	  
making	  sense	  out	  of	  huge	  amounts	  of	  biological	  data	  respectively.	  	  These	  research	  programs	  are	  physics-­‐
based	  and	  data-­‐driven.	  Our	  approach	  is	  mathematics-­‐based	  and	  biology-­‐driven.	  Further,	  we	  are	  dealing	  
with	   life	   that	   includes	   artificial	   artifacts	   with	   self-­‐reference	   (i.e.	   first	   person	   vs.	   third	   person)	   as	   key	  
issues,	  the	  development	  of	  self*	  software	  is	  the	  high-­‐yield	  intellectual,	  practical	  and	  economical	  reward	  
of	  this	  high-­‐risk	  program.	  Following	  results	  stemming	  from	  Systems	  Biology,	  AI	  researchers	  may	  want	  to	  
extrapolate	  and	  use	  the	   life-­‐metaphor	  to	  build	  systems	  capable	  of	  general	   intelligence	  and	  autonomy.	  
But	  General	  AI	   in	   itself	   is	  not	  the	  concern	  of	  Systems	  Biology.	  INBIOSA	  addresses	   life	   in	  general	   (both	  
natural	  and	  artificial).	  Our	  program	  treats	  both	  subjects	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  Systems	  Biology	  and	  other	  
related	  disciplines	  (Biological	  Computation,	  Computational	  Biology,	  etc.)	  address	  specific	  problems	  in	  
biology,	  which	  are	  of	  considerable	  practical	  interest,	  but	  are	  not	  fundamental	  biology	  problems	  in	  the	  
sense	   defined	   by	   the	   INBIOSA	   project45.	   The	   same	   holds	   for	   the	   recent	   efforts	   to	   apply	   Quantum	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Any	  random	  generator,	  either	  alone	  or	  with	  chaotic	  structure	  guidance,	  will	  deliver	  evolutionary	  output,	  if	  the	  results	  are	  
preserved.	  The	  results	  of	  the	  changes	  would	  be	  preserved,	  and	  further	  changes	  would	  be	  built	  upon	  these.	  No	  pattern	  would	  be	  
expected	  to	  accrue. 
44 Most	   generally,	   aside	   from	   whatever	   script	   might	   be	   involved,	   changes	   would	   at	   first	   be	   large	   and	   happening	   rapidly,	  
gradually	   slowing	   down	  with	   smaller	   and	   smaller	   changes	   resulting.	   	   The	   changes	  would	   all	   in	   effect	   be	   refinements	   of	   the	  
results	  of	  the	  original	  changes.	  The	  result	  is	  a	  gradually	  stabilizing	  form,	  (Salthe,	  1993). 
45	  Recently,	   some	  authors	   began	   speaking	  of	   "integrative"	   systems	  biology	   realizing	   that	   orthodox	   systems	  biology	  does	  not	  





Physics	   for	   explaining	   biological	   phenomena	   in	   the	   same	   style	   as	   for	   the	   emergence	   of	   classicality	  
from	  the	  quantum.	  Each	  one	  of	  them	  is	  based	  on	  a	  certain	  interpretation	  of	  QM	  taken	  as	  a	  base,	  but	  
not	   on	   a	   systematic	   review	   and	   analysis	   of	   the	   appropriate	   theoretical	   models	   (and	   perhaps	   the	  
creation	  of	  new	  ones)	  from	  the	  viewpoint	  of	  biology.	  	  	  
The	  INBIOSA	  focus	  is	  on	  looking	  for	  new	  ideas.	  In	  particular,	  contemporary	  biology	  and	  physics	  do	  not	  
address	  the	  following	  questions/goals:	  	  	  
1. Are	   the	   currently	   existing	   scientific/mathematical/computational	   theories	  sufficient,	   such	   that	  
meta-­‐level	  Turing	  oracles	  could	  be	  replaced	  by	  models	  within	  these	  existing	  theories,	  and	  given	  
that	  we	  have	  more	  data	  available?	  
2. Are	  the	  current	  theories	   insufficient	   in	  the	  sense	  that	  no	  amount	  of	  additional	  data	  is	  going	  to	  
replace	  some	  of	  the	  oracles	  in	  our	  models?	  
3. Can	   we	   postulate/conjecture	   that	   even	   if	   (2)	   holds,	  a	   theory	   (or	   a	   set	   of	   compatible	   and/or	  
complementary	   theories)	   able	   to	   replace	   oracles	   by	   models	   can	   be	   conceived/unveiled?	   	  In	  
other	  words,	  can	  we	  imply	  that	  decision	  making	  and	  judgments	  lie	  within	  the	  theory?	  
4. What	  is	  missing	  on	  the	  way	  to	  creating	  a	  Unified	  Theory	  of	  Life	  and	  Consciousness?	  
5. How	  to	  create	  a	  “Tree	  of	  Life”	   (or	  perhaps	  a	  universe	  of	  multiple	  and	  simultaneous	  worlds),	  a	  
living	  ontology	  of	   facts,	  axioms,	  propositions	  and	  theories,	   in	  biology,	  physics	  and	  science	  as	  a	  
whole	  guiding	  the	  evolution	  of	  science?	  	  
6. Can	   biology	   be	   associated	  with	   the	   emergence	   of	   decoherence	   in	   quantum	  mechanics?	   How	  
could	  the	  Turing’s	  oracles	  be	  naturalized	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  quantum	  physics?	  
Integral	   Biomathics	   can	   be	   regarded	   as	   a	   new	   branch	   of	   Theoretical	   Biology.	   If	   the	   intended	  
Theoretical	   Biology	   has	   an	   empirical	   relevance	   as	   it	   should	   do,	   it	   must	   be	   also	   anchored	   on	   solid	  
material	  or	  physical	  grounds.	  Therefore,	  we	  aim	  to	  devise	  a	  research	  program	  on	  a	  global	  scale	   in	  a	  
follow-­‐up	  project	  with	  the	  following	  foci:	  
1. development	  of	  a	  theoretical	  and	  computational	  framework	  that	  incorporates	  both	  oracles	  and	  
mechanisms	  whereby	  real-­‐life	  complexity	  can	  be	  captured	  to	  an	  extent	  that	  other	  contemporary	  
approaches	  (e.g.	  systems	  biology)	  do	  not;	  
2. stepwise	   elimination	   of	   oracles	   by	   the	   generalizing	   the	   theory	   (or	   theories)	   underlying	   the	  
framework;	   i.e.	  the	  oracles	  will	  gradually	  be	  replaced	  by	  statements/models	  that	  lie	  within	  the	  
mathematical	  and	  computational	  theories	  being	  generalized;	  
3. clear	  definition	  of	  milestones	  that	  include	  the	  following:	  
a. conceptualization	  and	  elaboration	  of	   the	  computational	   framework	   that	   includes,	  but	  also	  
separates	  meta-­‐level	  oracles	  from	  mechanisms;	  
b. construction	  of	  experimental	  and	  validation	  protocols	  to	  verify	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  oracles	  
(or	  classes	  thereof)	  and	  their	  interactions	  with	  the	  modeled	  mechanisms;	  
c. search	  of	  statements/models	  within	  existing	  theories	  that	  will	  eventually	  replace	  a	  subset	  (if	  
not	  all)	  of	  the	  oracles;	  
d. discover/unveil	  new/neglected	  theories	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  obtain	  a	  single	  “unified	  theory”.	  	  







Life	  and	  mind	  have	  escaped	  all	  effective	  complete	   theories	  up	   to	   this	  moment.	  Therefore,	  we	   require	  
that	   Integral	   Biomathics	   be	   an	   incomplete	   theoretical	   and	   computational	   framework.	   It	   uses	   oracle	  
machines,	  but	  it	  remains	  always	  incomplete	  and	  extendible.	  Our	  goal	  is	  to	  replace	  oracles	  by	  statements	  
within	  the	  sub-­‐theories	  being	  developed,	  but	  we	  cannot	  keep	  the	  promise	  that	  all	  oracles	  in	  their	  overall	  
arithmetical	   hierarchy	   will	   be	   systematically	   eliminated	   for	   the	   simple	   reason	   that	   each	  
solution/replacement	  generates	  a	  new	  more	  powerful	  (halting)	  oracle	  at	  the	  next	  stage,	  which	  defines	  a	  
harder	  (halting)	  problem.	  This	  is	  how	  life,	  mind	  and	  science	  evolve.	  Oracle	  machines	  are	  usually	  thought	  
of	   as	   infinite	   information	   objects	   supposed	   to	   make	   theories	   complete,	   but	   paradoxically	   even	   this	  
infinite	   information	   cannot	   usually	   lead	   to	   completeness,	   (Marchal,	   1992).	  Without	   (halting)	   oracles,	  
theories	   can	   only	   be	   "more	   incomplete".	  With	   (halting)	   oracles	  we	  obtain	   a	   research	   program	  hyper-­‐
computer	  or	  super-­‐Turing	  machine	  (Siegelmann,	  1995).	  	  
	  
Current	   theories	   about	   life,	   such	   as	   systems	   biology	   and	   related	   computational	   frameworks	  
(Wolfram’s	   Science,	   DNA/cellular	   computing,	   etc.),	   do	   not	   use	   oracle	   machines	   to	   model	   living	  
systems	   in	   their	   full	   complexity.	  By	   involving	  oracles	   in	  our	   Integral	  Biomathics	   research	   framework	  
we	  create	  a	  methodology,	  which	  leads	  us	  stepwise	  closer	  to	  reality.	  	  
	  
We	   have	   recognized	   that	   quantum	   mechanics	   is	   now	   entering	   the	   second	   revolutionary	   stage	  
particularly	   from	  the	  perspective	  of	  practicing	  biology.	  That	   is	   the	   resurrection	  of	   the	   time-­‐honored	  
issue	  of	  causality	  under	  a	  rejuvenated	  guise.	  The	  act	  of	  measurement	  comes	  to	  be	  internalized	  within	  
quantum	  mechanics.	   In	  essence,	  our	  main	  focus	  will	  be	   in	  how	  to	   implement	  the	  role	  of	  the	  oracles	  
within	  the	  proper	  framework	  of	  quantum	  mechanics.	  
	  
10.5.3	  Summary	  and	  Prospects	  
	  
Every	   level	  of	  a	   living	   system	   is	  partially	  enclosed	  and	  partially	   in	   communication	  with	   its	  neighboring	  
scales,	   and	   the	   entire	   system	   forms	   a	   ‘self-­‐correlating’	   whole	   of	   partially	   autonomous	   scaled	   ‘sub-­‐
systems’,	   each	   with	   its	   logic	   and	   temporality.	   The	   global	   logic	   and	   dynamic	   is	   modulated	   by	   their	  
cooperative	   or	   conflicting	   interactions.	   Scales	   of	   time	   and	   space	   emerge	   through	   this	   sort	   of	  
communication.	  This	  is	  the	  real	  strength	  of	  the	  Integral	  Biomathics	  approach.	  The	  problem	  with	  both	  
systems	   biology	   and	   molecular	   genetics	   is	   that	   they	   make	   use	   of	   standard	   reductionist	   approaches	  
which	  visualise	  organisms	  as	  machines46.	   There	  are	  aspects	  of	   living	   systems	   that	   can	  be	  described	   in	  
this	  way,	  and	  so	  we	  are	  trying	  to	  pass	  beyond	  this	  into	  uncharted	  territory.	  Biology	  is	  not	  simply	  about	  
such	  automata.	  
	  	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





There	  are	  a	  few	  options	  related	  to	  mathematical	  and/vs.	  computational	  approaches:	  	  
	  
1. extending	  an	  existing	  scientific	  theory	  that	  is	  mathematized,	  such	  as	  QM,	  GR,	  String	  Theory,	  etc.	  
to	  life;	  
	  
2. using	   new	   mathematical	   specialties/tools	   independent	   of,	   although	   applied	   by,	   science;	   new	  
advances	  within	  known	  mathematical	  domains	  or	  entirely	  new	  subdomains;	  
	  
3. developing	   a	   scientific	   theory	   of	   life	   that	   is	   mathematized	   and	   supported	   by	   computation	  
(barring	  the	  non-­‐computable	  parts);	  
	  
4. developing	  new	  mathematical	  specialties/tools	  independent	  of,	  although	  applied	  by,	  science	  and	  
supported	  by	  computation	  (barring	  the	  non-­‐computable	  parts);	  
	  
5. developing	  a	  new	  theory	  in	  computer	  science;	  
	  
6. making	   a	   radical	   computational	   shift	   but	   without	   either	   a	   new	   scientific	   theory	   or	   new	  
mathematics	   (e.g.	   Wolfram’s	   Science	   (Wolfram,	   2002),	   quantum	   computing,	   DNA/cellular	  
computing,	  etc.);	  
	  
7. all	  of	  the	  above?	  
	  
We	  actually	   vote	   for	   the	   last	  option	  and	  wish	   to	  go	  even	  beyond	   it,	   assuming	  also	  other	  options,	  not	  
listed	   above	   and	   reaching	   far	   into	   the	   fields	   of	   the	   arts	   and	   humanities.	   These	   are	   the	   new	   concepts	  
related	   to	  mathematics	   and	   computation	  we	  often	  use	   interchangeably	   throughout	   this	  White	  Paper,	  
demonstrating	  the	  true	  essence	  of	  the	  adjective	  Integral	  before	  Biomathics.	  
	  
The	  following	  actions	  are	  expected	  to	  take	  place	  on	  the	  way	  to	  realizing	  this	  goal.	  
	  
Action	  1	  
Define	  a	  mathematical	  ecology	  that	  can	  bring	  the	  following	  dynamic	  processes	  in	  relation	  to:	  
a. autopoiesis	  (self-­‐construction)	  and	  self-­‐organization	  of	  biological	  systems;	  
b. emergence	  of	  modules	  of	  hierarchy	  [and	  potential	  dynamic	  heterarchies/bifurcations]	  in	  all	  
complex	  systems;	  	  
c. variation	  of	  communication	  modalities	  within/between	  multiple	  hierarchical	   levels	   in	   living	  
systems;	  
d. transformations	  of	   information	  processes	   from	   scalar	   to	   vector/tensor	  quantities	   and	   vice	  
versa	  (see	  discussion	  in	  section	  4:	  the	  fourth	  major	  problem)	  ;	  
e. integration	   of	   mathematical	   approaches	   that	   can	   link	   discrete,	   continuous,	   fuzzy/vague,	  
probabilistic	  	  and	  geometrical	  information	  simultaneously;	  and	  
f. formal	  treatment	  of	  heuristics47,	  e.g.	  (Chaitin,	  2011).	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1. Define	  an	  n-­‐dimensional	  visualization	  that	  runs	  in	  dynamic	  parallel	  form.	  
2. Articulate	  relational	  definitions	  of	  biological	  functions	  and	  their	  boundary	  conditions.	  
3. Articulate	  a	  set	  of	  theories	  that	  cross	  boundaries	  between	  traditionally	  distinct	  domains:	  
a. time	  scales,	  spatial	  scales,	  adjacencies/material	  proximities:	  related	  to	  neighborhoods;	  
b. new	  mathematical	  analysis	  of	  emergence;	  
c. mathematics	  of	  vague/fuzzy	  spatial-­‐temporal	  boundaries;	  
d. contextual	  boundaries:	  boundaries	  between	  processes	  functioning	  at	  different	  scales	  of	  
time	   and	   space;	   boundaries	   that	   describe	   the	   relationship	   between,	   and	   nature	   of	  
fragmentation	  of,	  the	  entities	  they	  separate;	  
e. subject	  ßà	   object	   relation;	   this	   is	   about	   first	   vs.	   third	   person	   issues:	   how	   they	   are	  
separate,	  yet	  also	  unified.	  
4. Define	  form	  and	  function	  —	  model	  the	  following	  form-­‐function	  interactions:	  
a. exploring	   mathematical	   viability	   for	   biology	   and	   biological	   process	   suitability	   for	  
mathematics;	  
b. developing	  of	  new	  biology-­‐driven	  mathematical	  branches;	  
c. maturing	   Integral	   Biomathics:	   integration	   of	  mathematical	   theories	   under	   a	   common	  
umbrella	  for	  biology-­‐driven	  mathematics	  and	  computation	  which	  goes	  far	  beyond	  what	  
we	   know	   today	   as	   Computational	   Biology	   (Russe,	   2009)	   and	   Biological	   Computation	  
(Lamm	  &	  Unger,	  2011).	  
	  
The	  central	  questions	  to	  explore	  within	  this	  action	  plan	  for	  Integral	  Biomathics	  are:	  
	  
i) What	  is	  computation	  within	  the	  biological	  context?	  	  	  
	  
This	   question	   is	   about	   the	   relationship	  between	   the	  Church-­‐Turing	   thesis	   and	  Turing's	  
oracle	   machine.	   In	   short,	   the	   role	   of	   the	   (halting)	   oracle	   machine	   in	   the	   naturalized	  
empirical	  setting	  is	  first	  on	  the	  agenda	  of	  the	  INBIOSA	  initiative.	  
	  
ii) How	  useful	  is	  computation	  for	  living	  systems,	  where	  usefulness	  is	  considered	  from	  the	  viewpoint	  
of	  the	  entity	  performing	  the	  computation?	  
	  
This	   question	   is	   about	   the	   possibility	   for	   naturalizing	   the	   oracle	   machine.	   How?	   The	  
strength	  of	  INBIOSA	  is	  in	  raising	  such	  a	  question.	  	  
	  
iii) To	   what	   extent	   can	   a	   computation	   be	   carried	   out	   in	   an	   organism	   or	   an	   ecosystem	   with	   the	  
available	  resources?	  
	  
The	  computation	  cannot	  be	  separated	  from	  the	  matter	  of	  resource	  intake.	  This	  is	  
another	  strong	  point	  of	  INBIOSA.	  
	  
















This	   is	   all	   what	  we	  were	   able	   to	  write	  within	   this	   small	   and	   short	   project.	   If	   we	   had	  more	   time	   and	  
money,	   we	   could	   do	   better.	   We	   believe	   that	   if	   the	   decision	   makers	   in	   the	   EC	   follow	   our	  
recommendations	  on	  how	  we	  might	  better	  understand	  complexity,	  they	  would	  be	  better	  able	  to	  solve	  
some	  of	  the	  most	  urgent	  problems	  in	  future.	  
	  	  
We	   wish	   to	   thank	   all	   INBIOSA	   colleagues	   for	   the	   exciting	   discussions	   and	   valuable	   contributions	   and	  
comments	   during	   this	   project	   that	   led	   to	   this	  White	   Paper.	   The	  members	   of	   INBIOSA	   also	   gratefully	  
acknowledge	  the	  vision	  and	  support	  provided	  to	  this	  activity	  by	  the	  EC	  FET	  program	  and	  its	  staff.	  	  This	  
report	  does	  not	  address	  itself	  to	  the	  considerable	  resistance	  to	  the	  transformation	  of	  science	  created	  by	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Appendix:	  Answers	  to	  the	  INBIOSA	  Questionnaire	  
	  
In	  the	  following	  we	  provide	  a	  compilation	  of	  the	  answers	  of	  the	  INBIOSA	  members	  to	  the	  questionnaire	  
that	  was	  created	  and	  distributed	  by	  the	  coordinator,	  Dr.	  Simeonov,	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  project.	  Note	  
that	  not	  all	  questions	  were	  answered	  by	  all	  members;	  individual	  answers	  are	  separated	  by	  new	  lines.	  
	  
	  
PART	  I:	  GENERAL	  
	  
1:	   What	   global	   changes	   will	   occur	   in	   the	   next	   20-­‐50	   years	   with	   regards	   to	   human	   technology	  
needs?	  
	  
In	   M-­‐R	   (metabolism	   –	   repair)	   terms,	   our	   hominid	   species	   fascination	   and	   desire	   for	   more	  
powerful	   and	   situation	   specific	   tools	   will	   continue	   to	   increase	   its	   focus	   of	   investment	   in	   the	  
sciences	   and	   technologies	   that	   promise	   increase	   in	   individual	   health	   and	  wellbeing.	  We	   have	  
exceeded	   the	   comfortable	   long-­‐term	   carrying	   capacity	   of	   the	   earth	   by	   about	   an	   order	   of	  
magnitude.	  	  The	  most	  urgent	  need	  is	  to	  find	  a	  way	  of	  reducing	  the	  human	  population.	  
	  
Human	   technology	  needs	   fossil	   energy	  extraction.	   The	   reason	   is	  possible	   climate	   change.	   Two	  
factors	  need	  to	  be	  considered:	  unusual	  solar	  activity	  and	  radiation	  contamination.	  
	  
Summary:	   We	   need	   to	   increase	   the	   individual	   health	   and	   wellbeing,	   to	   reduce	   the	   human	  
population,	  to	  fossil	  energy	  extraction	  and	  climate	  change.	  
	  
	  
a.	  Which	  positive	  outcomes	  can	  be	  brought	  about	  by	  the	  use	  of	  technology?	  
	  
Sustainable	   energy	   production.	   Bio-­‐technology.	   We	   can	   live	   healthier	   and	   longer.	  
However,	   any	   such	   analysis	   must	   include	   an	   equally	   serious	   discussion	   of	   negative	  
outcomes.	   It	  will	   be	  positive	   if	  we	  used	   it	   positively.	   It	  will	   be	  destructive	   if	  we	  use	   it	  
negatively.	  Practical	  use	  will	  be	  the	  mix	  of	  both	  uses.	  We	  can	  improve	  efficiency	  by	  use	  
of	  technology,	  which	  will	  not	  address	  the	  core	  problem.	  
	  
Under	  the	  condition	  that	  there	  is	  plenty	  of	  clean	  and	  inexpensive	  energy,	  many	  existing	  
environments	   which	   are	   degraded	   and	   polluted	   could	   be	   restored	   and	   improved	   in	  
order	  to	  higher	  the	  quality	  of	  life	  for	  people	  globally.	  
	  
Summary:	   We	   can	   achieve	   higher	   quality	   of	   the	   life	   for	   people	   globally,	   greener	  









b.	  What	  are	  the	  really	  hard	  problems?	  	  
	  
The	  competition	  between	  opposing	  interests.	  
	  
Currently	  we	  have	  a	  monocausal	  explanation	  of	  the	  world.	  
	  
We	  don’t	  know	  how	  the	  human	  body	  and	  mind	  work.	  
	  
Our	  hardest	  real	  problems	  today	  are	  environmental	  ones.	  What	  can	  be	  expected	  is	  that	  
energy	  needs	  will	   continue	   to	   grow	   in	   spite	   of	   energy	   saving	   efforts.	  We	  do	  not	   have	  
clean	  and	  safe	  energy.	  If	  robotic	  and	  nano-­‐technology	  fulfill	  their	  promise	  we	  will	  need	  
even	   more	   energy	   –	   both	   for	   production	   and	   for	   re-­‐cycling	   of	   things,	   taking	   care	   of	  
pollution,	  environmental	  restoration	  and	  similar.	   If	  cheap	  and	  clean	  energy	   is	  available	  
then	  all	  the	  rest	  of	  technology	  is	  possible	  and	  their	  use	  justified.	  So	  the	  basic	  thing	  is	  to	  
find	  good	  energy	  sources.	  Besides	  hard	  problems	  of	  energy,	  right	  now	  we	  have	  several	  
scientific	   fields	   which	   seem	   to	   be	   on	   the	   edge	   of	   revolution.	   Physics	   seems	   to	   have	  
troubles	  in	  explaining	  of	  what	  is	  going	  on	  in	  the	  universe.	  Matter	  that	  we	  believed	  was	  
all	  the	  universe	  consists	  of	  turned	  to	  be	  just	  about	  4%.	  So	  something	  is	  very	  wrong	  and	  
that	  must	  be	  corrected.	  Possibly	  based	  on	  informational	  approach	  which	  could	  connect	  
physics	   with	   cognition	   and	   helps	   us	   better	   understand	   how	   actually	   knowledge	   is	  
produced	   (physics	   is	   knowledge)	   and	   on	   what	   grounds	   it	   is	   justified.	   Perhaps	   better	  
formalisms	   for	   physics	   can	   simplify	   biology	   as	   well.	   Complexity	   is	   yet	   another	  
hard-­‐problems	   field	   which	   hopefully	   might	   be	   simplified	   by	   more	   informationalist	  
formulation	  of	  physics.	  
	  
Social	   and	  economic	   structures	   favoring	   the	   fragmentation	  of	   knowledge.	   	   Increase	  of	  
population	   is	  unavoidable	   for	  a	   long.	  Thus,	  more	  buildings,	  more	  cultivated	   fields,	   less	  
natural	  areas,	  more	  garbage.	  That	  cannot	  be	  stopped.	  At	  best,	  it	  can	  be	  slightly	  slowed	  
down.	  Notice	  that	  most	  political	  parties	  suggest	  the	  expanding	  the	  economy	  activities	  is	  
the	  solution	  of	  most	  problems.	  
	  
Communicating	  the	  importance	  of	  reducing	  family	  size	  to	  the	  mass	  of	  humanity.	  
	  
How	  to	  extract	  oil	  and	  gas	  without	  totally	  disrupting	  the	  local	  and	  human	  habitation.	  
	  
Presently,	   the	   progress	   in	   science	   is	   halted	   due	   to	   powerful	   group	   interests.	   They	  
strongly	   influence	   the	   fundamental	   research	   in	  direction	   that	   serves	   their	   interests	  by	  
the	  funding	  policy	  and	  international	  collaboration.	  
	  
Summary:	  The	  competition	  between	  opposing	  interests;	  monocausal	  explanation	  of	  the	  
world;	   how	   the	   human	   body	   and	   mind	   work;	   environmental	   problems	   –	   energy,	  
pollution;	  to	  find	  good	  energy	  sources;	  increase	  of	  population,	  reducing	  family	  size;	  how	  





Presently,	   the	   progress	   in	   science	   is	   halted	   due	   to	   powerful	   group	   interests.	   They	  
strongly	   influence	   the	   fundamental	   research	   in	  direction	   that	   serves	   their	   interests	  by	  
the	  funding	  policy	  and	  international	  collaboration.	  
	  
	  
c.	  How	  can	  we	  tackle	  these	  problems	  together	  today	  and	  tomorrow?	  	  
	  
By	  teaching	  children	  about	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  alternatives	  
As	  in	  physics	  there	  is	  a	  need	  for	  recognizing	  the	  limitations	  of	  orthodoxy	  and	  to	  strongly	  
support	  the	  search	  for	  and	  development	  of	  alternative	  paradigms.	  
	  
One	  good	  strategy	  is	  to	  include	  more	  people	  globally	  in	  the	  knowledge	  production.	  We	  
need	   new	   ways	   of	   thinking	   and	   fresh	   impulses	   from	   groups	   that	   traditionally	   were	  
excluded.	  It	   is	  also	  not	  clear	   in	  advance	  where	  the	  solutions	  can	  come	  from.	  They	  may	  
come	  laterally	  from	  some	  currently	  peripheral	  field.	  
	  
Specific	   value	   should	   be	   given	   to	   the	   value	   of	   transdisciplinarity	   and	   generalist	  
approaches.	   Please	   convey	   this	   question	   to	   those	   who	   are	   elected	   and/or	   paid	  
to	  find	  solutions:	  their	  job	  is	  to	  find	  solutions.	  
	  
First	  we	  need	  to	  get	  past	  the	  cultural	  prohibition	  on	  discussing	  the	  population	  problem.	  	  
We	  need	  to	  find	  the	  courage	  to	  put	  the	  matter	  on	  the	  table.	  
	  
I	  presume	  via	  technological	  improvements.	  This	  type	  of	  directed	  research	  leads	  and	  will	  
lead	  to	  global	  disasters.	  
	  
	  
2.	  What	  is	  The	  Grand	  Challenge	  in	  science	  today?	  	  
	  
To	  bring	  together	  specialists	  of	  remote	  domains	  to	  collaborate,	  without	  exclusion.	  
Understanding	  THAT	  a	  unified	  field	  theory	  exists.	  
	  
Making	  peace	  between	  science	  and	  the	  bulk	  of	  humanity.	  
	  
The	  origin	  of	  life.	  	  
	  
Lack	   of	   democracy	   in	   science	   and	   particularly	   the	   problem	   in	   fundamental	   basis	   of	  
contemporary	  Physics.	  	  The	  	   CONCEPT	  OF	  SPACE	  IS	  WRONG	  but	  revision	  or	  even	  discussion	  is	  
strongly	   suppressed.	   The	   suppression	   is	   in	   university	   teaching,	   peer	   reviewed	   journals,	  









a.	  Which	  challenges	  do	  we	  face	  in	  biology	  and	  computation	  today?	  
	  
To	  develop	  new	  kinds	  of	  'computations'	  able	  to	  account	  for	  the	  degeneracy	  property	  of	  
biological	   systems	   and	   to	   deal	   with	   more	   or	   less	   conflicting	   logics	   with	   multiple	  
realizabilities.	  
	  
We	  have	  today	  two	  different	  kinds	  of	  logic	  and	  rationality:	  the	  “real”,	  technical	  logic	  and	  
the	  “mysterious”,	  “biological”,	  “natural”	  logic	  which	  we	  do	  not	  understand	  yet.	  
	  
Computational	   foundations	  of	  biology	  should	  be	  worked	  out.	   In	  the	  process,	  biological	  
structures	   and	   processes	   are	   used	   as	   inspiration	   for	   constructing	   new	   computational	  
devices,	  like	  in	  Organic	  Computing.	  
	  
Epidemies	  are	  good	  candidates.	  Few	  peoplei	  take	  care	  about	  the	  genocid	  due	  to	  AIDS	  in	  
some	  African	  countries.	  If	  the	  H1N1	  flu	  was	  able	  to	  kill	  as	  surely	  as	  the	  Ebola	  virus,	  we	  
would	  face	  to	  the	  greatest	  possible	  catastrophes,	  worst	  than	  what	  happened	  in	  Europe	  
in	   1347-­‐1348.	   But	   this	   may	   be	   not	   related	   the	   "challenge",	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   the	  
questionnaire.	  
	  
The	   challenge	   in	   computation	   is	   partly	   algorithmic.	   E.g.,	   increasing	   the	   speed	   of	   the	  
computers	  by	  10	  led	  to	  treat	  problems	  of	  size	  10	  times	  larger	  only	  when	  the	  algorithms	  
are	  linear.	  But	  alas	  many	  algorithms	  are	  quadratic,	  cubic,	  etc.,	  and	  often	  exponential,	  so	  
that	  the	  need	  to	  treat	  larger	  and	  larger	  datasets	  cannot	  be	  solved	  only	  with	  the	  increase	  
of	  computer	  power.	  
	  
Making	   computers	   with	   heart	   and	   soul.	   	   Understanding	   the	   human	   heart,	   mind,	   and	  
soul.	  
	  
How	  to	  model	  semiosis.	  	  
	  
The	  wrong	  space	  concept	  strongly	  affects	  the	  biology.	  
	  
	  
b.	  Which	  are	  the	  highest	  priority	  themes	  we	  should	  turn	  our	  attention	  to?	  	  
	  
As	  above	  rational	  explanation	  of	  biology	  (specifically	  in	  genetics).	  
	  
Understanding	  life,	   its	  genesis	  and	  evolution,	  its	  processes,	  structures	  and	  mechanisms	  
must	  be	  discussed.	  Understanding	  the	  affective	  domain	  in	  humans,	  and	  introducing	  the	  
affective	  domain	  into	  computation.	  
	  







c.	  Which	  are	  the	  key	  problems	  we	  have	  to	  solve?	  
	  
To	  harmonize	  conflicting	  logics	  and	  interests.	  
	  
The	  interdependence	  between	  sequenced	  and	  non-­‐sequenced	  information	  carriers.	  
	  
Re-­‐phrasing	  of	  sciences	  in	  terms	  of	  information	  and	  computation.	  
	  
We	  must	   face	  to	  an	  enormous	   increase	  of	  data.	   In	   the	  meanwhile,	  we	  have	   few	  more	  
people	   to	   extract	   knowledge	   from	   these	   data.	   Worse:	   the	   increase	   of	   knowledge	   is	  
global,	   but	   in	   fact	   it	   tends	   to	   be	   lost	   in	   the	   vast	   amount	   (and	   much	   increasing)	   of	  
documents	  to	  be	  read.	  This	  is	  aggravated	  by	  the	  "publish	  or	  perish"	  system	  and	  the	  way	  
that	   academic	   activities	   are	   evaluated:	   bibliometric	   indicators,	   counting	   papers,	  
citations,	  h-­‐factor.	  What	  is	  really	  useful	  in	  papers	  is	  what	  is	  useful	  after	  many	  years,	  not	  
what	   is	  many	  times	  cited	  within	  two	  years.	  Too	  much	  books,	  papers,	  conferences,	  etc.	  
Retrieving	  documents	   is	   a	   full	   science	  now.	   Think	   to	   the	  poor	   readers	   (and	  we	  all	   are	  
readers...)!	  
	  
We	  need	  to	  communicate	  between	  different	  ways	  of	  knowing	  (e.g.	  reason	  and	  feeling).	  
	  
3. Is	  life	  on	  Earth	  endangered	  through	  human	  technology?	  
	  





In	  as	  much	  as	  technology	  allows	  the	  population	  to	  grow	  beyond	  a	  reasonable	  level.	  
	  
Absolutely.	  The	  incorrect	  concept	  of	  space	  does	  not	  permit	  to	  understand	  the	  real	  danger.	  
	  
	  
a.	  Can	  life	  on	  Earth	  extinguish	  in	  a	  worst-­‐case	  technological	  disaster	  scenario?	  	  
	  




We	  do	  not	  know.	  But	   it	   is	  obvious	  that	  we	  do	  not	   fully	  understand	  the	   implications	  of	  
the	  unrestrained	  exploitation	  of	   the	  science	  that	  we	  have.	  We	  are	  experimenting	  with	  








A	  full	  extinction	  due	  to	  technology	  is	  improbable,	  but	  major	  catastrophes	  will	  probably	  
occur,	  such	  as	  the	  nuclear	  ones.	  I	  am	  afraid	  that	  nuclear	  energy	  is	  unavoidable,	  at	  least	  
because	  in	  some	  countries	  it	  is	  believed	  so.	  
	  
I	  believe	  we	  could	  extinguish	  life	  on	  Earth	  if	  we	  make	  the	  choice	  (consciously	  or	  not)	  to	  
use	  nuclear	  energy	  to	  allow	  the	  population	  to	  continue	  to	  grow.	  
	  
No.	  	  Microbial	  life	  will	  continue	  in	  almost	  any	  scenario.	  
	  
Yes,	  the	  life	  could	  be	  extinguished.	  In	  the	  first	  hand	  –	  a	  nuclear	  war,	  in	  the	  second	  hand	  
increased	   radiation	   level	   from	   nuclear	   disasters.	   This	   includes	   contamination	   from	  
nuclear	  plant	  catastrophes	  after	  earthquakes	  or	  from	  the	  200,000	  tons	  radioactive	  wast	  
accumulated	  from	  the	  era	  of	  nuclear	  energy	  and	  weapons.	  
	  
	  
b.	  How	  can	  science	  and	  technology	  prevent	  such	  a	  human-­‐made	  technological	  disaster?	  
	  
By	  more	  responsibility.	  
	  
By	  smaller	  entities.	  (e.g.	  local	  production	  and	  delivery	  of	  energy)	  
	  
It	   can	   only	   be	   prevented	   where	   we	   make	   greater	   effort	   to	   consider	   consequences.	  
However	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  complexity	  (real	  and	  artificial)	  increases	  the	  difficulties	  of	  
constructive	  anticipation.	  
	  
By	  honestly	  looking	  at	  the	  technology	  and	  its	  possible	  consequences.	  Nuclear	  energy	  is	  
the	   field	  we	   can	   learn	   a	   lot	   from	  –	   about	  what	   not	   to	   do.	   Very	   expensive	   technology	  
which	  cannot	  be	  tested	  in	  a	  lab	  for	  all	  possible	  scenarios.	  And	  in	  the	  first	  place	  possible	  
scenarios	  must	   be	   seriously	   analyzed	   instead	   of	   basing	   safety	   on	   faith	   and	   hope	   that	  




Impossible	   to	  prevent.	  Humans	   (scientists	  and	  other)	  are	  convinced	   to	   set	   the	   risks	   to	  
very	   low	   values.	   But	   see	   catastrophs	   with	   boats	   (Titanic	   and	   others),	   planes,	   trains,	  
chemical	  factories,	  nuclear	  energy	  production,	  etc.	  Each	  time,	  smart	  people	  explained	  us	  
that	   all	   was	   controlled,	   very	   low	   risk,	   and	   so	   on.	   But	   each	   time,	   there	  was	   a	   serie	   of	  
unpredicted	   causes,	  partly	  due	   to	  money	  problems	  and	  greedy	  people,	   and	   this	   latter	  
cause	  is	  impossible	  to	  eliminate.	  
	  
The	  extinction	  scenario	  (as	  I	  stated	  it	  in	  3a)	  can	  be	  prevented	  by	  controlling	  population	  






By	  study	  of	  new	  type	  of	  energy	  alternative	   the	  nuclear	  one.	   It	   is	   referred	   	  as:	  vacuum	  
energy,	   zero	   point	   energy,	   space	   energy,	   free	   energy	   and	   so	   on.	   It	   is	   a	   hidden	   space	  
energy	  of	  non	  EM	  type	  but	  connected	  to	  the	  mass.	  It	  is	  a	  primary	  source	  of	  the	  nuclear	  
energy.	   It	  could	  be	  accessed	  by	  specific	  technology	  not	  involving	  nuclear	  reactions	  and	  
radioactive	  waist.	   The	  wrong	   space	   concept	   (physical	   vacuum)	  adopted	  100	   years	   ago	  
does	  not	  allow	  to	  envision,	  understand	  and	  research	  this	  type	  of	  energy	  that	  is	  a	  primary	  
source	  of	  the	  nuclear	  energy.	  
	  
c.	  Which	  technological	  solutions	  are	  possible	  today?	  
	  
Focused	  hearing,	  viewing.	  
	  
In	   what	   sense?	   I	   would	   say	   that	   to	   prevent	   technological	   disasters	   many	  
non-­‐technological	   components	  must	  be	   involved.	   Like	   acceptance	  of	   the	   costs	   for	   risk	  
management,	  preparedness	   for	  accidental	  situations	  etc.	  Society	  as	  an	  environment	   in	  
which	  technology	  is	  implemented	  has	  no	  knowledge	  or	  understanding	  of	  all	  the	  risks	  of	  
technology	  they	  have.	  Not	  many	  visitors	  of	  New	  York	  and	  even	  citizens	  are	  aware	  of	  the	  
risks	  of	  Indian	  Point	  nuclear	  power	  station.	  Everybody	  hopes	  nothing	  bad	  will	  happen.	  
	  
No	  technological	  solutions	  are	  possible,	  only	  philosophical	  and	  political	  ones.	  
	  
Experts	  should	  know.	  
	  
The	  solution	  that	  I	  propose	  is	  to	  forgo	  certain	  technologies	  (e.g.	  nuclear).	  
	  
It	  maybe	  possible	   to	  begin	   slowly	   to	  disengage	   from	   the	  capitalist	   growth	  economy.	   	  I	  
think	  we	   need	   to	   begin	   to	   value	   the	   senescent	   state,	   and	   begin	   to	   try	   to	   understand	  
stasis	  better.	  Only	  a	  prolonged	  senescent	  period	  could	  be	  'sustainable'.	  
	  
One	   of	   the	   technology	   is	   the	   cold	   fusion.	   Other	   technologies	   based	   on	   direct	   EM	  
processes	   are	   not	   yet	   developed.	   Only	   scattered	   success	   of	   some	   individuals	   are	  
sporadically	   reported,	   but	   without	   funding	   of	   scientific	   research	   	   they	   are	   not	  
technologically	   ready.	   Also	   this	   new	   energy	  may	   have	   a	   biological	   effect	   so	   a	   serious	  
parallel	   research	   is	   needed	   and	   development	   of	   means	   for	   shielding	   from	   unwanted	  
scalar	  (longitudinal	  waves).	  
	  
	  
d.	   Can	   science	   and	   technology	   change	   their	   one-­‐way	   avail	   policy	   into	   a	   balanced	   avail-­‐
adversity	  appraisal	  when	  introducing	  and	  using	  new	  technologies?	  	  
	  
Some	   responsibility	   is	   necessary	   to	   be	   exercised	   by	   politicians	   and	   scientists,	   but	   too	  
strict	  "principes	  de	  précaution"	  could	  paralyze	  science	  and	  impede	  any	  progress.	  
	  






Not	  until	  we	  fully	  understand	  complexity	  (real	  and	  artificial).	  
	  
If	   I	   understand	   the	   question	   correctly,	  when	   using	   and	   introducing	   new	   technologies,	  
science	   is	   important.	  Both	  as	  a	  basis	   for	  new	  technology	  and	  then	  as	  an	   instrument	  of	  
assessment	  of	   its	   functioning	  and	  also	   for	   its	   improvements.	  Maybe	  this	  step	   is	  not	  so	  
common	  today.	  Usually	  technology	  based	  on	  science	  (like	  nuclear	  technology)	  continues	  
to	   live	   its	  own	   independent	   life.	   It	   seems	  to	  me	  good	  to	  connect	  with	  science	  even	  as	  
one	  goes	  on	  with	  technology.	  
	  
On	   the	   other	   hand,	   science	   traditionally	   uses	   high-­‐tech	   –	   from	   computers	   to	  
measurement	  instruments	  and	  similar.	  
	  
They	   cannot	   change	   by	   themselves:	   only	   a	   new	   philosophical	   approach,	   grounded	   in	  
science,	  can	  make	  the	  balance	  you	  indicated	  attractive	  enough	  to	  be	  implemented.	  
	  
I	  don’t	  understand	  this	  question.	  
	  
	  
e.	  What	   is	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   cultural	   and	   political	   imprint	   of	   an	   information	   society	   in	   this	  
process	   of	   changing	   priorities	   in	   technological	   development	   towards	   maintaining	   living	  
processes	  of	  interaction?	  
	  
An	   information	   society	   speaks	  with	   too	  many	   discordant	   voices	   competing	   for	   scarce	  
material	  resources	  to	  be	  able	  to	  develop	  a	  straightforward	  program.	  	  
	  
Maybe	  for	  100	  years	  nothing	  visible	  
	  
The	   information	   society	   enables	   a	   valuable	   exchange	   of	   data,	   information	   and	  
knowledge.	   However	   the	   massive	   proliferation	   of	   electronic	   self-­‐publication	   of	   low	  
quality	  research	  and	  thought	  undermines	  the	  process	  of	  evaluation	  and	  debate	  which	  is	  
critical	   to	   the	   advance	   of	   science.	   It	   does	   this	   by	   assuming	   that	   all	   perspectives	   are	  
equally	  worthy	   and	  more	   importantly	   fails	   to	   provide	  platforms	   for	   structured	  debate	  
(eg	  through	  target	  papers,	  evidence-­‐based	  medicine)	  
	  
Cultural	  and	  political	  impact	  is	  of	  course	  fundamental	  for	  what	  gets	  prioritized.	  It	  would	  
be	   interesting	   to	  have	   some	   statistics	   about	  differences	  between	   countries	   globally	   in	  
what	  they	  invest	  in	  sciences.	  
	  
It	  is	  not	  a	  technological	  problem.	  	  It	  is	  a	  problem	  of	  education,	  culture,	  politics,	  etc.	  
	  
See	   above.	   The	   main	   obstacle	   is	   the	   psychology	   of	   opposition	   to	   the	   change	   in	   the	  








f.	  What	  are	  the	  global	  and	  social	  consequences	  of	  such	  decisions?	  	  
	  
Too	  many	  rules	  might	  endanger	  creativity.	  	  
	  
Massively	  wasteful	   expenditures	   on	   low-­‐grade	   research	   (as	   has	   been	   characteristic	   of	  
much	  biomedical	  research	  in	  the	  past	  30	  years.)	  
	  
Of	  course	  consequences	  are	   important.	   In	  Germany	  political	  opinion	   is	  against	  nuclear	  
power	   and	   it	   has	   practical	   consequences.	   Such	   decisions	  must	   be	   based	   on	   informed	  
consent.	  People	  must	  know	  what	  technological	  risks	  they	  are	  taking.	  
	  
They	   will	   determine	   how	   severely	   we	   will	   damage	   the	   planet,	   and	   how	  much	   of	   the	  
biodiversity	  we	  will	  lose.	  
	  
No	   more	   growth	   of	   anything.	   Ascendency	   of	   currently	   powerful	   groups	   -­‐-­‐	   no	   more	  
'American	  dream'	  of	  getting	  rich.	  
	  
A	  new	  technological	  revolution.	  
	  
	  
g.	  How	  can	  we	  better	   integrate	  scientific	  discovery	  and	  technological	  progress	   in	  the	  natural	  
circulation	  processes	  and	  interactions	  of	  living	  systems	  on	  Earth?	  
	  
I	  doubt	  man	  can	  have	  a	  deep	  influence	  on	  Nature	  except	  on	  a	  local	  plan.	  
	  
By	  understanding	  it.	  
	  
Reduce	  the	  number	  of	  PhDs.	  Introduce	  a	  new	  degree;	  uberPhD;	  anything	  to	  emphasize	  
the	  need	  to	  know	  when	  you	  do	  not	  know.	  
That	  is	  an	  interesting	  question.	  We	  do	  not	  know	  at	  present	  about	  how	  those	  processes	  
on	  Earth	  actually	  work.	  And	  we	  do	  not	  understand	  exactly	  what	  the	  result	  of	  our	  impact	  
is.	   We	   should	   apply	   precautionary	   principle	   and	   at	   least	   in	   those	   cases	   which	   are	  
obvious	  prioritize	   value	  of	   clean	  environment	  before	  mass	  production	  of	   cheap	   things	  
that	  end	  as	  garbage	   in	   short	   time.	   Less	   things	  and	  more	   fee	   space	  would	  be	  good	   for	  
many	   people	   who	   possess	   innumerable	   pieces	   of	   clothes,	   and	   other	   things	   that	   they	  
hardly	  ever	  use.	  
	  
By	  limiting	  certain	  destructive	  technologies.	  
	  







h.	   Can	  we	   expect	   a	   natural	   circulation	   and	   interaction	   of	   computation	   and	   technology	   on	   a	  
global	  scale?	  
	  




Probably.	  But	  only	  	  by	  chance	  will	  we	  limit	  the	  products	  to	  positive	  outcomes.	  
	  
Yes	  it	  is	  necessary.	  Idea	  of	  everything	  is	  on	  a	  global	  scale	  today.	  
	  
Only	  if	  our	  system	  is	  largely	  mechanized,	  which	  I	  think	  would	  be	  a	  mistake,.	  
	  
	  
i.	  How	  can	  we	  achieve	  that?	  
	  
By	  developing	  encompassing	  theories	  at	  the	  basis	  of	  computation	  and	  technology.	  	  	  
	  
By	  using	  the	  internet,	  e.g.	  
	  
Increase	   the	   varieties	   of	   computation	   and	   technology	   and	   the	   desire	   for	   their	  
interaction	  in	  laboratory	  situations.	  
	  
I	   am	  not	  quite	   sure	  what	   is	  meant	  by	   “circulation	  and	   interaction	  of	   computation	  and	  
technology”	  but	  at	  least	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  technology,	  information	  technology	  has	  much	  
higher	   spreading	   than	   any	   older	   technologies.	   Even	   in	   the	   poorest	   countries	   with	   no	  
electricity	  people	  have	  mobile	  phones.	  
	  
Communication	  technologies	  are	  very	  easily	  accepted	  globally.	  
	  
4. How	  does	  our	  social	  and	  cultural	  background	  define,	  i.e.	  limit	  (lat.),	  our	  scientific	  horizon?	  
	  
Heavily.	   We	   have	   largely	   lost	   the	   affective	   ways	   of	   knowing,	   and	   thus	   tend	   to	   see	   the	   world	  
narrowly	  through	  reason	  and	  intellect.	  	  The	  impairs	  our	  ability	  to	  truly	  understand	  the	  world,	  and	  
make	  wise	  judgments.	  
	  
We	  have	  a	  capitalist,	  Darwinian	  growth	  ideology.	  
The	  scientific	  horizon	  is	  limited	  by	  the	  current	  status	  quo	  in	  Physics,	  again	  due	  to	  the	  wrong	  space	  
concept.	  
	  






New	   ideas,	  especially	   if	   they	  are	   really	  creative	  and/or	  opposite	   to	  established	  paradigms,	  are	  
difficult	   to	   be	   diffused	   because	   they	   impose	   thought	   revisions	   possibly	   reverting	   the	   power	  
scale.	  	  
	  
By	   observing	   processes	   of	   senso-­‐motoric	   patterns	   (what	  we	  perceive	   depends	   on	   our	   organs:	  
watch	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  organs	  and	  counterbalance	  their	  neurological	  artefacts).	  
	  
Reduce	  the	  tendency	  to	  narrowing	  the	  creativity	  of	  individuals	  by	  introducing	  meta-­‐,	  trans-­‐	  and	  
multi-­‐disciplinary	  education.	  
	  
When	  we	  understand	   info-­‐computational	  mechanisms	  of	  knowledge	  production,	   this	  becomes	  
obvious.	  See	  answer	  to	  (c)	  
	  
Hard	   to	   do.	   A	   way	   could	   be	   through	   teaching	   and	   through	   TV	   broadcasts:	   this	   is	   useful	  
philosophy.	  But	  I'm	  afraid	  that	  other	  priorities	  exist.	  
	  
We	  must	  rekindle	  our	  affective	  domain.	  
	  
It	   should	   be	   gradually	   disengaged	   from	   by	   adopting	   a	   new	   model	   of	   the	   physical	   vacuum,	  
carefully	  verified	  by	  the	  experiments	  and	  observation	  accumulated	  during	  the	  past	  100	  years.	  
	  
	  
b.	  What	  is	  the	  role	  of	  human/machine	  logic	  and	  natural	  philosophy	  in	  this	  process?	  
	  
Natural	  philosophy	  (in	  a	  'large'	  meaning)	  could	  have	  more	  influence	  than	  classic	  logic	  for	  
discovering	  new	  approaches.	  
	  
Not	  hindering	  it.	  
	  
The	  rejection	  of	  obvious	  error.	  
	  
See	  answer	  to	  (c).	  
	  
The	   first	   step	   is	   to	   recognize	   the	   categorial	   separation	   between	   human	   and	  machine	  
logic.	   Existing	   “human”	   logics	   (epistemic,	   doxastic,	  etc.)	   have	   all	   been	   linguistic,	   truth-­‐
functional	   and	   context-­‐independent.	   These	   are	   incapable	   of	   supporting	   a	   natural	  
philosophy	  useful	   for	   the	   foundation	  of	   science,	   including	   information.	  Logic	   in	  Reality	  
purports	  to	  fill	  this	  gap.	  
	  
Outside	  of	  the	  pure	  hard	  sciences	  and	  mathematics,	  such	  as	  in	  the	  area	  of	  philosophy,	  a	  
blend	  of	  affect	  and	  reason	  is	  required.	  
	  











c.	  Which	   changes	   do	  we	   need	   to	  make	   in	   the	   foundations	   of	   science	   to	   better	   understand	  
Nature	  and	  life?	  
	  
Open	  the	  way	  to	  more	   imagination,	   in	  particular	  by	  giving	  transdisciplinary	  experience	  
to	  young	  research	  students.	  	  
	  
Understand	   that	   the	   human’s	   sensory	   organs	   imprint	   an	   a-­‐priori	   pattern	   on	   the	  
perception	  and	  the	  organisation	  of	  the	  impulses	  perceived.	  
	  
Introduce	   and	   demonstrate	   the	   value	   of	   meta-­‐,	   trans-­‐	   and	   multi-­‐disciplinary	   higher	  
education	  in	  the	  progress	  of	  science.	  
	  
The	  synthesis	  of	  informationalism	  and	  computationalism	  is	  the	  best	  approach.	  	  
	  
The	  worlds	  of	  feeling	  and	  reason	  need	  to	  recognize	  one	  another,	  reconcile,	  learn	  mutual	  
respect,	  and	  merge,	  because	  only	  then	  can	  we	  truly	  be	  whole.	  
	  
Valuing	  the	  study	  of	  senescence,	  not	  as	  a	  problem,	  but	  as	  a	  desired	  state.	  
	  
In	  first	  place:	  revision	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  space	  (physical	  vacuum).	  
	  
	   	   	  




We	  don’t	  know	  until	  we	  achieve	  Alife.	  See	  answer	  to	  3.b	  above.	  
	  
Not	  at	  current	  population	  levels.	  
	  
Artificial	  organisms	  will	  likely	  be	  naturally	  senescent.	  	  Natural	  organisms	  will	  be	  needed	  to	  repair	  
the	  artificial	  ones.	  
	  
	  
a.	  What	  kinds	  of	  conflicts	  have	  natural	  and	  artificial	  forms	  of	  life?	  
	  
Are	  there	  conflicts?	  
	  






Many	  applications	  of	  AI/Alife	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  very	  beneficial	  in	  the	  beginning	  because	  we	  
will	   design	   them	   and	   their	   decision-­‐making	   capabilities	   for	   these	   advantageous	  
purposes.	   As	   we	   go	   higher	   up	   the	   hierarchical	   ladder	   the	   self-­‐maintenance	   of	   the	   A	  
systems	   and	   their	   capacity	   to	   create	   their	   own	   goals	   (from	   nano	   to	   meso	   biological	  
levels)	  would	   create	  much	  conflict	  with	  extant	  molecular,	   cellular,	  organic	  and	  human	  
decision-­‐making.	  
I	  have	  no	  clue.	  Could	  artificial	  organisms	  integrate	  in	  the	  eco-­‐system?	  Can	  they	  radically	  
change	  ecosystems?	  
	  
Same	  as	  between	  natural	  forms	  of	  life.	  
	  
Competition	  for	  finite	  resources.	  
	  
	  
b. Can	   systems	   theory	   help	   disentangling	   the	   hazard	   of	   exterminating	   natural	   live	   forms	   on	  
Earth?	  	  
	  
Systems	   theory	   (whatever	   it	   means)	   is	   formal,	   it	   can	   help	   better	   understanding	   the	   world	  
around	  us,	  but	   I	  doubt	   it	  can	  have	  a	  serious	   influence	  on	  policy	  decisions	  able	  to	  have	  deep	  




Not	  yet.	  About	  as	  valuable	  as	  Archimedes	  principle:	  Give	  me	  a	  place	  to	  stand	  and	  with	  a	  lever	  
I	  will	  move	  the	  whole	  world.	  
	  
In	  any	  event	  systems	  theory	  is	  best	  suited	  for	  the	  purpose.	  
	  
Systems	  theory	  is	  just	  a	  small	  part	  of	  math	  modeling	  tools	  we	  have.	  
	  
So,	  any	  tool	  we	  have	  could	  help.	  
	  
Only	  if	  it	  can	  help	  us	  address	  the	  core	  problem,	  being	  the	  need	  to	  reduce	  human	  family	  size.	  
	  
Systems	  theory,	  as	  it	  is	  now,	  is	  too	  mechanistic.	  	  We	  need	  vaguer,	  fuzzier	  understandings	  
	  
	  	  
c.	  If	  not,	  what	  else	  can	  help?	  	  
	  
More	  responsibility	  at	  all	  the	  levels.	  
	  






Also	  system	  theory	  operates	  under	  assumptions	  about	  what	  is	  the	  case,	  what	  structures	  
and	   mechanisms	   there	   are.	   So	   those	   are	   also	   important.	   Even	   complexity	   theory.	   If	  
systems	  theory	  covers	  horizontal	  interactions	  among	  systems,	  complexity	  theory	  covers	  
vertical.	  
	  
Systems	  theory	  is	  just	  a	  small	  part	  of	  math	  modeling	  tools	  we	  have.	  
	  
So,	  any	  tool	  we	  have	  could	  help.	  
	  
	  
6. What	  needs	  to	  be	  developed?	  
	  
Elementary	  school	  textbooks.	  
	  
	  
a.	  What	  kind	  of	  ontologies	  and	  theories	  should	  be	  developed?	  	  
	  




For	  what	  exactly?	  
	  
Logic	  in	  Reality	  includes	  a	  novel	  categorial	  ontology	  that	  emphasizes	  non-­‐separability	  of	  
the	  interactive	  elements	  of	  real	  processes.	  
	  
I	  would	  rather	  say	  that	  we	  should	  first	  discard	  inadequate	  theories.	  
	  
Before	   that,	   we	  must	   realize	   that	   the	  main	   requirement	   is	   to	   enhance	   the	   education	  
systems,	  for	  all	  people,	  at	  any	  level,	  anywhere.	  
	  
Concept	  of	  space	  that	  leads	  to	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  Nature	  and	  universe.	  
	  
	  
b.	  What	  kind	  of	  tools	  and	  methods	  do	  we	  need	  indeed?	  
	  
A	  collaboration	  between	  theory	  and	  applications,	  so	  that	  the	  theoretician	  takes	  account	  
of	  the	  constraints	  imposed	  by	  experimental	  data,	  and	  the	  experimentalist	  becomes	  able	  
to	  evaluate	  new	   ideas	  and	  possibly	  use	   them	  to	  search	   for	  more	  data.	  The	  problem	   is	  
that	  most	   scientists	  have	  only	  be	   trained	   in	  one	  domain.	  What	  would	  be	   important	   in	  
the	   future	   is	   to	   develop	  more	   transdisciplinary	   cursus	   for	   young	   students	   to	   acquaint	  
them	  with	  both	  theory	  and	  applications	  and	  thus	  close	  the	  gap	  between	  them.	  	  
	  






I	  would	  rather	  say	  that	  we	  should	  first	  discard	  inadequate	  theories.	  
	  
Before	   that,	   we	  must	   realize	   that	   the	  main	   requirement	   is	   to	   enhance	   the	   education	  
systems,	  for	  all	  people,	  at	  any	  level,	  anywhere.	  
	  
Fuzzy,	  vague	  logics;	  less	  focused	  models.	  	  
	  
	  
7. Which	  were	  the	  pitfalls	   in	  previous	  attempts	  to	  create	  a	  new	  paradigm	  shift	  and	  how	  can	  we	  
avoid	  them	  in	  future?	  
	  
We	  wish	  that	  3+4=2+5	  and	  decree	  that	  it	  is	  so,	  even	  though	  we	  see	  that	  the	  two	  expressions	  are	  
distinct.	  We	  live	  in	  a	  world	  we	  dreamed	  up	  according	  to	  our	  wishes.	  But	  this	  is	  not	  the	  world	  we	  
actually	  live	  in.	  
	  
There	   still	   appears	   to	   be	   no	   general	   acceptance	   of	   the	   limitations	   of	   the	   “Promethean”	  
technological	  paradigm.	  The	  difficulties	  I	  experience	  in	  trying	  to	  get	  the	  answers	  or	  the	  software	  I	  
want	  on	  the	  Internet	  are	  not	  artifacts	  of	  the	  system;	  they	  are	  an	  inherent,	  essential	  characteristic	  
of	  it.	  
	  
Any	  attempt	  that	  avoids	  the	  revision	  of	  the	  main	  issue	  –	  the	  concept	  of	  space	  is	  doom	  to	  fail.	  
	  
	  
a. What	  had	  we	  learned	  from	  the	  “OMICS”	  revolution	  (proteomics,	  genomics,	  etc.)?	  	  
	  
Collecting	   data	   is	   interesting	   but	   it	   remains	   ineffective	   without	   some	   theory	   to	   relate	   and	  
explain	  them.	  
	  
That	   there	  must	  be	  a	   clever	   and	   self-­‐evident	  explanation	  behind	   the	   “mystery”	  of	   life	  have	  
used	   this	   information	   to	   discover	   the	   human	   mental	   organs,	   and	   the	   diversity	   of	   ways	   of	  





b.	  What	  had	  we	  learned	  from	  progress	  in	  other	  disciplines?	  	  
	  
Theory	  and	  applications	  should	  go	  hand	  in	  hand	  rather	  than	  be	  at	  odds.	  
	  
From	  sociology	  and	  history:	   that	   there	  are	  equally	   legitimate,	   radically	  different	   social	  
orders;	  that	  the	  more	  a	  systems	  touts	  its	  infallibility,	  the	  dumber	  it	  is	  
	  





proved	   by	   computer	   science.	   The	   Computer	   science,	   for	   example,	   could	   achieve	   the	  
present	  advances	  without	  relying	  on	  a	  correct	  fundamental	  base	  –	  the	  bulean	  algebra.	  
In	  a	  similar	  way,	  all	   fields	  of	   the	  Natural	  science	  could	  not	  achieve	  significant	  progress	  
without	  relying	  on	  a	  correct	  space	  concept.	  
	  
	  
8.	  WHAT	  IS	  THE	  STATUS	  OF	  THE	  “UNITY	  OF	  SCIENCES”	  PROGRAM?	  	  
	  
It	   is	  difficult	  to	  be	  realized	  because	  of	  the	  strict	  specializations	  depending	  on	  conflicting	   logics,	  
making	   communication	   difficult	   between	   specialists	   of	   different	   domains.	   And	   there	   is	   also	   a	  




The	   concept	   of	   the	   Unity	   of	   Sciences,	   without	   qualification,	   is	   part	   of	   the	   problem,	   not	   the	  
solution.	  We	  should	  be	  aiming	  not	  at	  some	  abstract	  “unity”,	  but	  for	  a	  dynamic,	  transdisciplinary	  
interaction	  between	  the	  sciences	  in	  which	  none	  lose	  their	  specific	  methodology,	  etc.	  
	  





9.	  WHAT	  IS	  THE	  STATUS	  OF	  THE	  “UNITY	  OF	  KNOWLEDGE”	  PROGRAM?	  (intended	  to	  bridge	  the	  gap	  
between	  science	  and	  humanities)	  	  
	  
Still	  more	  difficult.	  
	  
Is	  there	  any	  such?	  
	  
The	   advocacy	   has	   generally	   failed	   in	   the	   universities	   for	   the	   usual	   reason	   of	   the	   closed-­‐
mindedness	   of	   the	   disciplines.	   It	   will	   take	   external	   pressure	   from	   public	   research	   funding	  
agencies	   to	   force	  universities	   to	   address,	   debate	   and	  advocate	   the	   integration	   issue	   as	   a	   step	  
towards	   the	   restoration	   of	   public	   confidence	   in	   the	   social	   responsibility	   of	   science	   and	   the	  
restoration	  of	  social	  regard	  for	  university	  ideals.	  
	  
One	  of	   the	  goals	  of	   the	  Nicolescu	  acceptation	  of	   transdisciplinarity	   is	   the	  Unity	  of	  Knowledge,	  
but	  this	  must	  be	  an	  open	  system	  to	  avoid	  dogma	  and	  fundamentalism.	  
	  
There	   is	   a	   continuum	   between	   sciences	   and	   humanities.	   The	   gap	   is	  
only	  in	  the	  head	  of	  some	  people.	  
	  
I	   believe	   that	   this	   has	   been	   dramatically	   advanced	   by	   Tom	   Ray’s	   work	   in	   discovering	   the	  










10.	  HOW	  CAN	  WE	  REALIZE	  THE	  VISION	  OF	  A	  RESPONSEABLE	  GLOBAL	  SCIENTIFIC	  COMMUNITY?	  
	  
Is	  it	  not	  a	  dream?	  
	  
By	  being	  responsible	  each	  one	  as	  an	  individual	  
	  
Invite	   EC	   to	   debate	   the	   responsibility	   and	   accountability	   of	   the	   scientific	   community,	   starting	  
with	  the	  climate	  science	  controversy	  as	  a	  very	  immediate	  example.	  How	  to	  debate	  the	  science	  is	  
the	  ultimate	  problem	  when	  there	  is	  no	  common	  forum,	  only	  individual	  disciplinary	  courts.	  
	  
There	   should	   be	   both	   a	   well	   functioning	   scientific	   communities	   and	   they	   should	   be	  
interconnected	  and	  well	  connected	  to	  the	  society	  globally.	  I	  guess	  we	  are	  building	  this	  through	  
networking	   and	   communication,	   openness	   and	   availability	   of	   popular	   information	   and	  
willingness	   to	   interact	   with	   public/society	   (CERN	  web	   page	   is	   exemplary)	   and	   also	   interest	   in	  
other	  scientific	  communities	  –	  collaboration	  across	  the	  disciplinary	  borders.	  Ethical	  aspects	  are	  
also	  important.	  Scientists	  should	  get	  ethics	  courses.	  
	  
A	  global	  scientific	  community	  cannot	  be	  separated	  from	  a	  global	  community	  tout	  court,	  but	  one	  
in	  which	  values	  and	  meaning	  are	  not	  lost	  as	  they	  are	  currently	  being	  in	  the	  social	  media,	  despite	  
the	  positive	  features	  of	  the	  latter.	  But	  this	  in	  turn	  requires	  the	  difficult	  task	  of	  finding	  a	  scientific	  
basis	   for	   value.	  Modern	  philosophy	  has	   failed	  due	   to	   the	   absence	  of	   grounding	  of	  morality	   in	  
science,	  including	  information	  science.	  I	  see	  information	  science	  (supported	  by	  my	  LIR)	  as	  one	  of	  
the	  few	  new	  ways	  to	  go.	  
	  
By	   cultivating	   our	   affective	   sides,	   so	   that	  we	   are	   not	   cold	   hollow,	   heartless	   creatures	   of	   pure	  



















PART	  II:	  SPECIFIC	  
	  
1. What	  is	  “fragwürdig”	  (ger.),	  i.e.	  what	  deserves	  to	  be	  asked	  about?	  
	  
How	  the	  information	  content	  in	  a	  sequenced	  form	  is	  equivalent	  with	  the	  information	  content	  in	  a	  
3-­‐dim	  (4-­‐dim,	  etc.)	  form.	  
	  
Why	  the	  speed	  of	  light	  is	  constant?	  Is	  the	  mass	  equivalent	  to	  matter?	  
	  
a.	  What	  should	  be	  explored?	  	  
	  
The	  development	  of	   an	   Integral	   Biomathics	   necessitates	   a	   better	   apprehension	  of	   the	  
interactions	   between	   levels	   with	   different	   complexities,	   temporalities	   and	   multiple	  
realizabilities.	  	  
	  
The	  difference	  between	  6+7	  and	  5+8	  
	  
Cognition,	   intelligence,	   foundations	  of	   life.	  The	   first	   two	   in	  order	   to	  better	  understand	  




Fuzziness,	  vagueness	  /	  senescence	  	  
	  
The	   “not	   null”	   effect	   of	   ether	   drift	   experiment,	   the	   Cosmic	   microwave	   background	  
anisotropy,	   the	   clock	   corrections	   in	   geostationary	   satellites	   and	   other	   enigmatic	  
problems.	  
	  
b.	  What	  kind	  of	  research	  is	  interesting	  and	  possible	  today?	  	  
	  
No	  frontier	  should	  be	  raised;	  it	  is	  while	  doing	  research	  that	  new	  ideas	  emerge.	  
	  
Basic	   research,	   philosophy.	   Once	  we	   understand	  what	   to	   produce,	  we	   are	   technically	  
first-­‐class.	  Presently,	  there	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  orientation	  
	  
I	  would	   personally	   be	   interested	   in	   the	   research	   in	   natural	   intelligence	   and	   cognition,	  
origins	  and	  evolution	  of	  life	  and	  connections	  between	  inorganic	  and	  organic	  matter.	  All	  
of	  that	  may	  be	  done	  within	  info-­‐computational	  framework.	  
	  
A	  research	  on	  the	  new	  space	  energy	  alternative	  to	  the	  nuclear	  one,	  a	  research	  on	  a	  new	  
kind	  of	  propulsion	  mechanism	  based	  on	  a	  gravity	  field	  control	  (around	  a	  spacecraft)	  for	  







c.	  Who	  is	  interested	  to	  fund	  such	  kind	  of	  novel	  fundamental	  research?	  
	  
Research	   organisms	   and	   associations	   who	   can	   dispose	   of	   funds	   which	   could	   lead	   to	  
important	  results,	  but	  also	  be	  lost	  in	  non	  fructuous	  attempts.	  
	  
Who	  should	  be	  interested	  in	  funding	  basic	  research?	  The	  King,	  Meacenas,	  etc.	  
	  
One	  may	  expect	  that	  each	  of	  existing	  funding	  bodies	  should	  be	  supporting	  even	  this	  kind	  
of	   fundamental	   research.	   The	   sad	   fact	   is	   that	  many	   of	   them	   do	   not	   dare	   to	   take	   risk	  
supporting	  an	  emerging	  research	  field.	  In	  that	  category	  it	  must	  be	  something	  promising	  
practical	  applications	  within	  a	  few	  years	  to	  be	  supported.	  
	  





d.	  Which	  ideas	  can	  be	  funded?	  
	  
The	  problem	  is	   that	   It	   is	  difficult	   to	  evaluate	  the	   interest	  of	  an	   idea	  before	   it	  has	  been	  
developed.	  
	  
I	  don’t	  know.	  
	  
Those	  ideas	  which	  can	  help	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  this	  enormous	  amount	  of	  knowledge	  and	  
information	   that	   we	   have	   now.	   Producing	   even	   more	   information	   and	   knowledge	  
without	  common	  system	  makes	  things	  even	  worse	  for	  a	  human	  to	  grasp.	  
	  
That's	  highly	  polemical.	  
	  
Possibly	  fuzziness,	  vagueness,	  off-­‐focus.	  	  
	  
Gravito-­‐inertial	  effect	  for	  a	  new	  type	  of	  propulsion	  system	  for	  interplanetary	  travels.	  
	  
Heterodyne	   Resonance	   Mechanism	   for	   accessing	   the	   hidden	   space	   energy	   and	  
development	  of	  technique	  alternative	  to	  the	  nuclear	  energy.	  
	  
	  
e.	  Which	  solutions	  were	  suggested	  in	  the	  past	  and	  which	  results	  came	  out	  of	  them?	  
	  
A	  lot	  of	  data	  have	  been	  collected,	  but	  have	  not	  been	  correctly	  analyzed	  nor	  exploited	  





Many	   interesting	   models	   have	   been	   developed,	   but	   they	   are	   essentially	   of	   a	   local	  
nature,	   or	   impose	   non-­‐realistic	   hypotheses	   without	   any	   regard	   for	   the	   known	  
experimental	  results.	  
	  
There	  was	  an	  effort	  to	  solve	  the	  logical	  problems	  of	  theoretical	  genetics,	  but	  they	  were	  
failed.	  
	  
In	  what	  field?	  What	  types	  of	  solutions?	  
	  
The	  best	  and	  the	  worst	  was	  done.	  
	  
in	   the	   past	   the	   research	   on	   a	   new	   propulsion	   mechanism	   was	   classified	   and	   on	   an	  
alternative	   energy	  was	   suppressed.	   In	   both	   cases	   there	  was	   a	   lack	   of	   serious	   physical	  
theory	  (the	  need	  of	  an	  alternative	  	  concept	  of	  space	  have	  not	  been	  envisioned).	  
	  	  
f.	  Which	  paradigms	  do	  we	  have	  at	  hand	  in	  biology	  and	  computation	  today?	  
	  
They	  are	  essentially	  specific	  to	  a	  small	  domain	  and	  more	  or	  less	  reductionist.	  
	  
That	  we	  pretend	  that	  our	  way	  of	  thinking	  is	  rational	  (although	  it	  is	  not).	  
	  
In	  biology,	  we	  have	  evolution	  theory.	  It	  is	  not	  accepted	  by	  all	  people,	  and	  I	  am	  not	  sure	  
that	  most	  of	  those	  who	  claim	  to	  accept	  it	  face	  to	  all	  its	  deep	  consequences.	  About	  
"computation"	  theories,	  may	  I	  cite	  the	  one	  of	  Bruno	  Marchal,	  that	  I	  heard	  about	  
recently,	  and	  which	  deserves	  attention	  due	  to	  its	  deep	  implication	  in	  biology	  (and	  in	  




In	  Biology	  and	  particularly	  in	  living	  organism	  there	  is	  an	  important	  energy	  issue	  that	  
could	  not	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  currently	  adopted	  space	  concept.	  
	  
	  
g.	  Do	  we	  need	  a	  transposition	  or	  an	  integration	  of	  existing	  paradigms	  from	  other	  disciplines	  
into	  biology?	  	  
	  
A	  fusion	  of	  several	  disciplinary	  approaches	  particularly	  tailored	  to	  be	  of	  use	  in	  biology	  
and	  in	  interpreting	  the	  host	  of	  data.	  
	  
No,	  rather	  the	  other	  way	  around:	  if	  it	  works	  in	  biology,	  it	  is	  as	  rational	  as	  mechanics	  or	  







I	  would	  say	  so,	  computational	  paradigm	  is	  suitable	  for	  biology	  too,	  but	  computation	  is	  
generalized	  from	  Turing	  Machine	  to	  Natural	  Computation.	  
	  
Since	  the	  definitions	  of	  many	  paradigms	  cannot	  be	  fully	  unambiguous,	  
this	  question	  cannot	  be	  answered	  exactly.	  
	  
	  
h.	  Do	  we	  need	  an	  entirely	  new	  biological	  paradigm	  (What	  is	  life?	  …	  Life	  itself	  …	  More	  than	  life	  
itself)?	  If	  yes,	  how	  can	  we	  develop	  it?	  
	   	  
We	   need	   to	   erase	   the	   frontiers	   between	   different	   specialties,	   and	   also	   between	  
theoreticians	  and	  experimentalists.	  However	  this	  is	  almost	  impossible…	  
	  
Biology	  has	  as	  much	  with	   life	  to	  do	  as	  the	  relationship	  between	  monkeys	  and	  humans	  
with	   the	   Holy	   Bible	   and	   God’s	   works.	   There	   are	   countless	   forms	   on	   the	   boundary	  
between	   “life”	   and	   “non-­‐life”.	   If	   yes,	   how	   can	   we	   develop	   it?	   By	   revisitring	   our	  
elementary	  school	  textbooks	  and	  discover	  what	  nonsense	  we	  have	  been	  taught.	  
	  
The	   word	   I	   contest	   here	   is	   “entirely”:	   to	   expect	   that	   something	   will	   be	   better	   if	   it	   is	  
“entirely”	  new	  is	  an	  expression	  of	  the	  paradigm	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  changed.	  
	  
Yes	  we	  need.	  The	  problem	   is	   that	  defining	   life	  have	   in	  common	  with	  defining	  a	  cloud,	  
that,	   viewed	   from	   far,	   it	   seems	   to	   be	   obvious	   what	   it	   is,	   but	   bounding	   it	   exactly	   is	  
impossible.	   More	   seriously,	   there	   are	   two	   extrema:	   no	   difference	   between	   living	  
systems	   and,	   say,	   a	   stone,	   and	   at	   the	   opposite,	   the	   restriction	   to	   some	   groups	   of	  
humans,	  based	  on	  religion	   (which	  one,	   I	  do	  not	  know,	   religions	  do	  not	  agree	  between	  
themselves).	   In	   the	  past,	   life	  was	   located	   in	   the	  human	  heart.	  Now	  we	  know	  that	   it	   is	  
erroneous.	   Being	   "conscious"	   to	   be	   "alive",	   some	   people	   deduce	   various	   things:	  
difference	  between	   living	  entities	  and	  non	   living	  entities,	  existence	  of	   the	  soul,	  special	  
role	   of	   the	   human	   specy,	   etc.	   Would	   somebody	   claim	   that	   all	   that	   is	   void,	   the	   reply	  
would	   be:	   can't	   you	   realize	   that	   you	   differ	   from	   a	   stone	   ?	   (i.e.	   obviously	   you	   should	  
realize	  that).	  But	  would	  we	  admit	  that,	  just	  as	  the	  stone,	  we	  cannot	  understand	  ourself,	  
that	   the	   apparent	   problem	   above	   vanishes:	   it	   is	   normal	   that	   we	   cannot	   explain	   our	  
apparent	  difference	  with	   a	   stone	  or	   anything	  we	   like,	   just	   for	   the	   same	   reason	   that	   a	  
stone	  can't.	  Personnally,	  I	  have	  no	  proposal	  to	  define	  life.	  I	  may	  just	  notice	  that	  very	  old	  
theories	  (still	  in	  vigor	  for	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  people),	  contain	  so	  much	  obvious	  defects	  
that	  they	  should	  be	  discarded.	  Alas,	  they	  are	  not,	  and	  the	  crimes	  and	  wars	  they	  provoke	  
are	  disasters	  since	  millenaries.	  
	  
Start	  with	  basics	  =	  thermodynamics.	  	  Living	  things	  are	  dissipative	  structures.	  
	  







i.	  (How)	  can	  we	  make	  biology	  as	  “good”	  and	  “serious”	  science	  as	  physics?	  	  
	  
By	  developing	  adequate	  encompassing	  dynamic	  models	   rather	   than	  restricting	  to	   local	  
phenomena.	  
	  
By	  educating	  people	  to	  see	  the	  world	  as	  is	  and	  not	  as	  decreed	  by...	  
	  
How	  can	  we	  make	  physics	  as	  “good”	  and	  “serious”	  topic	  as	  biology?	  I	  am	  a	  physicist,	  but	  
I	  do	  not	  think	  that	  physics	  is	  the	  paradigm	  of	  science	  anymore.	  Instead,	  computing	  is	  the	  
paradigm.	  http://www.springerlink.com/content/g14t483510156726/	  
	  
Biologists	  must	   integrate	   the	   aspects	   of	   physics	   that	   are	  most	   appropriate	   and	   at	   the	  
same	   time	   the	  most	   difficult,	   such	   as	   new	   conceptions	   of	   the	   absence	   of	   background	  
space-­‐time,	  determinism	  rather	  than	  randomness	  and	  non-­‐computability	  (see	  below).	  
	  
Those	  who	  rank	  biology	  as	  less	  good	  or	  serious	  than	  physics	  are	  just	  idiots.	  I	  hope	  there	  
are	  no	  such	  guys.	  Both	  fields	  are	  good	  and	  serious.	  
	  
As	   a	  biologist	   I	   find	   this	  question	   insulting.	   	   Biology	   is	  much	   richer	   and	  more	   complex	  
than	  physics,	  thus	  you	  might	  want	  to	  reverse	  the	  question	  and	  ask	  how	  we	  could	  make	  
physics	  as	  good	  and	  serious	  as	  biology.	  
	  
By	  linking	  the	  two	  through	  thermodynamics.	  	  
	  
	  
j.	  What	  kind	  of	  mathematics	  do	  we	  need	  to	  help	  this	  scientific	  (r)evolution?	  	  
	  
All	   domains	   can	   be	   adequate	   to	   solve	   some	   problems.	   The	   difficulty	   is	   to	   make	   a	  
junction	   between	  multiple	   local	   approaches,	   each	   one	   of	   them	  well	   adapted	   to	   some	  
particular	  situation	  (complexity	  level,	  material	  composition,	  temporal	  constraints,	  etc.),	  	  
and	  a	  global	  apprehension.	  	  
	  
Computing	  is	  a	  new	  sort	  of	  formal	  tool	  able	  to	  behave	  in	  time	  and	  in	  space	  (in	  physical	  
world,	   like	   in	   robotics).	   So	  we	  need	   computing	   for	   future	   sciences,	   and	   that	   is	   exactly	  
what	  is	  being	  developed.	  And	  we	  need	  much	  more	  and	  especially	  more	  intelligent	  and	  
cognitive	  computing.	  
	  
The	  mathematical	  constructs	  are	  available,	  they	  only	  need	  to	  be	  applied.	  
	  
	  
k.	  Is	  mathematics	  really	  an	  abstract	  science?	  	  
	  
Mathematics	  may	  seem	  abstract	  if	  you	  read	  mathematical	  publications	  because	  the	  real	  












Yes.	   Even	   the	   natural	   numbers	   are	   a	   construct	   in	   our	   head.	   An	   other	   name	   for	  
mathematical	  sciences	  could	  be	  "modeling".	  
	  
Mathematics	   is	  abstract	  science.	  It	  could	  lead	  to	  better	  understanding	  the	  quantitative	  
relations	   if	  the	  assumptions	  are	  correct,	  but	   it	  could	  also	   lead	  to	  a	  false	   image	   if	  some	  




l.	  How	  can	  we	  build	  or	  discover	  biological	  mathematics?	  	  
	  
There	   are	   already	   good	   models,	   their	   development,	   diffusion	   and	   testing	   should	   be	  
helped	  so	  that	  their	  defaults	  can	  be	  corrected	  to	  lead	  to	  more	  practical	  applications.	  	  
	  
By	  gopind	  back	  to	  the	  basics	  like	  a+b=c.	  What	  is	  important	  and	  relevant	  on	  “a+b=c”	  
	  
Again,	   future	   is	   about	   computing	   tools	   not	   in	   the	   first	   place	  mathematical	   ones.	   They	  
will	  get	  subsumed	  under	  computing.	  
	  
No	   difference	   between	   mathematics	   and	   biological	   mathematics.	   All	   that	   are	   just	  
constructed	   structures	   in	   our	   head.	   Fortunately,	   we	   are	   most	   time	   (but	   not	   always)	  
successful	  to	  build	  math	  concepts	  the	  same	  way	  for	  any	  of	  us.	  That's	  much	  more	  difficult	  
with	  non	  math	  concepts,	  due	  to	  the	  differences	  of	  culture	  and	  language.	  
	  
Try	  a	  semiotics	  of	  math	  in	  conjunction	  with	  (Peircean)	  semiotics	  of	  life.	  	  
	  
Relying	   on	   correct	   space	   concept	   and	   correct	   image	   on	   the	  microworld	   including	   the	  
particle	  physics,	  atoms,	  molecules.	  Understanding	  the	  Quantum	  mechanical	  phenomena	  
by	  classical	  models	  based	  on	  the	  correct	  space	  consept.	  
	  
m.	  Can	  we	  capture,	  comprehend,	  measure,	  realize	  (“erfassen”,	  ger.)	  life	  with	  a	  (digital)	  
computer?	  
	  
'Digital'	  computation	  could	  be	  effective	  at	  the	  local	  level.	  However	  the	  global	  logic	  of	  life	  
relies	  on	  the	  interplay	  among	  a	  hierarchy	  of	   local	   logics,	  each	  with	  its	  own	  temporality	  









Yes,	  we	  can	  model,	  better	  than	  with	  any	  other	  tool.	  
	  
Computer	  just	  calculate	  what	  we	  programme.	  No	  programme,	  no	  computation.	  
	  
Understanding	  the	  affective	  ways	  of	  knowing,	  and	  cracking	  the	  hard	  problem	  (how	  do	  
joy,	   compassion,	   comfort,	   reason,	   logic,	   and	   consciousness	   emerge	   from	   biology?)	  




n.	  What	  kind	  of	  computer	  has	  to	  be	  the	  one	  that	  captures/models	  life?	  (cf.	  Feynman’s	  
argument	  about	  quantum	  computing).	  
	  
I	  think	  it	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  discovered	  because,	  as	  long	  as	  I	  know,	  the	  problem	  exposed	  
above	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  raised	  in	  computer	  science.	  	  
	  
New	   computational	  models	   are	   being	   developed	   based	   on	   organic	   computing.	   So	  we	  
might	  expect	  those	  new	  approaches	  improve	  our	  capabilities	  to	  properly	  model	  organic	  
systems	  
	  
In	  my	   view,	  no	   computer	   can	   capture	   life.	   A	   computer	   cannot	  model	   life	   but	   only	   an	  
abstraction	  of	  it	  that	  represents	  an	  enormous	  reduction.	  
	  
When	  quantum	  computers	  will	  be	  able	  to	  output	  the	  decimals	  of	  pi	  with	  many	  digits,	  I	  
shall	  look	  at	  them	  closer.	  
	  
One	  that	  realizes	  that	  energy	  is	  in	  shortage.	  	  
	  
o.	  What	  is	  the	  use	  of	  computing	  and	  Internet	  in	  biology?	  
	  
They	  play	  a	  large	  role	  to	  collect	  and	  analyze	  a	  great	  number	  of	  important	  data,	  but	  more	  
theoretical	   studies	   should	   be	   done	   to	   approach	   the	   real	   characteristics	   of	   life.	   	   For	  
instance	  the	  Wandering	  Logic	  Intelligence	  (Plamen	  Simeonov)	  opens	  the	  way	  for	  a	  more	  
dynamic	   computing/Internet	   approach.	   It	   seems	   to	   have	   means	   for	   studying	   the	  
problem	  raised	  in	  (m)	  above	  since	  "The	  intelligence	  of	  a	  wandering	  network	  at	  a	  certain	  
point	  of	   time	   is	   an	  aggregation	  of	   its	   logics	   and	   their	   interplay".	   In	   fact,	  MES	  and	  WLI	  
have	  comparable	  organizations,	  if	  we	  compare	  a	  "netbot"	  to	  a	  CR	  and	  a	  "shuttle"	  to	  the	  
selection	  and	  transmission	  of	  a	  procedure	  (hence	  a	  logic),	  and	  the	  "Intelligence"	  to	  the	  
interplay	  among	  the	  CR	  logics.	  	  
	  






Bioinformatics	  is	  all	  about	  computing.	  Internet	  is	  important	  for	  communication.	  
	  
Neural	   networks,	   genetic	   algorithms,	   etc.,	   are	   just	   optimization	  methods	   with	   names	  
evoking	  biology.	  No	  more.	  Until	  now,	  I	  did	  not	  investigate	  more	  about	  relations	  between	  
biology,	  computing,	  and	  internet.	  
	  
p.	  What	  is	  the	  use	  of	  biology	  in	  computing	  and	  Internet?	  Has	  it	  a	  use	  in	  computing?	  	  
	  
Discovering	   supernumerary	   sets,	   discovering	   unified	   field	   theory,	   applying	  
interdependences	  between	  “where”,	  “what	  kind”	  and	  “how	  many”	  
	  
Biology	  is	  the	  source	  of	  inspiration	  for	  computing	  (including	  Internet).	  
	  
	  
q.	  What	  can	  computing	  and	  Internet	  learn	  from	  biology?	  	  
	  
A	  better	  understanding	  of	  biological	  organization	  and	  natural	  selection	  could	  give	  ideas	  
for	  developing	  a	  more	  performing	  Internet.	  
	  
That	   sequences	   and	   commutative	   collections	   are	   two	   different	   concepts	   that	   we	  
produce	  in	  our	  brain	  and	  visualise	  (hallucinate)	  ont	  the	  picture	  before	  us	  
	  
Learn	  how	  to	  effectively	  cope	  with	  complexity.	  
	  
	  
r.	  What	  can	  biology	  learn	  from	  computing	  and	  Internet?	  
	  




Use	  them	  as	  tools	  for	  modeling,	  computation	  and	  communication.	  
	  
s.	  What	  are	  the	  unique	  characteristics	  of	  living	  that	  distinguish	  it	  from	  non-­‐living	  (recall	  the	  
recent	  discovery	  of	  the	  Mono	  lake	  bacteria)	  and	  from	  machines?	  
	  
Two	   necessary	   characteristics:	   (i)	   the	   existence	   of	   multiform	   components	   (our	  
"Multiplicity	   Principle")	   which	   ensures	   the	   formation	   of	   components	   of	   increasing	  
complexity	  order,	  with	  possibility	  of	  swiches	  between	  their	  non-­‐connected	  lower	  order	  
decompositions;	   (ii)	   the	  different	  temporalities	  of	   functional	  subsystems	  which	   impose	  
drastic	   temporal	   constraints	   on	   those	   subsystems.	   Both	   play	   a	   role	   in	   the	   interplay	  






“Life”	  (just	  a	  wild	  shot	  of	  a	  definition	  on	  the	  spot)	  is	  the	  bijective	  congruence	  between	  
one-­‐´,	  two-­‐	  and	  threedimensional	  arrangements.	  
	  
A	  set	  of	  self-­‐*	  properties.	  (But	  people	  are	  starting	  to	  build	  self-­‐*	  machines).	  
	  
A	   key	   unique	   characteristic	   is	   non-­‐computability	   and	   higher	   ethical	   value	   of	   living	  
systems	  than	  inert	  matter-­‐energy,	  although,	  as	  Floridi	  has	  pointed	  out,	  the	  latter	  is	  also	  
deserving	  of	  respect,	  as	  a	  component	  of	  existence.	   I	  will	   change	  this	  view	   if	  and	  when	  
you	  tell	  me	  how	  respect	  for	  existence	  can	  be	  programmed…	  
	  
Internally	  informed	  by	  the	  genome	  so	  as	  to	  be	  able	  to	  self-­‐heal.	  
	  
The	  living	  is	  a	  sophisticating	  programing-­‐like	  algorithm	  that	  constantly	  use	  and	  interact	  
with	  the	  zero	  point	  energy	  of	  space	  in	  everlasting	  process.	  The	  non-­‐iving	  process	  is	  not	  
everlasting.	  It	  is	  externally	  invoked	  and	  then	  terminates.	  
	  
	  
t.	  Which	  are	  the	  boundary	  forms	  and	  procedures	  of	  natural	  and	  artificial	  life?	  
	  
I	  suppose	  artificial	  life	  is	  not	  (yet?)	  endowed	  with	  as	  much	  multiplicity	  (complexity,	  
temporality,	  multiform	  objects)	  as	  biological	  systems.	  	  
	  
There	  is	  no	  artificial	  life	  and	  we	  have	  no	  agreement	  what	  we	  mean	  under	  the	  word	  “life”	  
	  
Natural	  life	  relies	  not	  only	  on	  chemical	  but	  also	  on	  zeropoint	  energy	  at	  Quantum	  
mechanical	  level.	  Arificial	  life	  does	  not	  rely	  on	  zeropoint	  energy.	  
	  
	  
u.	  Which	  states	  and	  modes	  has	  a	  living	  organism	  compared	  to	  a	  computer	  (an	  artificial	  one)	  
today?	  
	  
Multiform	  components,	  several	  local	  temporalities	  and	  interplay	  among	  a	  hierarchy	  of	  
multi-­‐scale	  local	  logics.	  
	  
Nonsequenced,	   moredimensional	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   mechanical	   which	   negates	   the	  




Multiple	  simultaneous	  projects,	  flexibly	  allowing	  temporary	  focusing.	  
	  
	  
v.	  What	  kind	  of	  energy	  and	  resources	  needs	  a	  living	  organism	  compared	  to	  a	  computer	  (an	  	  	  






Both	  need	  energy,	  but	  under	  different	  varieties.	  
	  
Entirely	  different	  basic	  concept.	  
	  
No	  electricity,	  no	  computer.	  
	  
Living	  has	  multiple	  possible	  sources,	  computer	  only	  one.	  
	  
w.	  What	  kind	  of	  exchange	  with	  the	  external	  environment	  has	  a	  living	  organism	  compared	  to	  a	  
computer	  (an	  artificial	  one)	  today?	  
	  
The	  great	  variety	  of	  Its	  sensory	  and	  receptor	  organs	  allow	  for	  a	  multitude	  of	  specialized	  
exchanges	  and	  communication.	  
	  
There	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  “a”	  living	  organism,	  as	  opposed	  to	  there	  being	  a	  unique	  
computing	  apparatus.	  Living	  is	  always	  a	  multitude.	  
	  
A	  living	  system	  has	  metabolism,	  unlike	  computers.	  
	  
The	  computer	  does	  nothing	  as	  long	  as	  there	  is	  no	  running	  programme:	  a	  human	  
product.	  
Multiple	  contacts	  with	  complex	  environment	  	  
	  
x.	  What	  defines	  liveness,	  intelligence	  and	  consciousness	  in	  organisms	  and	  machines?	  
	  
The	   development	   of	   a	  memory	   containing	   a	   kind	   of	   flexible	   internal	  model	   (what	  we	  
have	   called	  an	  Archetypal	  Core).	  AC	   is	   formed	  by	  higher	  order	  multiform	  components	  
relating	  to	  essential	  memories	  connected	  by	  loops	  of	  strong	  and	  fast	  links	  allowing	  that	  
an	   activation	  of	   some	  of	   them	  extends	   to	   a	   larger	  part	   of	  AC,	   is	   self-­‐maintained	   for	   a	  
long	  time,	  and	  is	  largely	  diffused	  to	  lower	  levels	  (through	  decompositions	  and	  switches	  
between	  different	  decompositions	  of	  multiform	  objects.	  
	  
What	  are	  these	  words?	  Do	  you	  really	  think	  machines	  have	  conscience?	  
	  
Aliveness	  is	  not	  really	  a	  term	  used	  for	  computers	  other	  than	  metaphorically.	  Intelligence	  
in	   computers	   tries	   to	   mimic	   human	   intelligence,	   but	   it	   is	   far	   beyond.	   Partly	   because	  
GOAI	  defined	  intelligence	  as	  symbol	  manipulation.	  Machines	  have	  no	  consciousness	  and	  
we	  don’t	  even	  know	  what	  it	  would	  be	  for	  a	  machine	  to	  be	  conscious.	  
	  







Recognition	  that	  not	  everything	  can	  be	  defined,	  except	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  as	  a	  process,	  
would	  be	  a	  start	  on	  the	  “new	  paradigm”.	  
	  
Internal	  drive,	  flexible	  partial	  focusing	  	  
	  
	  
y.	  How	  to	  determine	  the	  physical	  scales	  and	  operational	  modes	  manifesting	  these	  properties?	  
	  
In	  the	  human	  brain,	  the	  neural	  support	  of	  the	  AC	  is	  the	  Neural	  Structural	  Core,	  
discovered	  by	  Hagmann	  et	  al.	  (PLoS	  Biology	  6-­‐7,	  2008).	  
	  
by	  learning	  to	  think	  a	  bit	  more	  exactly	  one	  can	  generate	  the	  tools	  needed	  for	  this	  task.	  
Hierarchy	  theory	  might	  help.	  	  
	  
	  
z.	  (How)	  can	  we	  model	  the	  above	  characteristics	  adequately	  with	  the	  available	  tools	  and	  
methods	  at	  hand	  today?	  
	  
A	  dynamic	  category	  theory	  is	  at	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  ME(N)S	  dynamic	  model.	  In	  particular	  it	  
helps	   explaining	   the	   binding	   problem	   and	   the	   emergence	   of	   higher	   complexity,	   up	   to	  
higher	  cognitive	  processes	  and	  consciousness.	  However	  it	  remains	  the	  main	  problem:	  to	  
find	   means	   to	   'compute'	   the	   switches	   between	   non-­‐connected	   decompositions	   of	  
multiform	   components,	   essential	   in	   the	   interplay	   of	   the	  multi-­‐scale	   logics;	   I	   think	  WLI	  
could	  probably	  help.	  
	  
By	  not	   ignoring	   the	  difference	  between	  3+3	  and	  2+4	   (even	   if	  Teacher	  has	   told	  us	   that	  




2.	  Which	  paradoxes	  and	  unsolved	  questions	  do	  we	  have	  in	  biology,	  computing	  and	  Internet	  today?	  
	  
To	  develop	  other	  kinds	  of	  "computation"	  able	  to	  solve	  the	  above	  mentioned	  problem.	  
	  
How	  does	  a	  sequence	  translate	  into	  a	  commutative	  collection	  and	  back	  
	  
The	  biggest	  unsolved	  questions	  are	  origins	  and	  mechanisms	  of	  life,	  structures	  and	  functions	  of	  
the	  brain.	  
	  












That	   sequences	   (time	   is	   also	   a	   sequence)	   are	   a	   one-­‐dimensional	   picture	   of	   an	   n-­‐dimensional	  
assembly.	  That	  a	  living	  organism	  is	  an	  n-­‐dimensional	  unfolding	  of	  a	  sequence.	  
	  
Those	  are	  info-­‐computational.	  
	  
Stability	  in	  the	  face	  of	  unexpected	  insults	  	  
	  
	  
4.	  What	  are	  machines	  and	  computers	  from	  the	  viewpoint	  of	  biology?	  
	  
For	  the	  moment,	  they	  probably	  have	  a	  much	  less	  intricate	  organization,	  with	  no	  interplay	  of	  




Programmes	  are	  of	  interest,	  not	  computers.	  When	  the	  power	  is	  turned	  on,	  a	  programme	  is	  
immediatly	  loaded.	  When	  the	  computer	  apparently	  does	  nothing,	  e.g.	  when	  waiting	  for	  a	  mouse	  
clic,	  there	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  programme	  currently	  running.	  Computer	  technology	  accelerates	  what	  we	  
can	  do	  "by	  hand".	  
	  
Explicit,	  crisp,	  as	  opposed	  to	  vague	  
	  
	  





Matching	  place	  (spot	   in	  time)	  to	  extents	  and	  qualities	   Is	  "biocomputing"	  different	   in	  kind	  from	  
"classical	  computing"	  –	  yes	  
	  
Yes,	  biocomputing	  is	  a	  developing	  field,	  which	  changes	  as	  we	  learn	  about	  biology.	  
	  
No.	  
I	  suspect	  not	  yet.	  
	  
	  
6.	   What	   is	   computable	   (predicative)	   in	   biology,	   and	   what	   is	   noncomputable	   (impredicative)	   in	  
biology?	   Since	   it	   has	   been	   contended	   that	   not	   everything	   is	   computable	   under	   the	   current	  
definition	  of	   computability	  by	  algorithmic	  means	   (Rosen[1],	   Louie[2]),	  do	  we	  need	   to	  expand	   the	  






Local	  models	  are	  computable.	  What	  seems	  non-­‐computable	  is:	  	  
(i)	   To	   determine	   if	   2	   non-­‐connected	   patterns	   can	   be	   functionally	   equivalent,	   thus	   giving	   two	  
decompositions	   of	   the	   same	   multiform	   component,	   with	   possibility	   of	   a	   switch	   between	   them;	  
indeed	  it	  would	  require	  to	  examine	  a	  too	  large	  number	  of	  situations	  in	  a	  too	  short	  lapse	  of	  time.	  	  
(ii)	  To	  find	  out	  the	  result	  of	  the	  interplay	  among	  local	  logics,	  taking	  account	  of	  the	  freedom	  degrees	  
given	  by	  the	  possibility	  of	  such	  switches.	  
(iii)	   To	   'compute'	   the	   cascade	   of	   temporal	   and/or	   structural	   changes	   which	   can	   be	   induced	   by	  
complex	  events	  processing.	  
	  
Genetic	  mutation	  -­‐>	  surjective	  map	  commutative-­‐>sequenced	  (writing	  the	  DNA)	  
Genetic	  variation-­‐>	  surjective	  map	  sequenced-­‐>commutative	  (reading	  the	  DNA)	  
	  
Since	   it	   has	   been	   contended	   that	   not	   everything	   is	   computable	   under	   the	   current	   definition	   of	  
computability	  by	  algorithmic	  means	  (Rosen1,	  Louie2),	  do	  we	  need	  to	  expand	  the	  current	  definition	  
of	  computability	  in	  order	  to	  make	  living	  systems	  computable?	  
	  
Do.	  Just	  apply	  it.	  
	  
Count	  that	  what	  has	  traditionally	  been	  neglected,	  the	  difference	  between	  4+5	  and	  1+8,	  e.g.	  
	  
Absolutely.	  As	  they	  actually	  solve	  their	  computational	  problems	  in	  a	  satisfactory	  way.	  
	  
As	  you	  will	  have	  understood	  from	  the	  above,	  I	  respectfully	  disagree	  with	  the	  formulations	  of	  these	  
points.	   If	   living	   systems	   are	   not	   computable,	   expanding	   the	   definition	   of	   computability	   is	   a	   false	  
problem.	   If	   computability	   is	  not	   the	  key	   issue	   in	  biology	   (and	   I	  believe	   it	   is	  not),	   the	  approach	  of	  
bringing	  in	  concepts	  from	  the	  indicated	  disciplines	  is	  not	  as	  important	  as	  an	  overall	  compassionate	  
philosophical	  and	  logical	  (in	  my	  expanded	  sense	  of	  logic)	  framework	  that	  addresses	  issues	  in	  all	  of	  
them.	   This	  means	   paying	   attention	   to	   weaknesses	   in	   such	  widely	   accepted	   theories	   as	   those	   of	  
Wheeler	  and	  Tegmark	  in	  cosmology;	  Maturana	  and	  Varela	  in	  systems	  and	  biology;	  and	  Peirce	  and	  
his	  followers	  in	  philosophy	  and	  (still	  standard)	  logic.	  
	  
This	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  convention.	  We	  can	  do	  formal	  calculus	  with	  the	  axioms	  we	  like.	  As	  soon	  as	  we	  
can	  do	  it,	  we	  can	  store	  it	  on	  computers	  with	  appropriate	  conventions	  of	  representations,	  then	  we	  
can	  programme	  calculations	  on	  them.	  Again,	  we	  should	  not	  focus	  on	  computers:	  we	  should	  focus	  
on	  the	  mathematical	  models	  we	  need	  for	  various	  purposes.	  Once	  the	  model	  defined	  in	  our	  head,	  
why	  shouldn't	  it	  not	  stored	  in	  a	  computer,	  then	  give	  raise	  to	  calculation	  programmes	  ?	  
	  
Again,	   the	   affective	   domain	   and	   the	   affective	   ways	   of	   knowing	   may	   fall	   outside	   of	   the	  
computational	   domain.	   	   We	   can’t	   really	   know	   until	   we	   understanding	   the	   affective	   ways	   of	  
knowing,	   and	   crack	   the	   hard	   problem:	   how	   do	   joy,	   compassion,	   comfort,	   reason,	   logic,	   and	  
consciousness	  emerge	  from	  biology?	  
	  





I	  would	  rather	  imagine	  making	  computation	  more	  like	  the	  living.	  
	  
	  
7.	  What	  would	  be	  the	  contributions	  of	  in	  a	  new	  definition	  of	  computability	  for	  biology?	  
	  
Classical	   mathematics	   such	   as	  mathematical	   biology,	   systems	   theory,	   information	   theory	   and	  
chaos	  theory	  are	  important	  to	  develop	  good	  'local'	  models.	  A	  dynamic	  category	  theory	  allows	  to	  
describe	  a	  dynamic	  model	  such	  as	  ME(N)S	  which	  makes	  apparent	  the	  main	  characteristics	  at	  the	  
basis	  of	  the	  global	  dynamic.	  A	  mixture	  of	  MES	  and	  WLI	  could	  perhaps	  lead	  to	  develop	  a	  new	  kind	  
of	  "computation"	  adapted	  to	  make	  the	  global	  logic	  'computable'	  in	  an	  adequate	  sense.	  	  	  
	  
That	  one	  understands	  the	  theory	  behind	  the	  workings	  of	  genetics.	  	  
	  
Those	  are	   the	   fundamental	  disciplines	  which	  constitute	   the	   foundations	  of	  a	  new	  definition	  of	  
computability	  for	  biology	  
	  
As	   you	  will	   have	   understood	   from	   the	   above,	   I	   respectfully	   disagree	  with	   the	   formulations	   of	  
these	  points.	  If	  living	  systems	  are	  not	  computable,	  expanding	  the	  definition	  of	  computability	  is	  a	  
false	   problem.	   If	   computability	   is	   not	   the	   key	   issue	   in	   biology	   (and	   I	   believe	   it	   is	   not),	   the	  
approach	  of	  bringing	  in	  concepts	  from	  the	  indicated	  disciplines	  is	  not	  as	  important	  as	  an	  overall	  
compassionate	   philosophical	   and	   logical	   (in	   my	   expanded	   sense	   of	   logic)	   framework	   that	  
addresses	   issues	   in	   all	   of	   them.	   This	   means	   paying	   attention	   to	   weaknesses	   in	   such	   widely	  
accepted	   theories	   as	   those	   of	   Wheeler	   and	   Tegmark	   in	   cosmology;	   Maturana	   and	   Varela	   in	  
systems	  and	  biology;	  and	  Peirce	  and	  his	  followers	  in	  philosophy	  and	  (still	  standard)	  logic.	  
	  
All	   contributions	   are	   welcome.	   The	   future	   will	   tell	   us	   what	   are	   the	  
most	  fruitful.	  
	  
These	  areas	  need	  to	  grock	  affect	  and	  the	  affective	  ways	  of	  knowing.	  
	  
They	  are	  all	  excessively	  mechanistic.	  
	  
	  
